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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
UCA § 78-2a-3(2)(j) confers jurisdiction on this Court to decide this appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court err in apparently finding that the jury 
intended to award Mrs. Haase only 30% of its $820,000 damage award for 
the hospital's negligence? 
This is a question of fact to be reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" 
standard. Young v. Young. 979 P.2d 338, 342 (Utah 1999); Rule 52(a), URCP. 
Under this standard, the appellant must prove the district court's apparent finding 
is "against the clear weight of the evidence". State in Interest of JRT v. 
Timperly.750 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah App., 1988). 
2. Did the district court fail to follow Utah law in refusing to 
effectuate the jury's true intent to award Mrs. Haase $820,000 for the 
hospital's negligence? 
This is a question of law, reviewable for "correctness." This Court need give 
no deference to the district court's ruling. Bishop v. GenTec. 48 P.3d 281 (Utah 
2002); Moulton v. Staats. 27 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 1933). 
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ISSUES SOUGHT TO BE PRESERVED 
The hospital has filed a cross appeal seeking a new trial due to what it 
contends were errors in evidentiary rulings by the trial court. Mrs. Haase 
opposes remand for retrial. (See Arguments VI and VII, infra at pp. 31-35). 
However, in the event this Court is inclined to order a new trial, she wishes to 
preserve her right to appellate review of several evidentiary rulings which were 
unfavorable to her. Issues raised by those unfavorable rulings include these: 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the jury to 
consider authenticated medical records of the surgeon's treatment in 
a Dayspring Drug Addiction Treatment Program when those records 
were offered to rebut the hospital's claim it did not know the surgeon 
had a substance abuse problem and neither requested nor required 
him to submit to substance abuse treatment?1 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to permit the brief 
factual testimony of Dr. Raymond Middleton to be presented to the 
jury either via live telephonic examination or by the reading of his 
deposition transcript when, at the time of trial, Dr. Middleton was 
retired, living in St. George, and unable without hardship to appear 
personally at trial in Vernal? 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to permit two Salt 
Lake physicians who had treated the surgeon for drug and/or 
1
 At least 5 separate entries in this chart indicate the surgeon had been 
sent for treatment there by the hospital. The surgeon's treatment occurred just 6 
months before he operated on Mrs. Haase. Witnesses who were not allowed to 
testify at trial (Drs. Collins and Burgoyne) would have testified the surgeon failed 
to submit to the recommended out-patient treatment following his discharge. 
-2-
emotional problems prior to his surgery on Mrs. Haase (Drs. Collins 
and Burgoyne) to testify at trial via telephone? 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to permit the brief 
testimony of fact witness Bryan Gibby to be presented to the jury via 
live telephonic examination when, at the time of trial, Mr. Gibby (a 
physical therapist who had worked with the surgeon in Vernal) was 
living in Illinois and could not appear personally at trial in Vernal 
without great hardship on himself and his family? 
5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in precluding the introduction of 
evidence that the hospital was owned by Columbia/HCA and 
precluding any reference to the hospital at trial by its true name, 
Columbia/HCA Ashley Valley Medical Center? 
6. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the jury to 
consider any portion of the videotaped deposition testimony of Dr. 
Robert Dunn, an orthopedic surgery expert from New Jersey? 
7. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the jury to 
be informed that, at the hospital's request, the surgeon had submitted 
to several drug screen tests near the time of his surgery on Mrs. 
Haase and that the hospital was unable and/or unwilling to produce 
the results of those tests? 
8. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding that a statutory 
peer review privilege precluded Mrs. Haase's introduction of 
substantial evidence and testimony against the hospital, even though 
the individual who was the subject of the alleged peer review was, at 
the time of trial, deceased? 
9. Did the trial court err in refusing to allow the jury to consider an 
assessment of punitive damages against the hospital when the 
hospital's own expert testified that permitting an uncredentialed 
surgeon to operate on patients would constitute reckless conduct? 
Mrs. Haase defers her briefing of these issues to the submission she will file 
in response to the hospital's cross-appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2 
This is an appeal from the trial court's refusal to enter judgment in the 
amount of $820,000, as supported by the jury's post-verdict affidavits and in-court 
declarations. 
Mrs. Haase sued the hospital for negligently credentialing and retaining a 
dangerously impaired orthopedic surgeon who caused her serious permanent 
injury by severing her patellar tendon during a questionable surgery to repair a 
minimally displaced tibial plateau fracture. ( R. 3-10). The surgical error and 
injury occurred six years before Mrs. Haase's case against the hospital came to 
trial. ( R. 3-10). Mrs. Haase's claim against the surgeon was settled three years 
earlier. ( R. 895-899). That settlement occurred some fifteen months after the 
surgeon had died. Terms of the settlement were confidential but included 
express provision that Mrs. Haase would be free to pursue her claim against the 
hospital. ( R. 895-899, 1170-1173). 
Prior to trial, Mrs. Haase's counsel filed a formal motion in limine seeking 
clarification as to how the trial court intended to handle the matter of Mrs. Haase's 
prior settlement with the surgeon's estate. Counsel also included the matter in a 
2
 All references to the district court record shall be cited as "R. " 
Plaintiff Lori Haase shall be referred to as "Mrs. Haase." Defendant Ashley 
Valley Medical Center shall be referred to as "the hospital." 
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proposed agendum of legal issues he hoped would be addressed before trial.3 
(R. 934-940). 
Despite counsel's effort, the issue was not resolved prior to trial. However, 
the court did instruct the jury that the surgeon's negligence "is not at issue in this 
trial. This trial is about what happened before the surgery." ( R. 982; R. 1358 at 
p.4). A few weeks before trial, the hospital decided not to contest the 
surgeon's negligence and asked the court to declare the surgeon's negligence to 
be an established fact. The court honored that request. ( R. 796-810; 1162). 
After both sides had rested, the court reviewed proposed jury instructions 
with counsel in chambers. During this session, which was not "on the record," 
counsel debated one another's proposed jury instructions, with the court selecting 
those instructions it felt were appropriate. The form of the special verdict was 
also discussed. The special verdict form submitted on behalf of Mrs. Haase did 
not ask the jury to apportion fault between the hospital and the surgeon. ( R. 
857-859; Exhibit 3, attached). Significantly, neither did the one submitted on 
3
 That proposed agendum was delivered to the court and the hospital's 
counsel two days before trial. Of the 17 issues it asked to be considered, only 
one is entirely capitalized: The one dealing with whether the fault of the surgeon 
should be apportioned with that of the hospital. ( R. 936). 
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behalf of the hospital. (See Exhibit 2, attached)4. The parties' disagreement 
over the special verdict had nothing to do with apportionment of fault. Rather, it 
concerned the hospital's contention that in order to find for Mrs. Haase, the jury 
should have to find specifically that the surgeon was "physically impaired at the 
time he operated on Lori Haase". The court brought the debate to an end 
without indicating which of the parties' proposed special verdict forms it would 
employ. It dismissed counsel for a brief lunch break with the indication that the 
reading of jury instructions would occur immediately after the lunch break, 
followed by closing arguments. 
Following the lunch break, the court read its jury instructions to the jury and 
for the first time revealed to counsel the special verdict form it intended to use, 
which it apparently had created on its own during the lunch break. That form 
contained a blank for the surgeon's percent of negligence. Counsel were neither 
asked nor permitted to comment on the court's special verdict form prior to its 
being presented to the jury. They had no opportunity even to see it until shortly 
before it was read to the jury. 
4
 The Eighth District Court Clerk has no record of a special verdict form 
having been filed by the hospital. However, plaintiff's counsel received a 
proposed special verdict form from the hospital's counsel shortly before trial along 
with the hospital's proposed 27 jury instructions. It is appended hereto as Exhibit 
2. 
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The jury received no instruction concerning comparative negligence or 
apportionment of fault. ( R. 1006-1053). The jury also received no instruction 
explaining the impact of apportionment of fault decisions on the actual amount of 
the damage award Mrs. Haase would receive. ( R. 1006-1053). Neither party 
had requested any such instructions prior to trial. Mrs. Haase had not requested 
any because she had consistently contended, for a variety of reasons, that the 
jury should not be asked to apportion fault between the surgeon and the hospital. 
( R. 943-959). Again, neither counsel knew that the court had decided to ask the 
jury to apportion fault between the hospital and the surgeon until the court 
presented its own special verdict form to the jury shortly before closing arguments 
were delivered. 
The 48 instructions given by the court contain no guidance or standards as 
to how the surgeon's negligence should be "deliberated". They do not even 
discuss or mention the surgeon's negligence. The only reference to physician 
negligence appears in Instruction No. 24 which merely states: 
A physician's negligence does not raise a presumption 
that the hospital was negligent in granting the physician 
privileges. 
( R. 1030). Again, the court instructed the jury at the beginning of the trial that 
the surgeon's negligence was not at issue. ( R. 982,1358 at p. 4). 
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During its deliberations, the jury sent out a note to the court requesting 
clarification of its task in assessing damages. ( R. 1005). Although this was an 
occasion for the court to allow counsel to help dispel any misunderstanding the 
jury may have had due to an absence of apportionment instructions, the court did 
not contact counsel. Rather, it returned a terse note to the jury undertaking to 
answer its question. ( R. 1005; Exhibit 6, attached). It is apparent that the 
seven-word response did not satisfactorily clarify the matter for the jury. In the 
end, the jurors were left to their own assumptions based on what they 
understood. (R.1058-59 ; Exhibit 8, attached, at pp. 1-2). 
The jury foreman signed the special verdict form. It contains an award of 
$820,000 in damages5. It also lists fault at 30% for the hospital and 70% for the 
surgeon. (R. 1054-1055). 
The verdict was returned at approximately 11:00 p.m. The court invited the 
jurors to go home and suggested that if counsel wanted to ask them questions, 
they could do so the next day. ( R. 1357 at p. 8; Exhibit 6, attached). The next 
5
 During the trial, four witnesses testified concerning Mrs. Haase's general 
damages: Mrs. Haase's mother and two daughters and Mrs. Haase herself. Two 
expert witnesses testified as to special damages: Rehabilitation Specialist/Life 
Care Planner Helen Woodard and Economist Patricia Pacey, Ph.D. Dr. Pacey 
testified that based on Ms. Woodard's finding and her own calculations, Mrs. 
Haase's special damages were at least $1,241,900 (Trial Transcript Vol. IV, 618-
652). The hospital offered no rebuttal evidence or witnesses on damages. 
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morning, Mrs. Haase's counsel discovered from his juror interviews that the 
special verdict form as interpreted by the court did not reflect the jury's true intent. 
Seven of the eight jurors indicated without equivocation that they intended to 
award Mrs. Haase the full $820,000 for the hospital's negligence. ( R. 1058-
1067 and 1108-1109; Exhibit 6, attached). The eighth juror indicated she had 
agreed during deliberations to go along with the others but she declined to sign 
an affidavit reflecting her intentions or understanding. Affidavits were prepared, 
signed and filed with the court. ( R. 1056 -1081 and 1108 -1109; See Exhibit "6", 
attached). 
After considering the affidavits, the trial court ordered that the jury be re-
convened six weeks after the trial. ( R. 1138-1139). At that time, the jurors 
were asked to respond to questions. One of the questions put to the jurors was 
this: 
"Was it your intent to award Mrs. Haase the total 
sum of $820,000 for injuries sustained by her as a 
result of the hospital's negligence"? 
( R. 1358 at p. 17; See Exhibit "5", attached at p. 17). Six of the seven jurors 
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present6 responded in the affirmative. ( R. 1358 at pp. 17-19; See Exhibit "5", 
attached at pp. 17-19; See and hear also actual videotape of hearing for proof as 
to the number of affirmative responses, including Mr. Labrum's). 
Another question posed to the jurors was: 
"Was it your intent to award Mrs. Haase only 
$246,000 for the damages she sustained as a result 
of the hospital's negligence? 
( R. 1358; Exhibit 5, attached, P.19, lines 1-18). The same six jurors again 
responded "no" (Id. at lines 22-25). 
Finally, the six jurors who had responded with clarity to that question were 
posed this question: 
Hearing what you have heard now from the Court about 
the $246,00 judgment, did you inaccurately record on 
the special verdict form your actual intent? 
( R. 1358; Exhibit 5, attached at p. 24, lines 5-7) (Emphasis added). The record 
clearly reflects six individual affirmative responses to this question. ( R. 1358 at pp. 
24-25;Exhibit 5, attached at pp. 24-25; Also, see and hear actual videotape of 
proceeding). 
6
 One of the jurors (Becky Solomon) was absent when the jury was re-
convened and the eighth juror was not asked the question, having declined 
earlier to sign an affidavit but having indicated her agreement to "go along with 
the others". (See paragraph 4 of Affidavit of Frank J. Falk, 8th affidavit included in 
Exhibit "8", Exhibit "5", attached at pp. 17-19; see also Exhibit "9", attached). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The jury intended to award Mrs. Haase $820,000 for the hospital's negligence. 
Jurors made that intent clear in the affidavits they signed on the day following trial 
and in their declarations in open court when they were re-impaneled some six weeks 
later. Under Utah law, the jury's intent is to be carried into effect. 
If the trial court genuinely believed the jury did not intend to award Mrs. Haase 
the full $820,000 for the hospital's negligence, its belief was clearly erroneous and 
against the clear weight of evidence. If the trial court did not so believe, it erred as 
a matter of law in substituting its own judgment for the jury's. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
UNDER CONTROLLING UTAH CASE LAW, THE 
JURY'S TRUE INTENT GOVERNS AS TO THE 
DAMAGES MRS. HAASE IS TO RECEIVE FOR 
THE HOSPITAL'S NEGLIGENCE. 
It is well-established law that a court should enter judgment based on the 
actual intent of a jury in rendering its verdict. See 75B Am.Jur.2d, Trial §1789. If the 
verdict form completed by the jury does not accurately "reflect the jury's intent, the 
trial court may amend or modify the verdict to conform to the jury's intent and enter 
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judgment accordingly". Moulton v. Staats. 27 P.2d 455,459 (Utah 1933). See also, 
e.g., Eastridge Development Co. v. Halpert Associates. 853 F.2d 722,783 (10th Cir. 
1988); Fried v. MCGrath. 135 F.2d 833,834 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Newport Fisherman's 
Supply Co.. Inc. v. Derecktor. 569 A.2d 1051.1053 (R.I. 1990): Drop Anchor Realty 
Trustv. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.. 496 A.2d 339,346 (N.H. 1985); Umphrevv.Sprinkel. 
682 P.2d 1247, 1255 (Idaho 1983). Entry of a judgment based on a verdict which 
does not accurately reflect the jury's intent undermines the public's confidence in the 
judicial system and frustrates the interests of justice. 
The affidavits seven of the eight jurors signed on the day following the 
announcement of their verdict clarifies the verdict and explains the jurors' true 
intent. That the affidavits should be considered and declared dispositive is 
strongly suggested in our Supreme Court's recent decision in Bishop v. GenTec: 
We disagree with the trial judge's characterization of the 
substance of the motion and conclude. ..that the affidavits 
were admissible, and that the jury verdict should be 
amended to reflect the true intent of the jury. 
* * * * 
"[l]n this broad approach to correctibility under Rule 60(a), 
it matters little whether an error was made by the court 
clerk, the jury foreman, counsel, a party, or the judge 
himself, so long as it is clearly a formal error that should 
be corrected in the interest of having judgment, order, or 
other part of the record reflect what was done or 
intended." Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co.. 669 P .2d 
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1201, 1206 (Utah 1983) (quoting Jean F. Rydstrom, 
Annotation, Construction of Rule 60(a) of Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure Authorizing Correction of Clerical Mistakes 
in Judgements. Orders, or other Parts of Record, and 
Errors Therein. 13 A.L.R. Fed. 794 (1972)). 
Prior to the adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
we addressed the issue of whether a trial court could 
correct a jury verdict to reflect the true intent of the jury. In 
Moulton v. Staats. 27 P.2d 455 (Utah 1933), we allowed 
the trial court to correct a jury verdict to reflect the true 
intent of the jury. In Suniland Corp. v. Radcliffe. 576 P.2d 
847 (Utah 1978), Justice Maughan argued that juror 
affidavits were admissible "to demonstrate what verdict 
was actually agreed upon." id. at 850 (Maughan, J., 
dissenting)at 946 n.1. More recently, the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals has also determined that, under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a jury verdict may be 
corrected to reflect the true intent of the jury. See 
Eastridqe Dev. Co. v. Halpert Assocs.. Inc.. 853 F.2d 772, 
783 (10th Cir. 1998). 
Bishop is not arguing in this case that the mistake was a 
judicial error made in rendering the judgment, but rather 
that the error was clerical and was made by the jury in 
"recording the judgment as rendered." We agree that 
accurately recording the intent of the jury in its calculation 
of the damage award constitutes correction of a clerical 
error, not a judicial error. "The distinction between judicial 
error and clerical error. ..depends on whether it was made 
in rendering the judgment or in recording the judgment as 
rendered." Richards v. Siddowav. 471 P.2d 143, 145 
(Utah 1970) (quoting 46 Am.Jur. 2d Judgments § 202). 
Accordingly, the juror affidavits should have been 
admitted. On remand the jury verdict should.be corrected 
to reflect the true intent of the jury by increasing the 
general and special damages to $1,000,000 and 
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$1,067,000 respectively, and then deducting Bishop's 
percentage of fault as required by the LRA. 
Bishop v. GenTec Inc. 48 P.3d 218, (UT 2002). 
A trial court may and should consider evidence which clarifies the jury's true 
intent. Moulton. 27 P.2d at 459. See also, Eastridae Development Co.. 853 F.2d 
at 783. As succinctly noted by our Supreme Court in Moulton: 
The general rule, that statements of jurors will not be received 
to establish their own misconduct, or to impeach their verdict 
agreed on, does not prevent the reception of their evidence as 
to what really was the verdict agreed on, in order to prove that, 
through mistake or otherwise, it has not been correctly 
expressed, as the agreement reached by the jury, and not the 
written paper filed, is the verdict; and a showing that the writing 
is incorrect is not an impeachment of the verdict itself. 
Affidavits of jurors are admissible to show that the verdict, as 
received and entered of record, by reason of a mistake, does 
not embody the true finding of the jury. 
27 P.2d at 459 (citations omitted). 
Utah law on clarification of jury verdicts is consistent with the law of many 
other jurisdictions. That law is organized and summarized in two relevant ALR 
articles: Competency of Juror's Statement or Affidavit to Show That Verdict in Civil 
Case Was Not Correctly Recorded. 18 ALR 3d 1133; Propriety of Reassembling 
Jury to Amend. Correct. Clarify or Otherwise Change a Verdict After Discharge or 
Separation at Conclusion of Civil Case. 19 ALR 5th 622. These two articles 
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(comprising 199 pages of reported cases and analysis) provide support for several 
basic principles recognized by Utah's Supreme Court, including these: 
1) A verdict is what the jury intended; 
2) If a verdict does not express the jury's true intent, clarification or 
correction is appropriate; 
3) Juror affidavits which explain the intended verdict are admissible 
to clarify the verdict; and 
4) Once a jury has been discharged or separated, the jury may be 
reconvened for the limited purpose of explaining or clarifying its 
decision but not to re-deliberate, reconsider the facts, or alter its 
original intent. 
II. 
THE MARSHALED EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE 
TRIAL COURT'S APPARENT FINDING THAT THE 
JURY'S INTENT WAS TO AWARD MRS. HAASE ONLY 
$246,000 FOR THE HOSPITAL'S NEGLIGENCE. 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
The trial court made no express findings and gave no explanation as to why 
it decided to enter judgment in the amount of $246,000 rather than $820,000. Its 
only statement on the record is brief and opaque: 
I recognize there's some confusion in the jury instructions. 
And that responsibility, of course, falls on me but, I'm 
-15-
going to just order the judgment for the $246,000, which is 
the 30% and which probably means you'll want to appeal 
it. And I just have to let it go.7 
( R. 1357 at p. 9 and R. 1358 at p. 27). 
It is apparent, but only apparent, that the trial court found the jurors' true 
intent was to award Mrs. Haase $246,000 for the hospital's negligence.8 (See R. 
1357 at p. 9 and R. 2358 at pp. 27-28). An appellant generally is required to 
marshal evidence supporting the finding of fact in dispute. This requirement "serves 
the important function of reminding litigants and the appellate courts of the broad 
deference owed to the fact finder at trial." State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah 
App. 1990). This Court, however, grants deference only when the disputed finding 
is sufficiently detailed to disclose the evidentiary basis for the court's decision. A trial 
court's decision is afforded no deference when its findings are inadequate. State v. 
Lovegren. 7988 P.2d 767, 771 (Utah App. 1990). This Court has declared: 
There is . . . no need for an appellant to marshal the 
evidence when the findings are so inadequate that they 
cannot be meaningful challenged as factual 
determinations. 
7
 The court went on to speculate on the possibility of a reviewing court 
ordering a new trial and stated its "hope" that a new trial not be ordered, "from the 
point of view its very, very expensive. And I would hate to see the parties go 
through it again". ( R. 1358 at p. 28; Exhibit "5", p. 28). 
8
 It is possible, however, the district court simply decided to substitute its 
own judgment for the jury's. See Argument VI, infra, at pp. 31-34. 
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Rather, appellant can simply argue the legal insufficiency 
of the court's findings as framed. 
Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474, 477-478 (Utah App. 1991). 
Mrs. Haase, therefore, appears to have the option of marshaling evidence 
supporting the district court's assumed finding or challenging the legal sufficiency of 
the ruling as made. Mrs. Haase seeks to avoid further delay and sees no point in 
having the case remanded for an explanation of why the trial court entered judgment 
in the smaller amount. She contends the decision was wrong, whatever its basis, 
and prefers to attack that decision on the record as it exists. She asks this Court 
to determine that the decision was clearly erroneous, an abuse of discretion and 
incorrect as a matter of law, or reversible by whichever standard this Court deems 
applicable. (See Arguments III, VI, infra). 
The Marshaled Evidence 
A. The Percentage and Damage Figures Entered 
on the Special Verdict Form Itself. 
A finding that the jury intended Mrs. Haase to receive only 30% of its $820,000 
damage award may be inferable from the special verdict itself. ( R. 1055). While 
it is not clear the jury understood why it was being asked to assign a percentage to 
the surgeon's negligence or the effect of its doing so, it is clear the jury foreman 
entered 70% beside the surgeon's name and 30% beside the hospital's name. It 
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is also clear the jury assessed damages at $820,000 - $600,000 in special damages 
and $220,000 in general damages. 
B. The Court's Response to the Jury's Mid-Deliberation Question. 
The court may well have based its decision to enter judgment on only 30% of 
the jury's $820,000 damage award on what it perceived to be the clarity of its 
response to the note the jury sent out during its deliberations. The note reads: 
Your Honor, 
In figuring damages, do we figure the percentage of total 
damages, or the whole damage & the court figures the 
percentage that we decide. 
( R. 1005; Exhibit 6, attached). 
The court returned to the jury a seven word response: 
Figure the total value of all damages.9 
( R. 1005; Exhibit 6, attached). 
9
 However, what may have seemed perfectly clear to the trial court may not 
have been clear to the jurors. Neither the question nor the answer referred to the 
surgeon or his negligence or to damages which might be considered attributable 
to the surgeon's negligence. 
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C. Juror Responses to Individual Polling Immediately 
Following the Reading of the Verdict. 
After completing its deliberations, the jury was brought back into the 
courtroom. The court and counsel were present. At that time, the court asked the 
jury foreman to hand the verdict to the bailiff who then delivered it to the court. The 
court then read the verdict aloud. After doing so, the court asked if either counsel 
wanted the court to poll the jurors. Mrs. Haase's counsel responded in the 
affirmative. The court then asked each individual juror if each response to each of 
the questions on the special verdict form reflected his or her verdict. Each 
responded in the affirmative. (R. 1357 at pp.4-7). Arguably, this could be construed 
as reflecting an intent consistent with the court's intent to enter judgment in the 
amount of 30% of the $820,000 damage award.10 
10
 It is significant, however, that the jury had left the courtroom before the 
trial court directed counsel to prepare judgment for 30% of the $820,000 award. 
(R.1357 at pp. 8-9 ). Having been absent when that direction was given, the 
jurors had no opportunity to object or express surprise at the trial court's 
misunderstanding of their intent. 
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D. Isolated Excerpts of Juror Responses to Questions the Court 
Posed to Them When They Were Re-impaneled Six Weeks after 
the Trial. 
When the court re-impaneled the jury on May 2, 2002, it told the jurors: 
We brought you back to determine what you intended 
when you signed your verdict. . . . We are not going to 
ask you to reconsider your verdict. We are not going to 
ask you to deliberate any more. We are only going to 
inquire into what you intended on the night you signed that 
verdict. 
( R. 1358; Transcript of May 2, 2002 proceedings at 2-3; See Exhibit 5, attached). 
The first question the court posed was: "Did your verdict of $820,000 include 
all of the plaintiff's injuries, those caused by Dr. Hawkes as well as those caused by 
Ashley Valley Medical Center?". (R. 1358 at p.5; see Exhibit 5, attached, p.5). The 
court started with the jury foreman, who responded: 
My answer, I believe we were trying to clear up a question 
that we had when we were coming to that judgment on 
that. I don't recall the exact way it was stated to you on 
the (inaudible). 
Id. The court then reviewed with the jurors what had occurred on the night they 
were deliberating as to the note they sent out and the response the court sent back. 
After reviewing those matters, the court returned to the question and this further 
response was given by juror Chat Watt: 
My intention, when I went through it, it was my impression 
that we were going for the whole, the totality for the 
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plaintiff in this case. And the amount that we were coming 
up with was the totality. . . . 
The Court: Okay. . . . Did your 820,000 verdict include 
all of the plaintiffs injuries, those caused by Dr. Hawkes 
as well as those caused by Ashley Valley Medical Center? 
Mr. Watt: It was mine. 
The Court: It was the total $820,000, was her total 
damages? 
Mr. Watt: It is what I thought was the total damage. 
Id. at 7. Although other jurors responded inconsistently with this response and Mr. 
Watt himself later stated an intent and understanding completely contrary to the 
conclusion the court drew from the foregoing response, the district court may have 
inferred from this response that the entire jury intended to award Mrs. Haase only 
$246,000 for the hospital's negligence. 
On pages 10 and 11 of the May 2 transcript, juror Ardith Atwood11, identified 
only as "unidentified woman juror", expressed to the court her understanding of what 
she thought the damage award meant. Although her statements are somewhat 
opaque and indicate she believed it would be up to the judge to decide whether Mrs. 
Haase would receive $820,000 or $246,000 from the hospital, they may support a 
11
 Ms. Atwood was the one juror who declined to sign a post-trial affidavit, 
with the simple indication that she had agreed "to go along with the others" on the 
matter of damages. ( R. 1068-70; See Exhibit 8, attached). 
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conclusion that she believed part of the $820,000 damage award represented what 
Mrs. Haase had already received in settlement from the surgeon.12 
On page 12 of the transcript, the court asked the jurors whether the thought 
ever occurred to them "that the damages to be one hundred percent would have to 
be over two million?". The court apparently intended by this question to mean that 
in order for Mrs. Haase to receive $820,000 for the hospital's negligence they would 
have to have found a total damage award of over two million dollars. Juror Fagnan 
and the "unidentified woman juror" (Ardith Atwood) responded in the negative.13 
Mrs. Haase's counsel has scrutinized the record for other evidence 
supporting a finding that the jurors intended Mrs. Haase to receive only $246,000 
for the hospital's negligence and has found none. 
12
 If that was her view, it was a one-juror minority view. See R. 1056-67; 
1108-09; R. 1358 and Exhibit 9, attached). 
13
 Juror Fagnan went on to explain that she and her fellow jurors 
understood the focus of the case was on the damages resulting from the 
hospital's negligence. She stated: 
When we were deliberating, I don't remember us 
talking about like breaking down this is the harm that 
was caused by the hospital, this is the harm caused by 
the doctor. . . . - because we were focusing on the 
hospital. ( R. 1358 at pp. 9-10; see Exhibit 5, 
attached). 
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III. 
THE INTENT OF THE JURY TO AWARD MRS. 
HAASE $820,000 FOR THE HOSPITAL'S 
NEGLIGENCE IS OVERWHELMINGLY CLEAR FROM 
THE JURORS' MARCH 21 AFFIDAVITS AND MAY 2 
DECLARATIONS IN OPEN COURT. 
On the day following announcement of its verdict, seven of the eight jurors 
signed affidavits. One of the affidavits is written entirely by hand. In it, juror Toni 
Fagnan avers: 
During our deliberations, my fellow jurors and I had a 
question about our award of damages and how our 
"number" would be effected by our apportionment of 
fault between Dr. Hawkes and the hospital. 
Specifically, we didn't know and wanted to know 
whether Lori Haase would get the whole sum we 
arrived at or only a percentage of it. We sent a note 
out to the judge seeking an answer. He wrote back 
suggesting we refer to a particular jury instruction. 
Neither the judge's note nor the jury instruction 
answered our question.... 
/ believed and intended that Lori Haase would get 
the total amount of the number we finally awarded -
$820,000 and I believe my fellow jurors believed and 
intended the same. 
( R. 1058-59; Exhibit 8, attached) (Emphasis added). The other six affidavits are 
identical in form and state: 
Based on my understanding of the information and 
instructions given to us, it was my intention and belief 
that the full amount of the sum awarded in general and 
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special damages - $820,000 would go to the plaintiff, not 
30% of that sum. 
One of the affiants, Chad Watt, deleted the phrase "not 30% of that sum". 
However, his deletion did not alter his clearly stated intent that Mrs. Haase would 
receive the full $820,000 awarded, for the hospital's negligence. ( R. 1358; 
Exhibit 9, pp. 5-6, attached; See also Exhibits 5 and 8). 
Finding the jurors' post-verdict affidavits insufficiently dispositive, the trial 
court ordered the jury re-impaneled for a special hearing on May 2, 2002. At the 
beginning of that hearing, the trial court acknowledged it had instructed the jury 
before the trial started that the negligence of Dr. Hawkes "is not at issue in this 
trial. This trial is about what happened before the surgery". ( R. 1358; Exhibit 
5, attached, p.4 at lines 9-11). After undertaking to ask its own questions of the 
jurors, the court allowed counsel to question the jurors. 
Attached to this brief as Exhibit "9" is an Analysis of Juror Intent based 
on the entire May 2 proceeding and the affidavits which seven of the jurors had 
signed on the day following trial. The eight jurors who decided the case were 
Becky Solomon, Ray Labrum, Roberta Welch, Carrie Murray, Tonie Fagnan, 
Chad Watt, Tracy Cook and Ardith Atwood. Exhibit "9" sets forth a juror-by-
juror analysis based on all the available evidence. 
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During questioning by Mrs. Haase's counsel, one of the jurors, Ray 
Labrum, walked into the courtroom, having arrived at the hearing late. When Mr. 
Labrum entered the courtroom, the court interrupted counsel's questioning of 
individual jurors and immediately directed two questions of its own to Mr. Labrum. 
Without any possibility of being influenced or confused by any questions or 
answers which had preceded his entry into the courtroom, Mr. Labrum responded 
to the court's questions as follows: 
The Court: . . . Did your $820,000 verdict include all of the 
plaintiffs injuries, those caused by Dr. Hawkes as 
well as those caused by Ashley Valley Medical 
Center? 
Mr. Labrum: No. 
The Court: Second question. Was it your intent to award the 
plaintiff $820,000 from Ashley Valley Medical 
Center for injuries sustained by her as a result of 
the hospital's negligence? 
Mr. Labrum: Yes. 
( R. 1358; Exhibit 5, page 18, lines 2-11) (Emphasis added). 
Before Mr. Labrum had entered the courtroom, Mr. Mortensen had posed 
this question to the jurors individually: "Was it your intent to award Mrs. Haase the 
total sum of $820,000 for injuries sustained by her as a result of the hospital's 
negligence?" ( R. 1358; Exhibit 5, p. 17, lines 21-23). (Emphasis added). The 
record shows that at least four of the jurors had individually responded in the 
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affirmative when the questioning was interrupted by the court's acknowledgment 
of Mr. Labrum's late arrival and interruption of the proceeding by its above-quoted 
interrogation of Mr. Labrum. Mr. Mortensen was then allowed to continue. He 
posed this question to the jurors: "Was it your intent to award Mrs. Haase only 
$246,000 for the damages she sustained as a result of the hospital's 
negligence?" ( R. 1358; Exhibit 5 attached, p.19, lines 1-18). As the court then 
acknowledged, six of the seven jurors present responded "No". (Id. at lines 
22-25). 
Finally, Mrs. Haase's counsel was allowed to ask this question of the six 
jurors who had responded with clarity to his prior question: 
Hearing what you have heard now from the court about 
the $246,000 dollar judgment, did you inaccurately 
record on the Special verdict form your actual 
intent? 
(Id. p.24, lines 5-7) (Emphasis added). The record clearly reflects six individual 
affirmative responses to this question. ( R. 1358 at pp. 24-25). 
The clear weight of the evidence supports but one conclusion: The jurors 
intended to award Mrs. Haase $820,000 for the hospital's negligence. 
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IV. 
THE JURY BASED ITS AWARD ON WHAT IT 
THOUGHT THE HOSPITAL OWED, NOT ON 
PRINCIPLES OF APPORTIONMENT OF 
FAULT, ABOUT WHICH IT HAD RECEIVED 
NO INSTRUCTIONS. 
There is no evidence the jury was confused or indecisive about its core 
determinations. Clearly, it concluded from the evidence it heard that the hospital 
was negligent and that its negligence proximately caused significant injury to Mrs. 
Haase. At least seven of the jurors clearly desired and intended that Mrs. Haase 
receive the full $820,000 it awarded, for the hospital's negligence. 
The jury was forced to make its assessment of comparative fault in a virtual 
vacuum. It is strongly apparent the jury considered its apportionment assessment 
essentially irrelevant to its other determinations, including its damage award. 
Two weeks before trial the hospital filed a motion in limine seeking to 
preclude the admission at trial of any evidence of the surgeon's breach of the 
standard of care applicable to him. ( R. 796-8). On page 3 of its supporting 
memorandum, the hospital declared: 
Defendant submits herewith its stipulation that Thomas 
Hawkes, M.D., violated the standards of care for 
orthopedic surgeons in the performance of this 
operation on the plaintiff. 
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( R. 808). The hospital even submitted a formal "Stipulation as to Breach of the 
Standard of Care by Thomas Hawkes, M.D.". ( R. 798-9). Its clear purpose in 
doing so was to preclude the jury from considering the particulars of the 
surgeon's negligence. Though the stipulation was unilateral, the trial court 
accepted and honored it. At the hospital's request, the surgeon's negligence was 
declared to be an established fact. Because of this, no evidence was presented 
to the jury of the surgeon's actual negligence. The jury, therefore, had no direct 
evidence on which to compare the surgeon's fault with the hospital's fault. 
The jurors received no clue why they were asked to apportion fault 
between the hospital and the surgeon nor what the impact of that apportionment 
would be. They were told repeatedly that they were to concern themselves only 
with the hospital's negligence and liability. They listened to a case which from 
beginning to end was about what the hospital did and they decided the case 
against the hospital and against no one else. 
The hospital submitted 27 proposed jury instruction, none of which dealt 
with apportionment of fault, comparative negligence, contributory negligence or 
concurrent causation. (Exhibit 12, attached). Mrs. Haase's proposed instructions 
also did not cover such matters. (Exhibit 13, attached). Her contention from the 
beginning was that the jury should not be asked to compare fault or apportion 
damages between the hospital and the surgeon. 
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The trial court determined on its own to give the jury a special verdict form 
asking it to compare fault. However, the court did not give the jury any 
instructions on comparative negligence or apportionment of fault and did not tell 
the jury what it intended to do with the fault apportionment figures it was being 
asked to enter on its verdict form. The jury, therefore, was in the dark as to 
whether or how its comparative fault figures would impact Mrs. Haase. It had no 
idea that the court intended to enter judgment for only 30% its $820,000 damage 
award. 
As soon as the jury learned (upon being re-impaneled six weeks after the 
trial) that the court intended to enter judgment against the hospital in the amount 
of only $246,000, six of them unequivocally and unreservedly declared that their 
actual intent had been inaccurately recorded on the special verdict form. (R. 
1358 at pp. 24-25; Exhibit 5, attached). 
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V. 
THE ERROR MRS. HAASE SEEKS TO 
CORRECT WAS A "CLERICAL," 
NOT A "JUDICIAL," ERROR. 
Our Supreme Court could not have been clearer when it stated in the 
penultimate paragraph of its recent GenTec decision: 
We agree that accurately recording the intent of the jury 
in its calculations of the damage award constitutes 
correction of a clerical error, not a judicial error. 
Bishop v. GenTec Inc.. 48 P.3d 218; 2002 UT 36, at paragraph 32 (Utah 2002). 
Here, six individual jurors have clearly and unequivocally averred after learning of 
the court's intent to award judgment against the hospital for only $246,000 that 
they had inaccurately recorded on the special verdict form their actual intent. 
(See May 2, 2002 transcript, p. 24, lines 5-7; R. 1358). 
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VI. 
THOUGH JUDICIAL OR ATTORNEY ERROR MAY HAVE 
CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED TO THE DISPARITY 
BETWEEN THE COURT'S AND THE JURY'S 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE JURY'S DAMAGE AWARD, 
THAT DISPARITY OF UNDERSTANDING PROVIDES NO 
BASIS FOR RETRIAL. 
Two questions may arise in the minds of this reviewing Court: 
1. Why did the trial court and the jury not share the same 
understanding of the jury's damage award? and 
2. When the jury's actual intent became known, why did the trial court 
not follow it? 
These questions will be considered in reverse order. 
The trial court may well have declined to enter judgment on the full amount 
of the jury's damage award based on its own belief that the jury's award was too 
high. However, no motion for Remittitur was filed, briefed or argued and the court 
made no effort to consider Remittitur sua sponte. The trial court never expressed 
a view that the jury's award was excessive, nor did the hospital ever contend 
such. The record is devoid of any contention that Mrs. Haase does not deserve 
to receive $820,000 for the hospital's negligence. 
The difference between the jury's and the court's understanding of the 
jury's damage award probably arises from the fact that the jury was given no 
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instructions on comparative negligence or apportionment of fault. The jury was 
repeatedly told and understood that Dr. Hawkes was not on trial and his 
negligence was not at issue. (R. 982; 1358 at p. 4; See also Exhibit 5, p. 4). 
Moreover, the hospital had actually conceded the surgeon's negligence prior to 
trial, wanting to preclude the introduction at trial of direct evidence of the 
egregiousness of the surgeon's errors. Since the surgeon's negligence was not 
at issue during the trial, the jury was without substantive basis to compare the 
surgeon's negligence with the hospital's. 
The trial court fashioned its own special verdict form at the conclusion of 
trial after rejecting the special verdict forms proposed by counsel for both sides. 
Counsel had no input into the creation of the special verdict form the court chose 
to employ, was not invited to comment on it and was given no opportunity to 
submit additional instructions to explain the apportionment issues which the 
court's special verdict form necessarily created. 
The special verdict form adopted by the court appears to have been taken 
from one of the MUJI comparative fault special verdict forms. Unfortunately, 
none of those forms was designed for a case in which fault is being apportioned 
between a named defendant and a non party. Confusion might have been 
avoided or lessened by adding a clarifying phrase to Question No. 4 on the 
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special verdict form. For example, Question No. 4 may have avoided 
misunderstanding if it had stated: 
State the amount of special and general damages 
sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate result of both 
the hospital's and Dr. Hawkes' negligence, combined. 
MUJI's proposed comparative negligence instruction for multiple defendant 
cases may well have provided the clarity jurors sought. It may have been helpful 
for the jurors to have been told something like this: 
The total special and general damages sustained by the 
plaintiff may have been the proximate result of the 
negligence of Ashley Valley Medical Center or the 
negligence of Dr. Thomas Hawkes or the negligence of 
both of them, combined. Your task is to compute the 
total damages sustained by Mrs. Haase which were 
proximately caused by the negligence of either or both 
of the parties named in Question No. 3, above. The 
result will be that the Court will then award as damages 
to Mrs. Haase in this case the percentage of that total 
damage figure which is attributable to the hospital's 
percentage of negligence. For example, if you find the 
hospital's negligence to be 30%, then the plaintiffs 
recovery will be reduced by 70%. In other words, the 
plaintiff will receive only 30% of the total damage figure 
you list in response to Question No. 4 on the Special 
verdict form. 
That the jury was not adequately instructed on matters of comparative 
negligence and apportionment of fault may be regrettable. However, that 
provides inadequate basis for ordering a new trial. Having been told the 
surgeon's negligence was not at issue, having been given no clear basis for 
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apportioning negligence between the surgeon and the hospital, and having been 
given no clue as to how, if at all, its comparison of fault percentages would impact 
Mrs. Haase's actual recovery from the hospital, the jury made its decision based 
on the evidence before it, and what it understood its duty to be. At this point, its 
intent and desire for Mrs. Haase to receive $820,000 for the hospital's negligence 
is clear and should be carried into effect. 
VII. 
REMANDING FOR A NEW TRIAL WOULD PENALIZE 
A NON-ERRING PREVAILING PARTY AND WASTE 
COURT AND LITIGANT RESOURCES. 
Mrs. Haase's case against the hospital did not go to trial until six years 
after she was injured by the surgeon from whom the hospital failed to protect her. 
The trial lasted nine days. After both sitting Eighth District Court judges recused 
themselves, a senior judge from Davis County was brought in to preside over the 
case. The attorneys for both sides were from Salt Lake. They and the judge 
spent the two weeks the trial lasted living out of Vernal area motels. So too did 
Mrs. Haase and her family, who had moved to Bakersfield, California, several 
years earlier. Their return to Vernal for trial caused them considerable 
inconvenience and expense, which they could ill afford. Expert witnesses 
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traveled to Vernal from Washington, Wisconsin and Colorado, at considerable 
expense to the parties. Other expert and fact witnesses testified by videotape, 
which itself involved unusual expense. Two witnesses testified by telephone, one 
of whom was a veteran, 86 year-old surgeon from Southern California who would 
have had difficulty physically coping with the significant elevation in altitude, had 
he been required to appear in person. 
Mrs. Haase's out-of-pocket expenses incident to the trial exceeded $35,000. 
If the case were remanded for a new trial, those expenses would have to be 
duplicated, as would the expenses incurred by the hospital and Utah's court system. 
Justice would be ill-served by the duplication of such expense. Remanding the case 
for a new trial would have the effect of significantly punishing the innocent prevailing 
party. Mrs. Haase committed no errors warranting a new trial. She cannot be 
faulted for the court's failure to give the jury adequate instructions and information 
concerning apportionment of fault, nor can she be faulted for the jury's not sharing 
the court's intent and understanding of the impact of the apportionment figures on 
the damage award. 
Likewise, the jury did nothing wrong. It had ample evidence on which to 
determine the hospital's negligence and to determine the damages flowing from 
such negligence. It did so. It is clear the jury intended to award Mrs. Haase 
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$820,000 for the hospital's negligence. Its intent should be carried into effect without 
further delay. 
To rule otherwise would be to punish Mrs. Haase for misunderstandings she 
did not create and which, by the clear weight of evidence, the jurors' post-trial 
declarations resolve. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
As a matter of law and sound policy, the jury's intent should be carried into 
effect. In this case, the jury's true intent was to award Ms. Haase $820,000 for the 
hospital's negligence. The jury was not informed why it was being asked to 
compare the surgeon's negligence with the hospital's nor how Mrs. Haase would be 
impacted by the fault percentages they entered on the verdict form. The jurors 
cannot be faulted for not sharing the court's understanding of their intent. 
Regardless of the reasons for the misunderstanding, the juror's actual intent as 
revealed in their post-trial declarations should govern. 
Mrs. Haase requests this Court to reverse the trial court's decision to enter 
judgment on only 30% of the jury's $820,000 damage award and to instruct the trial 
court to enter judgment in favor of Mrs. Haase against the hospital in the amount of 
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$820,000, plus taxable costs of $4,570.19. Mrs. Haase also requests interest on the 
award at the prejudgment legal rate of 10% per annum. 
Respectfully submitted this A)*'day of November, 2002. 
Wfc^£> 
Morterysen 
Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
-37-
ADDENDUM EXHIBITS 
1. June 24, 2002 Amended Judgment on Verdict. 
2. The Hospital's Proposed Special Verdict Form. 
3. Mrs. Haase's Proposed Special Verdict Form. 
4. Jury Instructions given to jury at conclusion of trial. 
5. Transcript of May 2, 2002 hearing upon re-impaneling of jury. 
6. 3-20-02 note from Jury to Judge, with Judge's one sentence 
response. 
7. Special Verdict Form completed by jury following deliberations. 
8. Post-trial Affidavits submitted in support of entry of $820,000 
judgment against Ashley Valley Medical Center. 
9. Analysis of Juror Intent. 
10. District Court's April 2, 2002 "Preliminary Jury Verdict Ruling". 
11. Utah Supreme Court's March 29, 2002 Opinion in Bishop v. GenTec. 
lnc..48P.3d218(UT2002). 
12. The Hospital's Proposed Jury Instructions. 
13. Mrs. Haase's Proposed Jury Instructions. 
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EXHIBIT 1 
°epury 
Douglas G. Mortensen, USB #2329 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C. 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone (801)363-2244 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LORI HAASE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER 
AND COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY 
MEDICAL CENTER, AND JOHN DOE 
DEFENDANTS 1 THROUGH 10 
Defendants. 
AMENDED 
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT 
Civil No. 98-0800377 
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
Based upon the answers provided in the jury's special verdict form and on this 
Court's Ruling on Motion to Accept Costs and Disbursements: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff Lori 
Haase be and the same is hereby granted judgment against Ashley Valley Medical 
Center in the amount of Two Hundred Forty Six Thousand Dollars (3246,000.00), plus 
plaintiff's taxable costs incurred herein in the amount of Four Thousand Five Hundred 
Seventy Dollars Nineteen Cents ($4,570.19) for a total judgment of Two Hundred Fifty 
Thousand Five Hundred Seventy Dollars Nineteen Cents ($250,570.19) which 
judgment shall bear interest at the judgment rate of 4.28% per annum from May 7, 
2002, the date of this Court's original Judgment on Verdict herein. 
DATED this / 7 day of June, 2002. 
BYTHE£OURT: 
^ouglast^Gtfrnaby' District Court Juck^ e 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
obert R. Harrison > 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
in 
I certify that on the / r day of June, 2002 I caused to be served via the method 
indicated a copy of the foregoing to the following: 
Robert R. Harrison 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, 11 th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby 
Eighth District Court Judge 
3612 North 2900 East 
Layton, UT 84040 
D 
D 
• 
• 
/ 
• 
D 
D 
/* 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile - 363-0400 
Hand-Delivered 
Federal Express 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
Hand-Delivered 
Federal Express 
,<"\ 
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EXHIBIT 2 
EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTS 
From the Desk of: 
Michelle Thomas 
Deputy Court Clerk 
920 East Hwy. 40 
Vernal, UT 84078 
(435) 781-9307 Phone 
(435) 789-0564 Fax 
Facsimile Transmittal Sheet 
Date: July 23, 2002 Total Number of Pages (Including Cover Sheet): 4 
To: Frank Faulk Company Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson, 
P.C 
Phone: Fax: 801-363-2261 
Comments: Following is the Plaintiffs "Special Verdict Form" you requested. It was only 
"Received" into the file. It was received on March 4, 2002. It does not have a 
"FILED" date on it because this type of document is not "FILED" until signed. 
There is no record of a "Special Verdict Form" filed by the Defendant. 
There is no record in the file that the Plaintiffs or Defendant's "Proposed Jury 
Instructions" were ever filed. 
Please feel free to call me at the number listed above if you need further 
information. 
Please remit $3.00 for the cost of the fax. Thank you. 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LORIHAASE, 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. No. 98-0800377 
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER, Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
Defendant. 
We, the jurors empaneled in the above-entitled case, answer the questions put to us as 
follows: 
1. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Thomas Hawkes was 
physically impaired at the time he operated on Lori Haase? 
Yes 
No 
If you answered question number 1 "no" then do not answer the 
following questions. Have your foreperson sign the verdict and return to 
the courtroom. 
2. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Thomas Hawkes' physical 
impairment was a proximate cause of injury to Lori Haase? 
Yes 
No 
If you answered question number 2 "no" then do not answer the 
remaining questions. Have your foreperson sign the verdict and return 
to the courtroom. 
3. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Ashley Valley Medical Center, 
through its administrators, knew or should have known that Dr. Thomas Hawkes was physically 
impaired at the time he operated on Lori Haase? 
Yes 
No 
If you answered question number 3 "no" then do not answer the 
remaining questions. Have your foreperson sign the verdict and return 
to the courtroom. 
4. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Ashley Valley Medical Center, 
acting through its administrators, was negligent in not restricting Dr. Hawkes' operating privileges at 
the time he operated on Lori Haase? 
Yes 
No 
If, and only if, you answered questions numbered 1 through 4 
"yes," then answer the following question. 
-2-
5. What sum of money do you find from a preponderance of the evidence will fairly and 
adequately compensate Lori Haase for her injuries: 
Special damages $ 
General damages $ 
TOTAL $ 
DATED this day of February, 2002. 
Jury Foreperson 
N:\10749\l 51\MN\SPECVERD.DWS 
-3-
ROBERT R. HARRISON (A7878) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Ashley Valley Medical Center 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LORI HAASE, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER 
and COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY 
MEDICAL CENTER and JOHN DOE 
DEFENDANTS 1 THROUGH 10, 
Defendants. 
Pursuant to Rule 4-502, Code of Judicial Administration, Robert R Harrison of Snow, 
Chnstensen & Martineau, attorneys for Defendant Ashley Valley Medical Center, hereby certifies 
that he served upon all counsel of record the following 
i 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL 
VERDICT and SPECIAL VERDICT. 
No. 98-0800377 
Judge Boyd Bunnell 
DATED this / day of March, 2002. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Robert R. Harrison 
Attorneys for Defendants 
-2-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I state that I am employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
attorneys for defendants herein; that I served the attached CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (Case 
Number 98-0800377, Eighth Judicial District Court in and for Uintah County) upon the parties 
listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Douglas G. Mortensen 
Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby (Original and one copy) 
3612 North 2900 East 
Layton, Utah 84040 
and causing the same to be hand delivered on the / day of March, 2002 / 
• * 
N:\10749\151\CERTSERV.WPD 
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Tab 3 
EXHIBIT 3 
EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTS 
From the Desk of: 
Michelle Thomas 
Deputy Court Clerk 
920 East Hwy. 40 
Vernal, UT 84078 
(435) 781-9307 Phone 
(435) 789-0564 Fax 
Facsimile Transmittal Sheet 
Date: July 23, 2002 Total Number of Pages (Including Cover Sheet) 4 
To: Frank Faulk Company Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson, 
P.C 
Phone: Fax: 801-363-2261 
Comments: Following is the Plaintiffs "Special Verdict Form" you requested. It was only 
•'Received" into the file. It was received on March 4, 2002. It does not have a 
"FILED" date on it because this type of document is not "FILED" until signed. 
There is no record of a "Special Verdict Form" filed by the Defendant. 
There is no record in the file that the Plaintiffs or Defendant's "Proposed Jury 
Instructions" were ever filed. 
Please feel free to call me at the number listed above if you need further 
information. 
Please remit $3.00 for the cost of the fax. Thank you. 
JUL-23-2002 IUt u*:<rc rn vuinm. om uw, w W . 
Douglas G. Mortensen, USB #2329 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C. 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone (801)363-2244 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LORI HAASE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY 
MEDICAL CENTER, 
Defendant. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
Civil No. 98-0800377 
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions, in the order presented, based on the jury 
instructions and the evidence presented in this case. If you find the evidence 
preponderates in favor of the issue presented answer "yes". If you find the evidence is 
so equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if 
you find that the evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer "no". 
- ~ . ~ . wwivi inn nu. 400 f03 UDM P 
QUESTION NO. 1: Was the defendant Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center 
negligent in any respect as alleged by the plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO. 2: Was Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center's negligence a 
proximate cause of injury sustained by the plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO. 3: State the amount of special and general damages 
sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate result of the injuries complained of. 
Special Damages (both past and future): $ 
General Damages (both past and future): $ 
QUESTION NO. 4: Do you find this an appropriate case for the assessment of 
punitive or exemplary damages against Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO, 5: If you have answered Question No, 4 "yes", what do you 
find to be an appropriate sum of punitive or exemplary damages against 
Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center? 
$ 
DATED this day of March, 2002. 
Foreperson 
- 2 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the ) day of March, 2002 I caused to be served via the method 
indicated a copy of the foregoing to the following: 
Robert R. Harrison 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, 11 t h Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby 
Eighth District Court Judge 
3612 North 2900 East 
Layton, UT 84040 
• 
» 
• 
• 
/ 
D 
D 
• 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile - 363-0400 
Hand-Delivered 
Federal Express 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
Hand-Delivered 
Federal Express 
o 
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EXHIBIT 4 
INSTRUCTION NO. ' 
It is my duty to instruct you in the law that applies to this case, and it is your duty, as 
jurors, to follow the law as I state it to you, regardless of what you personally believe the law is 
or ought to be. Even if you do not like the laws that must be applied, you must use them. On 
the other hand, it is your exclusive duty to determine the facts in this case, and to consider and 
weigh the evidence for that purpose. Your responsibility must be exercised with sincere 
judgment, sound discretion and honest deliberation. 
INSTRUCTION NO. x 
This case must not be decided for or against anyone because you feel sorry for anyone or 
angry at anyone. It is your sworn duty to decide this case based on the facts and the law, without 
regard to sympathy, passion or prejudice. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
This case must be decided only upon the evidence which you have heard from the 
witnesses, and have seen in the form of documents, photographs or other tangible things admitted 
into evidence. 
Anything you may have seen or heard from any other source may not be considered by you 
in arriving at your verdict. 
You should not consider as evidence any statement of the lawyers made during trial. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
A fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence consists of 
facts or circumstances that give rise to a reasonable inference of the truth of the facts sought to 
be proved. 
INSTRUCTION NO. £ 
Remember, the lawyers are not on trial. Your feelings about them should not influence 
your decision in this case. The lawyers are here to represent the best interests of their clients. It 
is the duty of the lawyer on each side of a case to object when the other side offers evidence which 
the lawyer believes is not admissible. You should not speculate as to the reasons for the 
objections, nor should you allow yourself to become angry at a party because a party's lawyer has 
made objections. 
INSTRUCTION NO. S 
Remember, the lawyers are not on trial. Your feelings about them should not influence 
your decision in this case. The lawyers are here to represent the best interests of their clients. It 
is the duty of the lawyer on each side of a case to object when the other side offers evidence which 
the lawyer believes is not admissible. You should not speculate as to the reasons for the 
objections, nor should you allow yourself to become angry at a party because a party's lawyer has 
made objections. 
INSTRUCTION NO. C 
It has never been my intention to give any hint that you should return one verdict or 
another in this case. Please understand that I do not wish in any way to influence your verdict. 
It would be improper for me to do so. Deciding a proper verdict is exclusively your job. I cannot 
participate in that decision in any way. Please disregard anything that I may have said or done 
if it made you think that I preferred one verdict over another, that I believed one witness over 
another, or that I considered any piece of evidence more important than another. 
You are the exclusive judges of the facts and the evidence. It is your duty to render a just 
verdict based upon the facts and the evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
Your attitude and conduct at the outset of your deliberations is very important. It will not 
be productive for any of you, upon entering the jury room, to make an emphatic expression of 
your opinion on the case, or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When that 
happens, your sense of pride may be aroused and you may hesitate to recede from an announced 
position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates in this 
matter, but are judges. Your deliberations in the jury room are for the ascertainment and 
declaration of the truth and the administration of justice. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ? 
Your verdict must be based solely and exclusively upon the evidence in this case and upon 
the instructions outlining the law as given to you by the Court. You should not be influenced by 
preconceived opinions or prejudices or by sympathy or any other motive except to do justice 
between the parties to this case. You should not allow any sympathy which you may have for the 
Plaintiff to influence you in any degree whatsoever in arriving at your verdict. This does not 
mean that you may not sympathize with the Plaintiff, because it is only natural and human to 
sympathize with persons who have sustained misfortune, but you are instructed that you must not 
permit your feelings of sympathy to influence a fair and impartial consideration of the evidence. 
Further, you are not permitted to base your verdict on speculation, guesswork or 
conjecture, nor upon what you think ought to be the law or the facts in this case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the 
evidence. In judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the witnesses, you have a right 
to take into consideration any biases, any interest in the result, and any motive or lack of motive 
to testify fairly. You may consider the witnesses' conduct while testifying before you, the 
reasonableness of their statements, their apparent frankness or candor, or the want of it, their 
opportunity to know, their ability to understand, and their capacity to remember. You should 
consider these matters you believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses' 
statements. 
INSTRUCTION NO. sc 
If you believe any witness has willfully testified falsely as to any material matter, you may 
disregard the entire testimony of that witness, except as that witness may have been corroborated 
by other credible evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. //_ 
INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS 
You may believe that a witness, on some former occasion, made statements 
inconsistent with that witness' testimony given here in this case. 
That does not necessarily mean that you are required to entirely disregard the 
present testimony. The effect of such evidence upon the credibility of the witness is for 
you to determine. 
INSTRUCTION NO. cz_ 
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY 
In the present action, certain testimony has been read to you by way of 
deposition. You are not to discount this testimony for the sole reason that it comes to 
you in the form of a deposition. It is entitled to the same consideration as if the witness 
had personally appeared. 
INSTRUCTION NO. £_ 
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinions of a witness to be received as 
evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. Witnesses who, by 
education, study and experience, have become expert in some art, science, profession or calling, 
may state opinions as to any such matter in which that witness is qualified as an expert, so long 
as it is material and relevant to the case. You should consider such expert opinion and the 
reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound by such an opinion. Give it the weight you think 
it deserves. If you should decide that the opinions of an expert witness are not based upon 
sufficient education and experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons given in support 
of the opinions are not sound, or that such opinions are outweighed by other evidence, you may 
disregard the opinion entirely. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ,'u 
- * 
An opinion is the expression of a conclusion or judgment which does not purport to be 
based on actual knowledge. In determining whether a panicular statement was a statement of fact 
or merely an expression of opinion, you may consider the surrounding circumstances under which 
it was made, the manner in which the statement was made and the ordinary effect of the words 
used. You may also consider the relationship of the panies and the subject matter with which the 
statement was concerned. 
INSTRUCTION NO. /3T 
OUT OF STATE/TOWN EXPERTS 
The fact that an expert witness resides cr pursues his or her profession in 
another state or community should not effect the weight you give that witnesses' 
testimony. A party may rely upon qualified experts from other states £ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B in 
presenting evidence to the jury. 
INSTRUCTION NO. £ _ 
CONFLICT BETWEEN MEDICAL EXPERTS 
In resolving any conflict that may exist in the testimony of medical experts, you 
may compare and weigh the opinion of one expert against that of another. In doing 
this, you may consider the relative qualifications and credibility of the expert witnesses, 
as well as the reasons for each opinion and the facts and other matters on which 
opinions are based. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ,'7 
Whenever in these instructions it is stated that the burden, or the burden of proof, rests 
upon a certain party to prove a certain allegation made by him, the meaning of such an instruction 
is this: That unless the truth of that allegation is proved by a preponderance of the evidence, you 
shall find that the same is not true. If the evidence is evenly balanced, as to its convincing force 
on any allegation, you must find that such allegation has not been proved. 
INSTRUCTION NO. y 
The term "preponderance of the evidence" means thai evidence which, in your minds, 
seems to be of the greater weight; the most convincing and satisfactory. The preponderance of 
the evidence is not determined by the number of witnesses, nor the amount of the testimony, but 
by the convincing character of the testimony, weighed impartially, fairly and honestly by you. 
If the evidence is evenly balanced as to its convincing force on any allegation, you must find that 
such allegation has not been proved. 
INSTRUCTION NO. / * 
PROXIMATE CAUSE 
A proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and continuous 
sequence, produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred. A 
proximate cause is one which sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury. 
To find "proximate cause," you must first find a cause and effect relationship 
between the negligence and plaintiffs injury. But cause and effect alone is not enough. 
For injuries to be proximately caused by negligence, two other factors must be present: 
1. The negligence must have played a substantial role in causing the 
injuries; and 
2. A reasonable person could foresee that injury could result from the 
negligent behavior. 
INSTRUCTION NO. .Uo 
CONCURRENT PROXIMATE CAUSES 
There may be more than one proximate cause of the same injury. If the 
negligence a person and a corporation combines to produce an injury, and the 
negligence of each of them is a proximate cause of the injury, then the person and the 
corporation must share liability for the resulting injury, in proportion to their individual 
negligence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ; i ' 
A person has a duty to use reasonable care to avoid injuring other people or property. 
"Negligence" simph means the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care doeb not require 
extraordinary caution or exceptional skill. Reasonable care is what an ordinaiy. prudent person 
uses in similar situations. 
The amount of care that L consideied "reasonable" depends on the situation. You must 
decide what a prudent person with similar knowledge would do in a similar situation. 
Negligence may arise in acting or in failing to act. 
A party whose injuries or damages are caused by another party's negligent conduct may 
recover compensation from the negligent party for those injuries or damages. 
INSTRUCTION NO. n 
NEGLIGENCE OF COMMISSION VERSUS OMISSION 
Negligence is of two kinds. The first kind is the doing of something that an 
ordinarily careful and prudent person or, in this case, hospital, would not have done 
under the same or similar circumstances; the second kind is the omission to do 
something than an ordinarily careful and prudent person or, in this case, hospital, would 
have done in the same situation. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 23 
NON NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF 
You are instructed as a matter of law that the plaintiff, Lori Haase, was not 
negligent. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2* 
A physician's negligence does not raise a presumption that the hospital was negligent in 
granting the physician privileges. 
INSTRUCTION NO. S^ 
DUTY OF HOSPITAL TOWARD PATIENT 
It is the duty of a hospital toward a person received as a patient to use 
reasonable care in the selection of both its employees and its staff physicians and 
surgeons and in otherwise providing for the needs of the patient. 
INSTRUCTION NO. £L 
You must determine whether Defendant complied with the standards of care applicable to 
it based upon the information available to it prior to the Plaintiffs surgery, rather than on the 
basis of facts which are revealed by later developments. 
INSTRUCTION NO. JJ 
DUTY OF HOSPITAL TO COMPLY WITH STANDARD OF CARE 
A hospital is required to exercise the same degree of care ordinarily possessed 
and used by other hospitals in good standing. The law requires a hospital to exercise 
the degree of care that other qualified hospitals would ordinarily exercise under the 
same circumstances. 
INSTRUCTION NO. #8 
You are instructed that the hospital has a governing body that is legally 
responsible for the conduct of the hospital as an institution; the governing body of the 
hospital must ensure that the medical staff is accountable to it for the quality of medical 
care provided to patients. The hospital, through its governing body and medical staff, is 
under a duty to exercise reasonable care in granting physicians the privilege to admit 
and treat patients in the hospital based upon the practitioner's competence, training, 
character, experience and judgment; the medical staff has a duty to examine the 
credentials of candidates for medical staff appointment and to make recommendations 
to the governing body on the appointment of candidates; privileges may not be granted 
solely on a practitioner's certification, fellowship or membership in a specialty body or 
society. 
Negligent credentialing on the part of the hospital is the failure of the hospital, 
through its governing body and medical staff, to use reasonable care in granting a 
surgeon the privilege to admit and perform surgery on patients in the hospital; 
"reasonable care" does not require extraordinary caution or exceptional skill. 
Negligence may arise in acting or in failing to act. 
A party whose injuries or damages are caused by another party's negligent 
conduct may recover compensation from the negligent party for those injuries or 
damages. 
INSTRUCTION NO. *P 
VIOLATION OF INDUSTRY STANDARD 
A violation of an industry' standard intended to protect patients from harm is 
evidence of negligence if it is shown that: 
1. The person injured belongs to a class of people the standard intended to 
protect; and 
2. The standard intended to protect against the type of harm which in fact 
occurred as a result of the violation. 
INSTRUCTION NO. Jc 
Hospitals are prevented, by Utah law. from disclosing the contents or substance of 
meetings or documents which are part of the peer review and quality improvement 
process. You must not conclude that the inability to discuss those processes is evidence 
of improper behavior on the part of the hospital. 
INSTRUCTION NO. , / 
The only way you may properly learn the applicable standard of care is through evidence 
presented during this trial by individuals testifying as expert witnesses and through other evidence 
admitted for the purpose of defining the standard of care. 
In deciding whether a hospital properly fulfilled its duties, you are not permitted to use a 
standard derived from your own experience with physicians, hospitals or any other standard of 
your own. 
INSTRUCTION NO. Jx-
CORPORATION ACTS THROUGH ITS AGENTS 
Ashley Valley Medical Center is a corporation and, as such, can act only through 
its officers and employees, and others designated by it as its agents. 
Any act or omission of an officer, employee or agent of a corporation, in the 
performance of the duties or within the scope of the authority of the officer, employee or 
agent, is the act or omission of the corporation. 
INSTRUCTION NO. S3 
SCOPE OF AGENTS AUTHORITY DEFINED 
In order for Ashley Valley Medical Center to be heid responsible for the act or 
acts of one or more of its employees, the act or acts must be within the scope of the 
agent's employment authority either expressed or implied. However, it is not necessary 
that the specific act, or failure to act, be expressly authorized by the employer to bring it 
within the scope of the agent's employment. An act is within the scope of an agent's 
authority if it is done while the agent is doing anything which his or her contract of 
employment expressly or impliedly authorizes him or her to do or which would be 
reasonably incidental to his or her employment. 
INSTRUCTION' NO. ** 
Each licenced hospital in the State of U;ah shall ha\'e s governing body 
called the board. The board is legaih responsible for the conduct oi the hospital. 
The board is also responsible for the appointment of the medical staff. 
INSTRUCTION NO. -~r 
The adrr.irdstr.itor shall function as h;._r J:. letw em :he board, the medical 
staff, the r.ur^ing' stiff and departments o: :l\e hospital. 
INSTRUCTION NO. Jfc 
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICIAN PREDICATED ON NEGLIGENCE 
IN EXTENDING AND/OR CONTINUING STAFF PRIVILEGES 
The law requires a hospital to screen its medical staff to ensure that only 
competent physicians are permitted to treat its patients. If, therefore, you find from the 
evidence that Ashley Valley Medical Center knew or ought to have known that Dr. 
Hawkes' condition or propensities made him a danger to patients and that but for 
Ashley Valley's failure to remove him, failure to adequately monitor and supervise him 
or failure to cease extending him privileges to operate in the hospital Mrs. Haase's 
injury would have not occurred, you must find for the plaintiff against the hospital. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 31 
ROLE OF CUSTOM IN JUDGING BEHAVIOR 
When deciding whether a corporation is negligent, you may consider customs of 
behavior, such as business customs or industry customs, However, following a custom 
does not necessarily mean a corporation exercised ordinary care. It is merely a factor 
you may consider. A custom or standard may be negligent in and of itself. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3$ 
CHARTS AND SUMMARIES 
Certain charts and summaries have been shown to you in order to help explain the facts 
disclosed by the books, records, and other documents which are in evidence in the case. 
However, such charts or summaries are not in and of themselves evidence or proof of any 
facts. If such charts or summaries do not correctly reflect facts or figures shown by the 
evidence in the case, you should disregard them. 
INSTRUCTION NO. j ? 
/— 
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to 
reaching an agreement, if your individual judgment allows such agreement. You each must decide 
the case for yourself, but only after consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. You should 
not hesitate to change an opinion when convinced that it is wrong. However, you should not 
surrender your honest convictions concerning the effect or weight of evidence for the mere 
purpose of returning a verdict or solely because of the opinion of the other jurors. 
INSTRUCTION NO, <& 
It is your duty to make findings of fact as to the questions I will submit to you. In making 
your findings of fact, you should bear in mind that the burden of proving any disputed fact rests 
upon the party claiming the fact to be true, and that fact must be proved by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 
This is a civil action and six members of the jury may find and return a verdict. At least 
six jurors must agree on the answer to each question, but they need not be the same six on each 
question. As soon as six or more of you have agreed on the answer to each question, have the 
verdict signed and dated by your foreperson and then return it to this room. 
INSTRUCTION NO. •»./ 
INTRODUCTORY INSTRUCTION ON DAMAGES 
If you find the issues in favor of Lori Haase and against Ashley Valley Medical 
Center, then it is your duty to award Lori Haase such damages that you find from a 
preponderance of the evidence will fairly and adequately compensate her for the injury 
and damage sustained. 
INSTRUCTION NO. -?2— 
GENERAL DAMAGES 
In awarding such damages, you may consider any pain, discomfort, and 
suffering, both mental and physical, its probable duration and severity, and the extent to 
which the plaintiff has been prevented from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as 
previously enjoyed. You may also consider whether any of the above will, with 
reasonable certainty, continue in the future. If so, you may award such damages as will 
fairly and justly compensate the plaintiff for them. 
No definite standard or method of calculation is prescribed by law to fix 
reasonable compensation for pain and suffering. Nor is the opinion of any witness 
required as to the amount of such reasonable compensation. Furthermore, the 
argument of counsel as to the amount of damages is not evidence of reasonable 
compensation. In making an award for pain and suffering, you shall exercise your 
authority with calm and reasonable judgment and the damages you fix shall be just and 
reasonable in light of the evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. /S 
SPECIAL DAMAGES 
The law also allows you to award special damages. Special damages are those 
that are alleged to have been sustained in reference to the special circumstances of the 
plaintiff. They include the reasonable value of medical and nursing care, both medical 
and non-medical services and supplies and tools reasonably required and actually 
given in the treatment and/or care of the plaintiff and the reasonable value of such 
items that more probably than not will be required and given in the future. 
Special damages also include lost earnings and loss of future earning capacity or 
loss of earning power. 
In awarding such damages, you may consider the reasonable value of working 
time lost to date. In determining this amount, you should consider (1) evidence of the 
plaintiff's earning capacity; (2) earnings; (3) how the plaintiff ordinarily was occupied; 
and (4) what the plaintiff was reasonably likely to have earned in the time lost if the 
plaintiff had not been injured. 
If you find the plaintiff has suffered a loss of earning capacity, you should award 
the present cash value of earning capacity reasonably likely to be lost in the future as a 
result of the injury in question. 
Special damages also include the reasonable value of the loss of employed 
related benefits, such as loss of or reduction in retirement benefits, health benefits, paid 
vacation, employee stock options and savings benefits and the like. 
INSTRUCTION NO. & 
AMOUNT OF DAMAGE NEED NOT BE PROVED WITH PRECISION 
Although an award of damages may not be based only on speculation, some 
degree of uncertainty in the evidence of damages will not relieve a defendant from 
recompensing a wronged plaintiff. As long as there is some rational basis for a damage 
award, it is the wrongdoer who must assume the risk of some uncertainty. Where there 
is evidence of the fact of damage, a defendant may not escape liabiity because the 
amount of damage cannot be proved with precision. The amount of damages may be 
based on approximations if the fact of damage is established and approximations are 
based on reasonable assumptions or projections. 
INSTRUCTION NO. - S~ 
The amount of damages for any loss to be suffered in the future would not be the present 
payment of the total of such damages, but must be discounted to the present cash value of such 
future benefit. Therefore, in determining the present value of any future benefit lost to the 
Plaintiff as a result of the injury, you should calculate the same on the basis that any sum you 
might award will be invested with reasonable wisdom and frugality, and that all of it, except the 
amount currently needed to compensate for the loss sustained, will be kept so invested as to yield 
a rate of return consistent with reasonable security. 
INSTRUCTION NO. */L 
The law forbids you to decide any issue in this case by resorting to chance. If you decide 
that a party is entitled to recover, you may then determine the amount of damages to be awarded. 
It would be unlawful for you to agree in advance to take the independent estimate of each juror, 
then total the estimates, draw an average from the total, and to make the average the amoxmt of 
your award. Each of you may express your own independent judgment as to what the amount 
should be. It is your duty to thoughtfully consider the amounts suggested, test them in the light 
of the law and the evidence and, after due consideration, determine which, if any, of such 
individual estimates is proper. 
INSTRUCTION NO. * 7 
COLLATERAL SOURCE 
Any fact or inference in the evidence that any portion of the damages may have 
been paid by some entity other than the defendant is not to be considered by you to 
diminish any of the damages, if any, to be awarded. 
In awarding such damages, you may consider the reasonable value of medical 
hospital and nursing care, services and supplies reasonably required and actually given 
in the treatment of the plaintiff and the reasonable value of similar items that more 
probably than not will be required and given in the future. 
It is the court's duty following the trial to see that what other damages are 
awarded are allocated or distributed to the party who, by law, is entitled to receive them. 
You are instructed not to concern yourself with such matters. They will be handled by 
the court in due course following trial. This instruction applies with respect to past, 
present and future damages. 
INSTRUCTION NO. / / 
Upon retiring to the jury room you will select one of you to act as foreperson, who will 
preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict to which you agree. The foreperson should 
not dominate the jury, but the foreperson's opinion should be given the same weight as the 
opinions of the other members of the jury. 
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May 2, 2002. Vernal, Utah. 
PROCEEDINGS 
THE COURT: You can be seated. Record can show that 
counsel and the plaintiff and some of the jurors are present. 
Appreciate your being here. 
Let me just check to see those not here. There are 
six jurors out of the eight that are present. We have no idea 
why the other two are not. One would be. Let's see — you are 
Carie Murray. And so Becky Sullivan is absent. And you are 
Chad Watts. And Ardith Atwood. And Roberta Welch. Tracy 
Cook, Toni Fagnan. And Ray Labrum is not here. 
see 
brou 
your 
have 
sign 
just 
not 
the 
sign 
you 
ght 
ve 
si 
th 
so 
sig 
aff 
th 
reconsi 
Appreciate your being here. 
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May 2, 2002. Vernal, Utah. 
PROCEEDINGS 
THE COURT: You can be seated. Record can show that 
counsel and the plaintiff and some of the jurors are present. 
Appreciate your being here. 
Let me just check to see those not here. There are 
six jurors out of the eight that are present. We have no idea 
why the other two are not. One would be. Let!s see — you are 
Carie Murray. And so Becky Sullivan is absent. And you are 
Chad Watts. And Ardith Atwood. And Roberta Welch. Tracy 
Cook, Toni Fagnan. And Ray Labrum is not here. 
Appreciate your being here. 
When we left, we didn't anticipate we were going to 
see you again as jurors. But we appreciate you being here. We 
brought you back to determine what you intended when you signed 
your verdict. You, I think most of you, if not all of you, 
have signed an affidavit. Is there anybody here that didn't 
sign those affidavits? You did not. Okay. Now, let's see, 
just so I get it right, that would be Ardith Atwood. You did 
not sign an affidavit. And the other five of you here did sign 
the affidavits. Okay. Was there any, counsel, that didn't 
sign the affidavits besides Mrs. Atwood? 
MR. MORTENSEN: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. We are not going to ask you to 
reconsider your verdict. We are not going to ask you to 
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deliberate any more. We are only going to inquire into what 
you intended on the night you signed that verdict. Ifm going 
to refer to some things that I have here, however. As we began 
the case, I gave you — first instruction I gave you, there was 
some preliminary jury instructions before the trial started. 
I'm going to quote from a part of that first one. "In this 
case, the plaintiff alleges she was injured by a surgeon during 
an operation he performed in 1996. Her claim against the 
surgeon, Dr. Thomas Hawkes, has been settled. And his 
negligence is not at issue in this trial. This trial is about 
what happened before the surgery." 
There was an instruction more before that, there was 
more after that. And I am repeating again today, that the 
plaintiff has settled her claim with Dr. Hawkes. And so, 
nothing more is going to be received by the plaintiff from Dr. 
Hawkes. The amount of that settlement was never made public 
and probably never will be made public. When you returned your 
verdict, after we determined that was in fact your verdict, do 
you remember I asked you each individual questions about it. 
And then we excused you. And then I told counsel based on the 
verdict that you had told the total negligence between Ashley 
Valley Medical Center and Dr. Hawkes at 100 percent, ask you to 
make the determination of how much or what percentage of each 
of them the negligence was caused by. And your answer was 
70 percent by Dr. Hawkes and 30 percent by Ashley Valley 
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Medical Center. Based on that then, I directed counsel that a 
verdict of 30 percent of the injury should be attributed to the 
hospital, or $246,000, gave them a judgment for that amount. 
When you signed the affidavits, it brought the 
question back up to the court. And rather than just rely upon 
those affidavits, the court directed you to come back in today. 
First question for you, did your verdict of $820,000 
include all of the plaintiff's injuries, those caused by Dr. 
Hawkes as well as those caused by Ashley Valley Medical Center? 
Let me ask first — as I recall, Mr. Watts, you were the 
foreman. Let me just start with you and ask what your answer 
to that is. 
MR. WATTS: My answer, I believe we were trying to 
clear up a question that we had when we were coming to that 
judgment on that. I don't recall the exact way it was stated 
to you on the (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Let me refer to something, if I can. 
MR. WATTS: Okay. 
THE COURT: I have, and, counsel, I think has been 
given a copy of this, haven't you? 
MR. HARP. IS ON: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: About 10 o'clock it was getting late. And 
the court was trying to decide whether we would put it off 
until the next day to finish the deliberations or finish. And 
the jurors chose to finish. But they sent out this question 
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dated March 20th, 2002. "Your Honor, in figuring damages, do 
we figure the percentage of the total damages or the whole 
damages and the court figures the percentage that we decide? 
I added just a simple little thing there. Counsel was 
not present. Counsel was each in their motel waiting for a 
call from the clerk to reassemble. I just added at the bottom, 
"Figure the total value of all damages." 
And now, Ifm sure you didn't know what the results of 
that was going to be. I referred you with that to another 
instruction. And I111 read that instruction. I understand in 
the replies that were given that it was not helpful to you. 
But Ifm going to read it to you anyway. 
"Any fact or inference in the evidence that of portion 
of Mrs. Haasefs damages have been paid by some person or entity 
other than Mrs. Haase is not to be considered by you or used to 
diminish the damage award you make, if any. The fact, if it be 
a fact that any one of the plaintiff's claim that any of the 
plaintiff's claimed expenses or damages were or may be paid by 
some source other than the plaintiff's own funds does not 
affect the plaintiff's right to recover for such expenses or 
damages. It is the court's duty following trial to see what 
other damages are awarded. What other damages awarded or 
allocated or distributed to the party who by law is entitled to 
receive them, you are instructed not to concern yourself with 
such matters. They will be handled by the court in due course 
6 
following trial. This instruction applies with respect to 
past, present and future damages." 
That was the instruction that the court referred you 
to. It was the only one that the court could see would be of 
any help to you to answer that question. Now, I come back to 
the question that I ask you of what you intended. 
MR. WATTS: My intention, when I went through it, it 
was my impression that we were going for the whole, the 
totality for the plaintiff in this case. And the amount that 
we were coming up with was that totality. For (inaudible) . 
THE COURT: Okay. You can stay seated as you answer 
these questions. It will probably be easier for you. Let me 
ask you the question again, because itfs very carefully worded. 
Did your 820,000 verdict include all of the plaintiff's 
injuries, those caused by Dr. Hawkes as well as those caused by 
Ashley Valley Medical Center? It's not the only question we 
may ask you, but that!s the first question. 
MR. WATTS: It was mine. 
THE COURT: It was the total 820,000, was her total 
damages? 
MR. WATTS: It is what I thought was the total damage. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, of the other five jurors 
sitting there, do any of you — did any of you have a different 
understanding? 
MS. MURRAY: Judge — 
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THE COURT: State your namef if you would, 
MS. MURRAY: Carie Murray. I intended her to get that 
much money. 
THE COURT: Now, I'm — let me — 
MS. MURRAY: Okay. 
THE COURT: Let me ask another little question. I'm 
sure that all of you intended she would receive all 820,000. 
That your affidavits' clear on that. That's not quite this 
question though. And there were some things that you didn't 
know that we couldn't tell you. The amount of the settlement 
for Dr. Hawkes we couldn't tell you that. The legal effect was 
that, whatever that sum was, that took care of his 70 percent 
of damages because that was negotiated. So it brings me back 
to the question. Now, go ahead. Finish the explanation that 
you are making. 
MS. MURRAY: Apparently, we should have awarded her 
over $2 million for her to get $820,000. 
THE COURT: That's correct. Where did you get the two 
million figure? That's right. But where did you get it from? 
Did you talk about it that night? 
MS. MURRAY: No. 
from? 
THE COURT: All right. Where did you get the figure 
MS. MURRAY: Well, I figured it out later. 
THE COURT: All right. 
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MS. MURRAY: But I — I — when we finished at night, 
I thought she was going to receive 820,000. So that would be 
the 30 percent of the 2 million, is what I thought. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WATTS: When we --
THE COURT: I'm going to have to have you speak your 
name each time. 
MR. WATTS: When we brought the question to your 
attention, I believe we were trying to come to that, whether we 
needed to not necessarily do the math and try to say that this 
is what the total is, this is what she gets out of it, the 
plaintiff in this case gets out of it. We were trying to 
figure out if what we were given would be the amount which 
would be concerned is that 30 percent without doing the math or 
anything like that. I think that was the intention of the 
question when it was written, as we were discussing it as it 
was being written. 
THE COURT: Anybody else on that answering on that? 
Ifm going back to the original question now. Did the 800 --
did your 820, 000-dollar verdict include all of the plaintiff's 
injuries, those caused by Dr. Hawkes as well as those caused by 
Ashley Valley Medical Center? 
MS. FAGNAN: Toni Fagnan. When we were deliberating, 
I don't remember us talking about like breaking down this is 
the harm that was caused by the hospital, this is the harm that 
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was caused by the doctor. We were just trying — because we 
were focusing on the hospital- And so I don't remember us 
talking about saying okay, the doctor did "X" amount of dollars 
of damage here and the hospital did this- I mean, I think 
that's the question. We weren't talking about the doctor and 
the hospital between ourselves. And I'm still very confused. 
But I — it was a confusing thing. We really struggled with 
it. So it was still just unknown what the damages -- what we 
were figuring. * y * ^^^ 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: I think I felt like we were 
trying to decide what it would, dollar-wise, would cost for her 
to be adequately taken care of the rest of her life, in 
essence. We figured that we thought she should be able to work 
part-time. We didn't think she was totally disabled. We 
thought that it would cost "X" amount of dollars for help for 
her in the house and things we have talked about in her 
testimony. And that's the way we came up with the 820,000. 
But I felt like that she had received part of that through the 
other settlement. I knew that she had had another settlement. 
But I think we were thinking that's what would take care of 
her. And so it wasn't a total thing that we thought — we 
thought she had already received part of it through a 
i 
settlement. 
THE COURT: Okay. The only other question I have on 
it, was the $820,000 intended to be solely from Ashley Valley 
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Medical Center for the injuries she suffered by the hospital's 
negligence? - , 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: Say that again, please. 
THE COURT: Was it your intent to award the plaintiff 
820,000 from Ashley Valley Medical Center for injuries 
sustained by her as a result of the hospital's negligence? 
Now, this question overlaps what you have just been asked. And 
you have all been answering the same question. But you just 
got through answering, Mrs. Atwood, that question. I think she 
said, you intended it to come from two sources. Is that right? 
One settled --
\\c^k <t,L&-^ J^* y^r r Oh 
MS. ATWOOD: She had-already received-^ne—paxt. 
THE COURT: Yes. Anybody else want to comment on it. 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: That was' not my intention. 
My intention was for her to get the $820,000. 
THE COURT: Now, I just have two of you. The other 
four of you want to answer on that? 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: That was my intent. 
THE COURT: Okay. You are --
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: That's what I thought would 
happen. 
THE COURT: — Toni Fagnan. 
MS. FAGNAN: Toni Fagnan. 
THE COURT: You expected 820,000 was going to come 
from the hospital? 
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MS. FAGNAN: That's what I hoped. I hoped because 
there was a question of the percentage. In making that 
verdict, I still didn't know if she would get the 820 or if 
that percentage would come down. So I hoped that she would get 
the whole amount. But I didnft know that she would. That was 
my thinking. 
THE COURT: Did the thought ever occur to you that the 
damages to be 100 percent would have to be over 2 million? 
MS. FAGNAN: For? 
THE COURT: For the hospital to pay that amount. 
MS. FAGNAN: Pardon me? 
THE COURT: For the hospital to pay 820,000. 
MS. FAGNAN: No, that didn't. 
THE COURT: Did that ever occur to anybody? 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: Not until later. 
MS. FAGNAN: No. For me, it was hard to try to think 
in that many zeroes, if you want to know the truth. 
THE COURT: I don't deal in that many zeros either. 
MS. FAGNAN: Very intimidating thing. 
THE COURT: Now, that's all the questions the court 
intends to ask. Now — 
MR. MORTENSEN: Yes, I would ask, first of all, I have 
some questions that each of them be asked to answer those two 
questions. I think just before Miss Fagnan spoke, we didn't 
get the name on the record of the juror seated in the corner 
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who said it 
the hospital 
THE 
MR. 
MS. 
intent. It 
was her intent to award $820,000 to this woman for J 
1 
COURT: Tracy Cook, is that who you are talking? 
HftRRxaOISI: Ttfo. I am talking to Tracy Cook. 
COOK: No, I agreed with Carie. That was my 1 
was for her to get 820,000 from the hospital. I 
didn't realize that she would only get 30 percent of that. 
MR. MORTENSEN: Right. And I saw, when you were 
asking the second question, I saw an affirmative head nod from 
the juror who hasn't yet spoken --
THE 
MR. 
intended to 
negligence. 
MS. 
MR. 
question? 
MS. 
MR. 
supplemental 
COURT: Mrs. Welch. 
MORTENSEN: -- Mrs. Welch, that the $820,000 was 
be solely from Ashley Valley for the hospital's 
That's what I understood. 
WELCH: Yes. 
MORTENSEN: That would be your answer to that 
WELCH: Yes. 
MORTENSEN: Okay. And I believe from the 
answer that Mr. Watts gave, that that 
substantially modifies his first response. The way I 
understood, 
1 t 
th** way he said after the more complete explanation 
was given, that the $820,000, in his mind, was going to be 
construed as the 30 percent of the total damage. I thought 
that's what his answer was the second time he was allowed to 
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speak. 
THE COURT: I don't think that we ought to be 
asking — I don't think thatf at this point, you know, it's 
different. I don't want you to phrase so that he answers, has 
to answer to your positive statement. I just -- if he wants to 
add it differently or state what your intent was, you can go 
ahead and do it, Mr. Watts. 
MR. WATTS: You know, with the other jurors, I never 
went through and figured it would be a 30/70 split. To tell 
you the truth, not having experience in civil, I have 
experience in criminal, but I didn't really understand what the 
70/30 was all about; mostly other than probably trying to -- I 
don't know really what it was about. Because of the fact that 
there was already a settlement reached with Dr. Hawkes that, 
you know, we were -- we were made known there was some kind of 
a settlement, and we had to keep that out of our decision. I 
think, you know, at the time of the trial, at least for me, it 
seemed like the Dr. Hawkes, you know, obviously, the person who 
was an actor in this was not on trial. It was Ashley Valley. 
So my attention was towards Ashley Valley and not towards Dr. 
Hawkes. 
THE COURT: Okay. By the answers of the jurors, the 
court thinks it's bound to direct the judgment as I did before 
for 246,000 or 30 percent. Now, with that having been said, 
counsel, you can ask any questions you want. 
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MR. MORTENSEN: Thank you. I would like to ask each 
of them to respond separately. And I'll start with Miss Welch 
on this end. Did either Mr. Mortensen or Mr. Faulk apply any 
pressure on you to sign the affidavit you signed? 
MS. WELCH: No. 
MR. MORTENSEN: Mrs. Atwood? Well, you didn't sign 
one. 
MS. ATWOOD: I didnft sign one. 
MR. MORTENSEN: I'll come back on that. Mr. Watts? 
No? 
MR. WATTS: No. 
MR. MORTENSEN: Miss Cook? 
MS. COOK: No. 
MR. MORTENSEN: May the record show that all of the 
witnesses who are here who signed affidavits indicated rhat 
neither Mr. Mortensen or Mr. Faulk applied any pressure on them 
to sign allBltodidb 1> 
THE COURT: The record can show that. 
MR. MORTENSEN: Now, starting at the other end. Did 
you sign your affidavit voluntarily and willingly? 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: Yes. 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: Yes. 
UNIDENTIFIED MAN JUROR: I 'did'. 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: Yes. 
MR. MORTENSEN: May the record show that the five 
15 
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jurors who signed afterwards have all responded in the 
affirmative? 
THE COURT: It can show that. 
MR. MORTENSEN: Was your desire in signing the 
affidavit to clarify your intent as to the awarding of damages 
to Mrs. Haase? 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: Yes. 
MR. WATTS: Yes. 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: Yes. 
MR. MORTENSEN: May the record show that air signing 
jurors have indicated in the affirmative? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. MORTENSEN: Has anyone applied any pressure on you 
in any way concerning your verdict against the hospital or your 
affidavits? 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: No. 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: No. 
<yO-<_ £<~-~ - f /<Z2>^J*m 
MR. WATTS: No. 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: No. 
MR. MORTENSEN: Mrs. Atwood, did you agree to go along 
with other jurors on the matter of damages? 
MS. ATWOOD: Yes. In our deliberation, I still 
thought that the court would determine whether it was 30 or 70. 
But I thought — I felt that 820,000 was a good amount. And I 
thought that the court would take into consideration what she 
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had received before. That we didn't know that. But the court 
knew that. And so they would make the judgment whether 820,000 
was hospital or had she already received enough so that that 
was part of that 30 percent was there. 
MR. MORTENSEN: But was it your understanding it went 
the other way you had agreed to go along as well? 
MS. ATWOOD: Oh, not necessarily. I would have to 
rethink that. 
THE COURT: I think that it's not proper to ask her to 
rethink anything. 
MR. MORTENSEN: Ifm not asking her to. 
THE COURT: The only thing I!m going to permit him to 
ask questions is what you intended that night, not what you 
thought about since. Not what you did. You could rethink it 
and go back to the jury room knowing we would change some 
instructions knowing what we know, you see. So you had better 
understand what you were asked to do. If -- but we are not 
doing that. 
MR. MORTENSEN: Okay. I would like to ask each juror 
to answer this same question. I guess we could go in the same 
order. Was it your intent to award Mrs. Haase the total sum of 
$820,000 for injuries sustained by her as a result of the 
hospital's negligence? 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: Yes. 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: Yes. 
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MR. WATTS: Yes. 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: Yes. 
MR. MORTENSEN: Okay." Wa-s it your understanding at 
the time that you — 
THE COURT: Just a minute. Come on in. Go ahead, 
counsel. But we won't have him answer any questions at this 
point. I may ask him in a minute. But let me do it. Let me 
ask two questions first without going to the detail. Let's 
see, you are Mr. Labrum, right? 
MR. LABRUM: Yes. 
THE COURT: Appreciate your being here. 
MR. LABRUM: I'm sorry I was late. I thought it was 
tomorrow. 
THE COURT: We have asked each of the other jurors 
several questions about what they intended the night that the 
verdict was rendered, not what you have thought about since, 
not what you would do if you were going back in the jury room 
now, but what you intended the night that you signed your 
verdict. First question, did your 820,000-dollar verdict 
include all of the plaintiff's injuries, those caused by Dr. 
Hawkes as well as those caused by Ashley Valley Medical Center? 
MR. LABRUM: What did I think at the time? I took it 
that I understood it to say that she was to get 600,000 to take 
care of her for the rest of her life. And the 220,000 was for 
pain and suffering. 
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THE COURT: Okay. Let me go back and ask the question 
again, because that isn't what I asked you. Did your 
820,000-dollar verdict include all of the plaintiff's injuries, J 
those caused by Dr. Hawkes as well as those caused by Ashley 
Valley Medical Center? 
MR. LABRUM: No. 
THE COURT: Second question. Was it your intent to 
award the plaintiff 820,000 from Ashley Valley Medical Center 
for injuries sustained by her as a result of the hospital's 
negligence? 
MR. LABRUM: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead with your question. 
MR. MORTENSEN: Was it your understanding, at the time 
you agreed to the damage figures set forth on the special 
verdict form, that Mrs. Haase would be awarded only 30 percent 
of the sum of those damages? Otherwise stated, was it your 
intent to award Mrs. Haase only $246,000 for the damages she 
sustained as a result of the hospital's negligence? 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: No. 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: No. __ .
 r 
^ka^ MR. WATTS: No. 
-HYveiA ^ MR- MORTENSEN: May the record show that six — let's 
see. All of the jurors except Mrs. Atwood have responded 
negatively to the two questions I just posed. 
THE COURT: Yes. Record can show that. 
h* 
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1 MR. MORTENSEN: Thank you. 
2 THE COURT: Thank you. Any questions you want to ask 
3 I them, counsel? 
4 MR. HARRISON: I would like to ask each of you — and 
5 I realize some of you have spoken to this already — but I need 
6 to do this for the record. Did you at any point during your 
7 deliberations have any confusion or uncertainty as to the legal 
8 effect of apportionment of fault or any other aspect of your 
9 deliberations in reaching a verdict? 
10 MR. WATTS: (Inaudible.) 
11 UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: Is that the answer? 
12 MR. HARRISON: Were you confused? Did you feel that 
13 you didn't adequately understand apportionment of fault? I 
14 believe one person said something about didn't really 
15 understand the 70/30 business. Maybe that's putting it a 
16 little bit — I'm asking you if in reaching the verdict that 
17 you rendered you had on this issue or other issues some 
18 confusion or lack of understanding or uncertainty about the 
19 effect legally of what you were doing? 
20 MR. MORTENSEN: I just want the question, I ask that 
21 it be clarified. Not during the deliberation, but the end of 
22 the deliberation were they confused. Is that the question or 
I I 
23 any -- I want to make sure we are not talking about — 
24 THE COURT: After — when the verdict was rendered — 
25 you are not asking what occurred during the deliberations. We 
20 
have to be speaking of what occurred at the time — at the time 
the verdict was signed and came back into court. 
MR. HARRISON: Were you unsure —I fm on delicate 
grounds. I want to make sure the jury understands what I am 
asking, but I don't want to be prompting. 
THE COURT: Re-ask if you want. 
MR. HARRISON: Okay. I!m trying to ask for a response 
from each of you to the general issue that some of you have 
suggested this, is that you were not sure about how the 
allocation of fault, the apportionment of fault, the 
percentages, how that would affect your verdict. Does that 
help? Okay. All right. 
MR. MORTENSEN: Your Honor, Ifm going to have to 
object to that under rule 606 of the rules of evidence. I 
think the question asks them to pry into their deliberating 
process. 
THE COURT: Well, if the question is asking about the 
deliberative process, of course, I'm going to sustain the 
objection. But I didnft understand it that way. I understood 
the question to be is, at the time you rendered the verdict, 
did you have any — you use the words that you want to. 
MR. HARRISON: Any lack of understanding, uncertainty. 
I don't want to put words in your mouth. That's the concept 
I'm going for. 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: Where do I start? 
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MR. -MQRT-ENSEN:- With anyone. Mrs. Atwood? 
MS. ATWOOD: Yes. They were not clear to me. 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: I agree. I'm still not 
sure. You know, Ifm confused over the 70/30. 
MR. HARRISON: Okay. That's the answer — that's the 
answer I wanted. Sir? 
MR. WATTS: I believe after our question to the judge, 
(inaudible) deliberation, I think after the question to the 
judge to help us come up with or determine that total, I felt I 
was clear on my understanding. 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: I understood when we got 
finished that she would receive the 820,000 from the hospital. 
And the — do you want me to tell the first clue I knew she 
wasn't? Do you want me to go into more? 
MR. HARRISON: No. 
THE COURT: No, not what you found out afterwards. I 
think your answer would be after. 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: All I knew is what I 
intended her to receive. I didn't know if we had to do math or 
not. 
MR. HARRISON: Okay. 
MR. LABRUM: I was confused on 70/30. I wasn't too 
sure of what she was going to get out of the 820. But I 
assumed she would get 820. 
MR. HARRISON: And — 
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UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: I wasn't real confused, 
because I kind of know what to do. It was just trying to help 
everybody trying to figure out what we needed to do if it was 
going to end up this way, I would have went with a higher 
amount if I knew what was going to happen. 
MR. HARRISON: I would like to ask each of you if you 
have discussed your verdict or your deliberations with anyone 
other than Mr. Mortensen and his associates since the trial, of 
course. 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: Sure. 
MR. LABRUM: Yes. My wife." 
MR. HARRISON: How about you? 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: Not really. Nobody. 
MR. HARRISON: Okay. Your Honor, it is my 
understanding that two of the jurors indicated that they didn't 
really discuss how to allocate fault. I wonder if it's 
appropriate to ask all the jurors if they concur in what those 
two had said or if that's something to take up in another 
forum. 
THE COURT: Well, I think we would be asking what the 
cu^ reGt-ibQns were, if you go into that. And I have kept you away 
from that. 
MR. HARRISON: Well, if that's the case, then I have 
no other questions. Thank you. Thank you all too. 
MR. MORTENSEN: I have one further question for the 
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jurors — 
THE COURT: Go ahead, 
MR. MORTENSEN: — to respond to this. The six jurors 
who responded to my last two questions, hearing what you have 
heard now from the court about the 246,000-dollar judgment, did 
you inaccurately record on the special verdict form your actual 
intent? Do you understand the question? 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: Yes, I did. 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: I don't understand. 
MR. IIARRIGQN: Well, there's an indication that the 
amount that will be awarded to Mrs. Haase, based on the way the 
verdict form was filled out and signed, will be $246,000, not 
$820,000. And my question is, did the special verdict form 
inaccurately record your intent? 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: Well, my intent 
-820,000. 
yes? 
MR. MORTENSEN: So your answer to that question is 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: Yes. 
MR. MORTENSEN: Miss Fagnan? 
MS. FAGNAN: Yes. 
MR. MORTENSEN: Mr. Watts? 
MR. WATTS: Having had this hearing today, I think it 
explained it to me, so yes. 
MR. MORTENSEN: Miss Welch? 
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MS. WELCH: Yes, 
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR: Yes. 
^ C * > f » 
MR. MORTENSEN: Okay. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. Do we figure that to be fairly 
short? And we are going to excuse ycu now and express thanks 
for coming. You are free to leave. 
VOICE: (Inaudible.) 
THE COURT: Yes. 
(Whereupon, the following proceedings were held in 
open court outside the presence of the jury.) 
THE COURT: Record can show the jurors have all left 
the courtroom now. Does counsel want to do anything with the 
court? 
MR. MORTENSEN: Well, I would just like to state that 
I think the answers that we received from the late arriving 
juror and the answers that we received to the questions I posed 
to the jurors, I submit mandate an entry of judgment in the 
larger amounts. And they clearly stated what their intent was. 
And I think what the controlling precedent case law is, is that 
the intent of the jurors is to control and to be given, to be 
given effect. And I think they all very clearly said they 
never intended to award her for the hospital's negligence only 
246,000, but they did intend to jmda^ from the hospitalfs 
negligence $820,000. And I recognize that Ardith Atwood does 
not say that's the case. But it's the six out of eight. And 
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we had six. Clearly, six jurors who said that. I think their 
responses mandate that result. Thank you. 
MR. HARRISON: Your Honor, I think what the response 
indicates is that there was substantial confusion among the 
jurors about what they were communicating. They have — many 
of them said this morning they still don't understand the 
process. The continuing arguments of counsel in the briefs to 
the court are that the jury was confused, didn't understand, 
needed more clarity. The case law which counsel has offered to 
the court very clearly says without exception that that is the 
kind of error that is not susceptible to revision on the basis 
of affidavits. And that something other than a post-trial 
revision is an appropriate alternative for a plaintiff or for a 
party who feels that they have been disadvantaged. We disagree 
strongly that anything from this morning mandates anything 
other than the order which this court has indicated it will 
enter. Thank you. 
MR. MORTENSEN: Just briefly, Your Honor. We got up 
at 3:30 in the morning — after we got up 6 o'clock at night — 
after we got this last brief last night is when I opened my 
mail and looked through again, the distinction between clerical 
error and judicial error and looked at all the cases, and they 
are all clear that in this context what happened here was a 
clerical error, not a judicial error. Cases all say it doesn't 
matter who made the error. What matters is, was it an error in 
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the thinking deliberative process or an error in recording it. 
And the answers that they gave, especially to the last 
question, is they said what was written down on the special 
verdict form was an error by us. This was a clerical error. 
That's not what we intended. We intended the other thing. All 
of the cases that we looked at, and there are several, and they 
only end with the Gen Tech (phonetic) case. But the Gen Tech 
case, pardon the expression, but they talk about cases being on 
all fours. That one is on all fours. And I submit there isn't 
room for interpreting otherwise. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. I recognize there's some 
confusion in the jury instructions. And that responsibility, 
of course, falls on me. It would have been a lot easier if 
counsel had done what the court asked them to do a month prior 
to trial with regard to submitting agreed upon jury 
instructions, and then a week before trial, and then the day of 
trial starting, and then when we met, of course, we spent, oh, 
several hours trying to work them out. And it was very 
difficult, because to me it seems like this is something 
counsel, having been through this so many times, should be able 
to agree on, knows but couldn't agree on — couldn't agree on 
very many of them. But, I'm going to just order the judgment 
for the 246,000, which is the 30 percent and which probably 
means you'll want to appeal it. And I just have to let it go. 
And it will have to — what happens will happen. I think there 
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^W±\ W i ^  <7-d' <£. pre ^(^/ 
is enough problem it may be one of ynn tn npppal or overrule — 
not overruled, sustain on appeal — not sustain. Not saying 
the right word. That to order a new trial would not surprise 
me at all. I would hope not only from the point of view it's 
very, very expensive. And I would hate to see the parties go 
through it again. But you each have your own point of view and 
you have to go along with that. That's all. Thanks, counsel. 
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EXHIBIT 7 
MAS 2 0 2002 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT j , ^ 
OF UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH BY-—^S_^ 
LORI HAASE, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER, 
Defendant 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
Case Number 980800377 
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions, in the order presented, based on the jury 
instructions and the evidence presented in this case. If you find the evidence preponderates in 
favor of the issue presented answer "yes". If you find the evidence is so equally balanced that 
you cannot determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that the evidence 
preponderates against the issue presented, answer "no". 
QUESTION NO. 1 Was the defendant Ashlev Vallev Medical Center, nealieent? 
ANSWER: X Y e s N o 
If you answered question number 1 "no" then do not answer the following questions. 
Have your foreperson sign the verdict and return to the courtroom. 
QUESTION NO. 2 Was Ashley Valley Medical Center's negligence a proximate cause 
of injury sustained by the Plaintiff? 
ANSWER: y Yes No 
If you answered question number 2 "no" then do not answer the remaining questions. 
Have your foreperson sign the verdict and return to the courtroom. 
QUESTION NO. 3: Assuming the combined negligence of Dr. Thomas Hawkes and 
Ashley Valley Medical Center to total 100 %, what percentage of that negligence is attributable 
to: 
A. Dr. Thomas Hawkes 7 C % 
B. Ashley Valley Medical Center 3 f l % 
C. Total 100 % 
QUESTION NO. 4: State the amount of special and general damages sustained by the 
Plaintiff as a proximate result of the injuries complained of. 
Special Damages (both past and future): $ fp Op, COO ' 6 V 
General Damages (both past and future): $ 
DATED this 20th day of March, 2002. 
Foreperson 
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NOTARY PUBLIC 
t KATHLEEN W.- GRAY 
3 West Main 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
My-Commission Exoires 
February 15, 20C6 
STATE OF UTAH 
Douglas G. Mortensen, USB # 2329 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C. 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-2244 
Attomevs for PLintiif 
<?Y. 
MA5, 2 I 200? 
JOANWJ^KEE.CLEHK 
.DE=UTY 
LORI HAASE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER AND 
COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL 
CENTER AND JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS 
1 THROUGH 10 
Defendants. 
JI HUN S AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No. 98-0800377 
Judae Doualab L Lomabv 
State ol I tuh 
Countv of Uintah 
}ss. 
being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I was a member of the jury in this case. I have personal know ledw ot ttu' tacis I 
state here. 
2. Based on my understanding of the information and instructions given to us, it was 
my intention and belief that the full amount of the sum awarded in general and 
special damages - $820,000.00 would go to the plaintiff, not 30% of that sum. 
Dated this % \ day of March, 20002. 
juror i r a c j b jnn LCOVi— 
Subscribed and swom to before me this ,0_ I dav of March. 2002. 
Notary Public 
.-*J-tr> 
Douglas O. Mortensen, USB # 2329 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C. 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-2244 
JO****6, 
e* 
Attomevs for Plaintiff 
LORIHAASE. 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER AND 
COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL 
CENTER AND JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS 
1 THROUGH 10, 
Defendants. 
J! ROR'S AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No. 98-0800377 
Judae Douslas L. Comabv 
State of Utah 
}ss. 
County of Uintah J 
£d<?ex~ afitJ&<u*>-~ - being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I was a member of me jury in this case. I have personal knowL-iine onhe tact;., 
state here. 
2. Based on my understanding of the information and instructions given to us, it was 
my intention and belief that the full amount of the sum awarded in general and 
special damages - $820,000.00 would go to the plaintiff, not 30% of that sum. 
. - * * ; Dated this «?/ day of March. 20002. 
fl<tou&q^g& 
Juror 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this Al^dav of March. 2002. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
PEGGY S. MEHKLEY 
3 West Main 
V«mai. Utan 84078 
Commission &cpir«« 
Auquat 30, 200S 
STATE OF UTAH 
Pfryj^S^Mcli?^ 
Notarv Public 
Douglas G. Mortensen, USB # 2329 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-2244 
A rti mr ti >r Plaintiff 
BY. 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, UT/.I-
HAF 2 1 2002 
IgTvId' JOANN lcKEE. CLERK 
DEPUTY 
LOW HAASE. 
Plaintiff. 
Vb. 
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER AND 
COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL 
CENTER AND JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS 
1 THROUGH 10. 
Defendants. 
< H I il I i d h 
County of Uintah } 
}ss. 
JUROR'S AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No 98-0800377 
Judge Douglas L. Comabv 
GBniL, UMJO^ being first duly sworn, deposes and savs: 
I »as a member of the jury in this case. I have , ™ 
njl knowledge ot die facts I 
state here. 
2. Based on my understanding of the information and instructions given to us, it was 
my intention and belief that the full amount of the sum awarded in general and 
« 
special damages - $820,000.00 would go to the plaiatiff, not 30% of that sum. 
Dated this £\|_r day of March. 2060^. M$J^ 
\Jj\AAJUb Y H o t ^ & M 
Juror 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this/71 dav of March. 2002 | ! « 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
SA&3A3A 8. SPSiRS 
3 Wast Main 
Vernal. Utah 84078 
Commission Expires 
December 15 2004 
STATE OF UTAH mrdf)!^ 
Notarv Public 
BY. 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY. UTAH 
MAR 2 1 2Q02 
JOANNEJSteKEE. CLERK 
(Z7-—DE?UTV ^Er-
Douglas G. Mortensen, USB # 2329 
MATHESON, MORTFNSFN OI SI IN & JEPPSON, P.C. 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-2244 
nuri)e\'j lor Plaintiff 
LORIHAASE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER AND 
COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL 
CENTER AND JOHN DOF DEFENDANTS 
1 THROUGH 10, 
Defendants. 
II NMIf \ n III \ S IT 
Civil No. 98-0800377 
Judae Doualas 1 ( i miabv 
Sriit nl I tali 
}ss. 
County of Uintah } 
\^£^Y\ \ \ ""^Cs N l ^ Y v,' i being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1 I was a member of the jury in this case. I have personal knowledge of the facts I 
state here. 
2. Based on my understanding of the information and instructions given to us, it was 
my intention and belief that the full amount of the sum awarded in general and 
special damages - $820,000.00 would go to the plaintiff, not 30% of that sum. 
Dated this £T\_ day of March, 20002. 
Juror ^ ^ S *t»V*r<\o^ 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this &\ dav of March. 2002. 
/ " • -
Notary Public ^ 
DEANNA WRiGHT 
Notary Public 
State of Utcn 
My Comm. Expires Jun 6.2DC3 
147 East Main Uemc* UT 84078 
„ FILED 
MAR 2 I 2002 
8Y. 
McKEE. CLERK 
DEPUTY 
Douglas G. Mortensen, USB # 2329 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OI St N & JEPPSON, PC. 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-2244 
Attomev tot Plaintiff 
LORI HAASE. 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER AND 
COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL 
CENTER AND JOHN DOF DEFENDANTS 
1 THROUGH 10. 
Defendants. 
Jl WOW'S U'MDW >T 
Civil No. 98-0800377 
Judse Doudas 1. Lornabv 
State 
Countv of Uintah 
U -
— r\ 0j\ J, A L ^ A J J • being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I was a member of the jury in this case. I have personal knowledge of the far* [ 
state here. 
2. Based on my understanding of the information and instructions given to us, it was 
my intention and belief that the full amount of the sum awarded in general and 
special damages - $820,000.00 would go to the plaintiff, not 30% of Annum 
Dated this .?/ dav of March, 20002. 
Juror 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^ i dav of March. 2002. 
^Wftr ^ ' n°^HcUN) 
Notarv Public 
Douglas G. Mortensen, USB # 2329 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C. 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-2244 
\ttomeys for Plaintiff 
.ORIHAASE. 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
SHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER AND 
)LUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL 
:
.NTER AND JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS 
"HROUGH 10, 
Defendants. 
JUROR'S AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No. 98-0800377 
Judae Doualas L. Comabv 
te of Utah 
}ss. 
nty of Uintah } 
being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I was a member of the jury in this case. I have personal knowledge of the facts I 
state here. 
2. Based on my understanding of the information and instructions given to us, it was 
my intention and belief that the full amount of the sum awarded in general and 
special damages - $820,000.00 would go to the plaintiff, not 30% of that sum. 
Dated this ^ day of March, 20002. 
}?3^f^ 
Jufctf 7&b**zrfi Q. W&ls^ 
T<fotattP«bfic ^ U 
FiLEL 
DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COWY. urAr 
*& 2 i 2G02 
>i>- s ^<:'_._DE=i.r»--
Douglas G. Mortensen. USB # 2329 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C. 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-2244 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
LORIHAASE. 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER AND 
COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL 
CENTER AND JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS 
1 THROUGH 10, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF FRANK J. 
FALK 
Civil No. 98-0800377 
Judae Doualas L. Comabv 
State of Utah 
}ss. 
County of Uintah } 
Frank J. Falk. being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice in this state. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the matters stated herein. 
3. On the morning following the jury's verdict in this case (which was announced at 
11 p.m.)-1 participated in "exit" interviews with jurors, which we customarily 
conduct in an effort to tlnd out how we might improve our presentation, what the 
jurors found persuasive and what they found unpersuasive. During the course of 
an early interview with a juror, I learned that that juror intended Lori Haase to 
receive the full amount of the total damage figure listed on the Special Verdict 
Form and thought that she would. I thereafter learned the same thing from exit 
interviews with other jurors. I also learned that the jurors were uncertain on the 
relation between their apportionment of fault and their award of damages and sent 
a note to the judge seeking clarification. The note they received back did not 
answer their question to their complete satisfaction so they made certain 
assumptions based on what they understood and completed the Special Verdict 
Form. All of the jurors with whom I spoke told me voluntarily and without any 
prodding that they intended that the plaintiff receive the damage award they gave 
and that they had already made the discounts they felt were appropriate. 
4. Late this afternoon after receiving affidavits from several jurors. I accompanied 
plaintiffs chief counsel in this case to the home of the sister of juror Ardith 
Atwood. where Mrs. Atwood was working. Mrs Atwood spoke with us briefly. 
Although she declined to sign an affidavit; she did tell us that she agreed to ugo 
along with the others" on the matter of damages. When asked if she personally 
intended for the plaintiff to receive 30% of the S820.000 total damage figure. Mrs 
Atwood replied tiiat she preferred not to answer that question. 
Dated this P1 day of March. 20002. 
Frank J. Falk^/ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Subscribed and sworn to before me. a Clerk of the Court, this J/vj_day of March. 2002. 
Name: 
Clerk of the Coun 
Eighth Judicial District Coun 
Douglas G. Mortensen, USB #2329 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C. 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone (801)363-2244 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LORI HAASE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER 
AND COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY 
MEDICAL CENTER, AND JOHN DOE 
DEFENDANTS 1 THROUGH 10 
Defendants^ 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
DOUGLAS G. MORTENSEN 
Civil No. 98-0800377 
: Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Douglas G. Mortensen, being first duly sworn deposes and says: 
1. I am counsel for the plaintiff in this action and have personal knowledge of 
the facts stated in this affidavit. 
2. Following the announcement of the jury's decision in this case at 
approximately 11:00 p.m., on March 20, it was apparent that the jurors were not 
interested in staying later to discuss their decision with counsel or others. I therefore 
decided to wait until the following morning to conduct our customary "exit interviews". 
3. On the morning following trial, Frank Falk and I began telephoning 
members of the jury in an attempt to find out their impressions of various aspects of the 
evidence presented to them. We prepared a common list of several questions relevant 
to the case. Those questions included: How did you arrive at special damages of 
$600,000?; How did you arrive at general damages of $220,000?; Why did it take 7 
hours to reach your verdict?; What was your assessment of the experts who testified at 
trial?; What was your assessment of the fact witnesses?; What was the most 
persuasive evidence you considered?; What was the least persuasive evidence?; Were 
you bothered by having to hear testimony by videotape, telephone or by the reading of 
deposition transcript?; How did you apportion fault? 
4. We learned that the jurors carefully and painstakingly reviewed all of the 
evidence which had been presented at trial, with each juror in turn discussing his or her 
own notes on all of the evidence presented at trial. We learned that after reviewing all 
of the evidence, the jurors voted by secret, written ballot on issues of the hospital's 
liability. We learned that the jurors did in fact unanimously agree that the hospital was 
negligent and that its negligence proximately caused injury to Lori Haase. We learned 
that the jury then spent the bulk of its deliberation time considering damages. We were 
told that the jurors found expert economist Patricia Pacey very credible and informative. 
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) one told us that he or she thought Dr. Pacey's figures were uway off in any respect. 
i 
e learned that they were uncertain on the matter of apportionment of fault and how 
* apportionment affected the award of damages. We learned that the jurors sent a 
te to the judge seeking clarification. Several jurors told us that the note they received 
ck from the judge did not make the matter clearer to them. Some said they thought 
it the judge's response had referred them to a jury instruction but that when they read 
jury instruction, it didn't answer their question. It was clear from our interviews with 
jurors that whatever their note to the judge said and whatever the judge's note back 
hem replied, what they were really trying to determine was how to express their 
jnt as the net dollar sum they wanted the plaintiff to receive from their finding of the 
pitai's negligence. It became abundantly clear that the jurors' intent was that Lori 
ase would receive the net figure of $820,000. Each juror who signed an affidavit 
spendently and without reference to any other juror indicated an intent to award Mrs. 
ise $820,000 for the hospital's negligence. It was clear that they had already, 
ugh their own calculations and deliberations, "backed out" or apportioned off the 
lages attributable to Dr. Hawkes' negligence. 
5. No pressure of any kind was applied to any of the jurors in connection 
the signing of the affidavits. When one juror told us that she knew what she had 
us was true but that she wasn't sure she wanted to sign an affidavit, she was 
>uraged simply to think about it on her own and if she decided she wanted to sign 
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an affidavit, she could call us back. This discussion took place on a cell phone while 
Mr. Falk and I were driving to a bank where another juror had agreed to meet us to 
have his signature notarized. Several minutes later, we received a phone call on Frank 
Falk's cell phone from the juror who had been invited to think about the matter. This 
juror voluntarily called us back and expressed a desire to sign an affidavit so that there 
could be no doubt as to her and her fellow jurors' true intent. We then arranged to 
meet that juror at a place where that juror's signature could be notarized. When the 8th 
juror stated a disinclination to sign any sort of affidavit, we immediately thanked her for 
her time, apologized for inconveniencing her with our visit and departed. We made no 
attempt of any kind to persuade her to sign an affidavit against her wish. 
6. One juror signed an affidavit late in the day at a place of considerable 
distance from the nearest notary. She volunteered a willingness to take a blank form of 
the affidavit to a notary the next day, sign it in front of the notary and personally file it 
with the court. Again, no pressure of any kind was applied to any juror to sign an 
affidavit. 
DATED this fl-% day of March, 2002. A 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this £2^ day of March, 2002. 
Notary Public 
Pldg Affidavit Douglas G.Mortensen.0322 
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ANN BEHUMEN 
MOTMY PUBUC-STATE OT OTM 
648 Ea*100 South 
*ftui»atKur84iat 
My Count afcaawooi 
Tab 9 
EXHIBIT 9 
ANALYSIS OF JUROR INTENT 
The intentions and understandings of the individual jurors deserve scrutiny. The 
eight jurors who decided the case were Becky Solomon, Ray Labrum, Roberta 
Welsh, Carrie Murray, Tonie Fagnan, Chad Watt, Tracy Cook, and Ardith Atwood. 
All of the eight jurors except Ardith Atwood signed post-verdict affidavits. Six of 
the seven affidavits were identical in form and state: 
"Based on my understanding of the information and 
instructions given to us, it was my intention and belief that 
the full amount of the sum awarded in general and special 
damages - $820,000.00 would go to the plaintiff, not 30% of 
that sum". 
Chad Watt deleted the phrase "not 30% of that sum". However, his deletion did not 
change his clearly stated intent that Mrs. Haase would receive the full $820,000 
awarded. (See analysis of Chad Watt intent, pp. 5-6, infra). 
Becky Solomon did not appear at the May 2, 2002 hearing. The only thing 
known about her intention is reflected in her March 21 affidavit. Her intention and belief 
was that the full amount of the sum awarded - $820,000 - would go to the plaintiff, not 
30% of that sum. 
Ray Labrum signed an affidavit identical to Becky Solomon's. His statements at 
the May 2 hearing were totally consistent with his affidavit and entirely clear and 
unequivocal. He arrived at the hearing late. When he entered the courtroom, the court 
interrupted Mr. Mortensen's questioning of individual jurors and immediately directed its 
own questions to Mr. Labrum. Without any possibility of being influenced or confused 
by any questioning which had preceded his entry into the courtroom, Mr. Labrum 
responded to the court's questions as follows: 
The Court: . . . Did your $820,000 verdict include all of the plaintiffs injuries, 
those caused by Dr. Hawkes as well as those caused by Ashley 
Valley Medical Center? 
Mr. Labrum: No. 
The Court: Second question. Was it your intent to award the plaintiff $820,000 
from Ashley Valley Medical Center for injuries sustained by her as 
a result of the hospital's negligence? 
Mr. Labrum: Yes. 
(May 2, 2002 hearing, page 18, lines 2-11) (Emphasis added). Mr. Labrum's intent is 
therefore beyond dispute. 
Roberta Welsh signed a post-verdict affidavit unequivocally stating her intention 
and belief that the full amount of the sum awarded would go to Mrs. Haase, not 30% of 
that sum. Her statements during the May 2 hearing were as unequivocal as Mr. 
Labrum's. On page 11 of the May 2 transcript, the court asked jurors whether it was 
their intent "to award the plaintiff $820,000 from Ashley Valley Medical Center for 
injuries sustained by her as a result of the hospital's negligence." On that page, three 
unidentified women jurors individually responded that their intent was for Mrs. Haase to 
get the $820,000. Ms. Welsh was likely one of those three unidentified women jurors. 
On page 13 of the transcript, Mr. Mortensen specifically asked Mrs. Welsh virtually the 
same question and she responded unequivocally that the $820,000 was intended by 
her to be solely from Ashley Valley for the hospital's negligence. ( May 2 transcript, 
page 13 lines 12-18). 
When the hospital's counsel, Mr. Harrison, began querying the jurors about the 
extent of their confusion, Ms. Welsh (identified by the court reporter only as 
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"unidentified woman juror"), responded: 
I wasn't real confused, because I kind of know what to do. It 
was just trying to help everybody trying to figure out what we 
needed to do. If it was going to end up this way, I would 
have went with a higher amount if I knew what was going to 
happen. 
(See May 2, 2002 hearing transcript, page 23 lines 1-5). 
Thereafter, Mr. Mortensen asked the jurors whether, having heard what they had 
heard from the court about entering judgment for only $246,000, they had inaccurately 
recorded on the Special Verdict Form their actual intent. The six jurors to whom that 
question was directed all responded in the affirmative. (May 2 transcript, pages 24-25). 
Ms. Welsh was one of those jurors. 
Carrie Murray signed an affidavit identical to the affidavit signed by five of her 
fellow jurors. It was her intention and belief that the full amount of the $820,000 sum 
would go to the plaintiff, not 30% of that sum. During the May 2 hearing, Ms. Murray 
was the second juror to address the court. She stated unequivocally: "I intended her 
to get that much money [the total $820,000]". (May 2 hearing transcript, p. 8). She 
admitted she only later realized that in order for Mrs. Haase to receive the full $820,000 
sum, the jury should have put a figure on the special verdict form of over two million 
dollars. That this realization came to her only later is not dispositive, however, because 
she unequivocally volunteered to the court: 
But I -1 - when we finished that night, I thought she was 
going to receive $820,000. So that would be the 30% of the 
two million, is what I thought. 
(May 2 transcript, p. 8-9). Ms. Murray is, according to counsel's clear recollection, the 
"unidentified woman juror" who responded on page 22 of the May 2 transcript: 
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ttl understood that when we got finished that she would 
receive the $820,000 from the hospital". 
She clearly was one of the jurors who responded in the affirmative to Mr. Mortensen's 
closing question as to whether the special verdict form, in light of the court's intention to 
enter judgment against the hospital in the amount of only $246,000, inaccurately 
recorded the jury's actual intent. (See page 24-25 of May 2 transcript). 
Tonie Fagnan signed a handwritten affidavit slightly different and somewhat 
longer than the others. It includes this statement: 
. . . My fellow jurors and I had a question about our award of 
damages and how our "number" would be effected by our 
apportionment of fault between Dr. Hawkes and the hospital. 
Specifically, we didn't know and wanted to know whether 
Lori Haase would get the whole sum we arrived at or only a 
percentage of it. We sent a note out to the judge seeking an 
answer. He wrote back suggesting we refer to a particular 
jury instruction. Neither the judge's note nor the jury 
instruction answered our question. 
We continued to deliberate, forming our own assumptions 
on the matter. I believed and intended that Lori Haase 
would get the total amount of the number we finally awarded 
- $820,000.00 and I believe my fellow jurors believed and 
intended the same. 
(See Tonie Fagnan's March 21, 2002 affidavit herein). 
During the May 2 hearing, Ms. Fagnan told the court that she "hoped" Mrs. 
Haase would receive the full $820,000. She admitted the thought had never occurred 
to her that, in the court's words, "the damages to be 100% would have to be over two 
million". That is understandable, however, because she like the other jurors understood 
that the focus of the case was on the damages resulting from the hospital's negligence. 
Ms. Fagnan: When we were deliberating, I don't remember 
us talking about like breaking down this is the harm that was 
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caused by the hospital, this is the harm caused by the 
doctor. . . . - because we were focusing on the 
hospital. (May 2 transcript, pp. 9-10). 
The court had repeatedly told the jury that the case was not about Dr. Hawkes' 
negligence. The jurors apparently assumed from such indication that they were 
charged with responsibility for assessing the damages resulting from the hospital's 
negligence only. Ms. Fagnan was among the six jurors responding affirmatively to the 
final question: "Hearing what you have heard now from the court about the $246,000 
judgment, did you inaccurately record on the Special Verdict Form your actual intent?" 
Chad Watt also signed an affidavit indicating his belief and intent that Mrs. 
Haase would receive the full $820,000 awarded by the jury. His answers to the court's 
initial questions during the May 2 hearing reflect confusion over precisely what the 
court was asking. That Mr. Watt misunderstood the court's initial questions is apparent 
from his later explanation to the court: 
" It seemed to me like the Dr. Hawkes . . . was not on 
trial. It was Ashley Valley. So my intention was toward 
Ashley Valley and not towards Dr. Hawkes." (Emphasis 
added) (May 2, transcript, p. 14, lines 18-21). 
Mr. Watt expressly responded in the affirmative to Mr. Mortensen's question: 
"Was it your intent to award Mrs. Haase the total sum of $820,000 for injuries sustained 
by her as a result of the hospital's negligence". (May 2 transcript, p. 17, line 21 - p. 18, 
line 1). Later, Mr. Watt indicated unequivocally that it was not his intent to award Mrs. 
Haase only $246,000 for the damages she sustained as a result of the hospital's 
negligence. (May 2 hearing transcript, p. 18, lines 16-21). 
Finally, Mr. Watt agreed that having heard what he had heard during the May 2 
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hearing about the Court's intent concerning a $246,000 judgment, he did inaccurately 
record his actual intent on the Special Verdict Form . (May 2 hearing transcript, p. 24). 
Tracy Cook signed an affidavit identical in form to the affidavits of jurors 
Solomon, Labrum, Welsh and Murray. She stated clearly and unequivocally at the May 
2 hearing that her intent was to award Mrs. Haase $820,000 damages sustained by her 
as a result of the hospital's negligence. (May 2 hearing transcript, pp. 11, 13 (lines 5-7), 
15 (line 12), 17, 18, 24, 25). Ms. Cook's intent was stated perhaps most clearly on 
page 13: 
Ms. Cook: No, I agreed with Carie. That was my intent. 
It was for her to get $820,000 from the 
hospital. I didn't realize that she would only 
get 30 percent of that. (Emphasis added). 
Ardith Atwood, the eighth juror, declined to sign an affidavit. Her statements a 
the May 2 hearing are terse and opaque. Since Utah law requires the agreement of 
only 6 of 8 jurors on any issue, her view on the damage award may be "thrown out" as a 
one-person minority view. However, it is noteworthy that not even she understood or 
intended that Mrs. Haase would receive only $246,000 for the hospital's negligence. 
She claims to have believed it was up to the judge to decide whether Mrs. Haase would 
get $820,000 or $246,000 from the hospital. (May 2 transcript, p. 16, line 22 - p. 17, 
line 4). 
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Tab 10 
EXHIBIT 10 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LORIHAASE, 
Plaintiff, 
PRELIMINARY JURY VERDICT RULING 
vs. 
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL Civil No. 93-0800377 
CENTER, 
Judge Douglas L Cornaby 
Defendant. 
The jury rendered a verdict in this case on March 22, 2002. The following day the 
Plaintiff contacted each juror and most of them signed an affidavit stating they intended the 
Plaintiff to receive the entire $820,000. The Plaintiff then submitted a verdict to the Court 
different from the one directed by the Court along with a memorandum supporting her position. 
The Defendant has responded with a memorandum in opposition. The Plaintiff then submitted a 
eply brief together with a copy of what she claims is dispositive authority, to-wit, Patty Bishop, 
t al. v. Gen Tec Inc., et al., 2002 UT 36 (filed by the Supreme Court of Utah on March 29, 2002. 
inally, the Plaintiff submitted a notice to submit for decision. 
This matter is not ready for a decision. 
The Court is hereby ordering the jury to be reconvened at the Court's Building in Vernal 
i Thursday, May 2, 2002, at 11 a.m. to. determine, if, in fact, there was a clerical error. 
)unsel are invited to be present, personally or by associate counsel. The Court will make the 
presentation. Counsel are also invited to submit to the Court prior to that time specific questions 
they want the Court to ask the jurors. The Court expects this hearing to be limited in both time 
and content. At this point in time, however, the Court does not know how it can avoid informing 
J 
the jury of the amount the Plaintiff has already received from the Estate of Dr. Hawkes. 
The parties and their counsel are ordered not to have contact with any juror from this time 
forward and until the hearing is ended. 
Dated this 2nd day of April, 2002. 
Certificate of Service 
I certify that on the 2nd day of April, 2002,1 caused to be served via U.S. mail a copy of 
the foregoing to the following: 
Douglas G. Mortensen 
Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson, P.C. 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Robert R. Harrison 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P. O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Tab 11 
EXHIBIT 11 
2 1 8 Luh 48 P \ U M C KLPOUlhR id bLRILb 
2002 VI 36 
Patty BISHOP, individually and as pei 
sonal representative of tht Lstate of 
Douglas J Bishop, deceased, Bai t J 
Bishop, Douglas Wade Bishop, Bradley 
David Bishop, and Joshua l e e Bishop 
Plaintiffs and Appellants 
v 
GLN1LC INC, a Kentucky corporation, 
and John Does I—V, Defendants Third-
Paitv Plaintilf, Appellee, and Cioss- \p 
pellant 
v 
Valley Asphalt, Inc , a Utah eorpoiation, 
Third-Partv Defendant and 
Appellant 
Nos 20000467 20000492 
bupieme Couit of Ltah 
Mai eh 29 2002 
Keheanng Denied June 12 2002 
Pel sonal lepiesentative of estate of de 
ceased woikei bi ought wionglul death action 
against asphalt silo manufactuiei Manufac 
tin ei filed thn d pai ty complaint against em 
ployei seeking indemnification The tnal 
couit gianted summaiy judgment foi mmu 
factiuei on indemnification claim Aftei juiy 
tnal the Fouith Distiict Couit Ltah Coun 
ty Raj Hauling Ji appoitioned judgment 
Employei and pei sonal l epi esentativ e ap 
pealed Manufactuiei cioss appealed The 
Supieme Couit Dm ham J held that (1) 
Liability Retoim Act impliedly pieempted 
common law doctnne of lespondeat supenoi 
(2) Art did not cieate unconstitutional classi 
fication and (3) manufactuiei was not enti 
tied to indemnification 
Russon A C J concm I ed in I esult 
1 Appeal and Liror 0842(1) 
The application of LiabiliU Retoim Act 
(LRA) in appoiturning fault is a legal ques 
tion of statutoiy constiuction which the bu 
pi erne Couit ieuews foi conectness 
U C A 1953 78-27-37 to 78-27-43 
2 Appeal and Liror 0842(1) 
A distiict couits disp)aiti n of a sum 
maiv judgment motion is a questi )n of law 
that the Supieme Couit levievvs foi conect 
ness 
3 \ppeal and Lrroi OSb3 
The bupieme Couit accoids i tinl 
courts intelpietation of a contiact no defei 
ence and levievvs it foi conectness 
4 \ppcal and L n o i O b 12(9) 
Mi\ed questions of law and tact aie ie 
viewed foi abuse of di action in applvmg the 
1 iv\ t) the facts 
5 Negligence 0>49(S 10) 
Products I labihtv 0 2 8 42 
Liability Refoim Act impliedh pieempt 
ed common 1 iw doctnne of lespondeit supe 
noi and theiefoie habihtv of immune em 
plo\ei md emplovee should not hi \e been 
combined m detei mining fault alloc ition in 
wi ongful death action a^ unst manufactui ei 
bv estate of woikei killed while lepanmg 
asph lit silo whei e Act md common law w ei e 
in conflict compliance with both was lmpossi 
ble and application of lespondeat supenoi 
w oulcl nulhf\ effects of section of Act pel mit 
ting ieco\eiy foi mjuied plaintiffs horn any 
defendant whose fault ombined with fault of 
pei sons immune fiom suit exceeded tiult of 
plaintiffs U C A 19oo 78-27-37 to 78-27-4 :> 
b Constitutional 1 aw 0 2 4 3 1 
Negligence O203 
Statutes 074(1) 
Piovision of I lability Refoim Act that 
allowed ieco\eiy foi mjuied plaintiffs tiom 
any defendant whose fault combined with 
fault of pei sons immune fiom suit exceeded 
fault of plaintiffs did not cieate unconstitu 
tional classification and thus Act did not 
\iolate equal piotection oi Umfoim Opci i 
tion of Laws piovision of state constitution 
wheie Act served legitimate puipose of bal 
ancing economic buiclens between mjuied 
emplovee and defendant wheie immune em 
ployei was also at fault I S C A Const 
Amend 14 Const Ait 1 § 24 L C A 19o3 
78-27-37 to 78 27-43 
7 statutes 0 7 1 
In scrutinizing a legislative measuie un 
(lei Lnifoim Opeiation of Laws piovision of 
„tue constitution the couit must deteimine 
whethei the classification is leasonable 
wnethei the objectives of the legislative ac 
tion aie legitimate and whethei theie is a 
ie is enable lelationship between the classifi 
cation and the legislative pui poses Const 
Ait 1 * 24 
!> Indemnity 0 2 9 
Mmutictuiei of asphalt silo was not 
entitled to indemnification in wi ongful death 
action bv employei of vvoiker killed while 
peifoinnng lepau woik on silo wheie Ian 
guuc in indemnification clause limited em 
plovei s indemnification to situations where 
emplovei itself was negligent theie was no 
lefeience in indemnification clause to piod 
ucts liability and language disci uming habih 
tv foi any injiuy ansmg out of installation 
did not apph to condition of product when 
sold 
9 Indemnity 030(1) 
The common law geneially disfavois 
agieements that indemnify paities against 
then own negligence because one might be 
caieless of anothei s life and limb if theie is 
no penalty foi cai elessness 
10 Con t i ac t sOH4 
Paities seeking to exempt themselves 
horn toil habihtv must cleaily and unequivo 
callv expiess an intent to limit toit liability 
vvithii the contiact without such an expies 
sion of intent the piesumption is against any 
such intention and it is not achieved by 
infeience oi implication fiom geneial Ian 
guige 
11 Indemnity 030(1) 
The Supieme Couit will not mfei an 
intention to indemnify against othei kinds of 
lnbihty including stiict habihtv wheie such 
intention is not cleai lv expi essed 
12 Indemnity 0 2 8 
Allegations oi negligence contained in 
claim foi pioducts liability did not tianstoim 
cUim into one foi oiclmaiy negligence and 
thus claim was not coveied bv indemnified 
"c n language in pi oduct m\ oice 
BIbHOP v GLNTEC I M Ltah 219 
Cite aj, 48 P 3d 218 (Ut-ih 2002) 
13 Products Liabihtv 0 8 , 11, 14 
Pioducts habihtv alwavs lequnes pi oof 
of a defective pioduct which can include 
manufactuimg flaws design defects and m 
adequate warnings legaidmg use 
14 Trial 0 3 4 4 
Ju ivs enoi in lecoidmg judgment as 
lendeied constituted clencal enoi not judi 
cial ei 1 or and thus affidav its of jm 01 s w ei e 
admissible to show juioi s xctual intent and 
that juiy made mistake m calculating dam 
age aw aid by sub ti acting plaintiffs piopoi 
tion of fault Rules Civ Pioc Rules 59 60 
15 Motions 0 1 5 
It is the substance not the labeling of a 
motion that is dispositive in detei mining the 
chai actei of the motion 
Allen K Young Spnngville foi plaintiffs 
Paul M Belnap Andiew D Wnght Dan en 
K Nelson Salt Lake City foi GenTec 
Robeit G Gilchnst Maik L McCarty 
Biandon B Hobbs Lynn S Davies, Salt 
Lake Citv foi Valley Asphalt 
DURHAM Justice 
INTRODLC1ION 
111 This appeal and ci oss appeal challenge 
the judgment enteied m a wi ongful death 
action bi ought by Patty Bishop individually 
and as the executoi of the decedent Douglas 
Bishops estate and Bishops children 
Bishop an employee of Vallev Asphalt Inc 
died as a 1 esult of pei sonal injuiies sus 
tamed while peifoiming lepan woik on as 
phalt silo components manufactui ed by Gen 
Tec Inc and installed and maintained by 
\dlley Asphalt Bishop sued GenTec foi 
pioducts habihtv and GenTec filed a thud 
paity complaint against Valle\ Asphalt 
seeking indemnification foi GenTec s negh 
gence stiict habihtv and pioducts liability 
based on the language in an invoice signed 
by Vallev Asphalt With lespect to the in 
demmfication the court gi anted GenTec s 
motion foi summaiy judgment The juiy 
allocated fault to both GenTec and Vallev 
Asphalt Judgment was then apportioned 
220 Utah 48 PACIFIC REPORTER, 3d SERIES 
pursuant to Utah's Liability Reform Act. 
Bishop moved to amend the jury verdict 
based on clerical error, but the trial court 
denied the motion. Valley Asphalt and 
Bishop appealed, and GenTec filed a cross-
appeal. 
BACKGROUND 
H 2 In late 1994 or early 1995, Valley As-
phalt, planning to expand its asphalt storage 
capacity, contacted GenTec, a manufacturer 
and assembler of hot asphalt silos and silo 
components, to purchase hot asphalt silo 
components. Valley Asphalt purchased com-
ponents for an asphalt silo from GenTec on 
August 7, 1995, and signed GenTec's stan-
dard invoice entitled "Equipment Sales Or-
der and Security Agreement." On the re-
verse side of the pre-printed invoice were 
two sections entitled "INDEMNIFICA-
TION" and "INSTALLATION," which pur-
ported to place limitations on GenTec's liabil-
ity. Soon after completion of the purchase, 
Valley Asphalt received the silo components 
and constructed the system pursuant to the 
specifications provided by GenTec. 
II 3 On July 12, 1997, while inspecting and 
attempting to repair one of Valley Asphalt's 
asphalt silos, Bishop was caught between the 
doors of the silo when they suddenly closed 
and was crushed. He died later that day as 
a result of his injuries. The components that 
crushed Bishop were those purchased under 
the August 7, 1995 invoice. Subsequently, 
Bishop's executor filed this wrongful death 
action against GenTec. 
114 GenTec filed a third-party complaint 
against Valley Asphalt, seeking apportion-
ment of fault and indemnification under the 
pre-printed terms on the reverse side of the 
August 7, 1995 invoice. After review of Gen-
Tec's and Valley Asphalt's cross-motions for 
summary judgment on the indemnification 
question, the trial court found that the two 
entities were sophisticated business entities, 
that they negotiated the terms of the invoice 
at arm's length, and that the language in the 
invoice evidenced the intent of the parties to 
reallocate all liability to Valley Asphalt, in-
cluding claims against GenTec for negligence, 
strict liability, and products liability. 
11 5 The jury apportioned fault according to 
a special verdict form, allocating 25 percent 
of the fault to Bishop, 45 percent to GenTec, 
and 30 percent to Valley Asphalt. In addi-
tion to apportioning fault, the jury deter-
mined the amount of general damages to be 
$750,000 and special damages to be $800,000. 
Because Valley Asphalt was a party immune 
from suit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. & 78-
27-37(3)(a) (Supp.2001), the trial judge reap-
portioned Valley Asphalt's 30 percent fault 
according to Utah's Liability Reform Act 
("LRA"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 to -
43 (1999), which resulted in allocating 64.29 
percent of the total fault to GenTec and 35.71 
percent to Bishop. The trial court then re-
duced the jury's damages award by the 35.71 
percentage of fault allocated to Bishop. 
Both GenTec and Valley Asphalt objected to 
the reapportionment. They claimed that ei-
ther Valley Asphalt's liability should be com-
bined with Bishop's liability under the com-
mon law doctrine of respondeat superior or, 
if respondeat superior did not apply, that the 
reapportionment part of the LRA, section 
78-27-39(2)(a), is unconstitutional under both 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution and the Uniform Operation of Laws 
Clause of the Utah Constitution, art. I, sec-
tion 24. The trial court overruled GenTec's 
and Valley Asphalt's constitutional objec-
tions. With respect to the respondeat supe-
rior argument, the trial court found that the 
LRA superceded the common law and that 
"the statute clearly and unambiguously re-
quires that [the] Court must consider the 
fault of Mr. Bishop and Valley [Asphalt] sep-
arately." 
K 6 After the trial ended and the jury was 
excused, Bishop's counsel talked to at least 
three of the jurors, including the jury fore-
man, all of whom subsequently signed affida-
vits indicating they had made a mistake in 
their calculation of the jury award. In their 
affidavits, the jurors testified that they had 
mistakenly subtracted 25 percent (Bishop's 
proportion of fault as determined by the 
jury) from the general and &pecial damages, 
not realizing that the subtraction for Bishop's 
fault was the duty of the trial court, not the 
jury. Relying on these affidavits, Bishop 
moved to amend the jury verdict pursuant to 
BISHOP v. ( 
Cite as 48 P.3d 
Utah K. Civ. P. 59, or 60(a) or 60(b); later, 
however, in a hearing on the matter, Bishop 
modified his motion from a request for im-
peachment or amendment of the verdict un-
der rule 59 or rule 60 to one solely for a 
correction of clerical error under rule 60. 
Bishop conceded that the juror affidavits 
would not support a rule 59 motion to im-
peach the jury verdict. 
U 7 Bishop argued, with the support of the 
juror affidavits, that the jury's allocation er-
ror reduced the final general and special 
damages award announced in the jury ver-
dict to a sum that was 25 percent lower than 
the amount the jury intended to award. 
Bishop maintained that the jury's intent was 
further evidenced by the fact that its special 
damages award was almost exactly 75 per-
cent of the $1,067,000 special damages 
amount presented by Bishop's expert witness 
to the jury at trial. The trial court conclud-
ed that Bishop's motion to amend the jury 
verdict was in reality a motion to impeach 
the verdict and ruled that the affidavits were 
not admissible pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 
59(a)(2). In its order, however, the trial 
court did not specifically address Bishop's 
rule 60 motion to amend. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1-4] 118 The application of the LRA in 
apportioning fault is a legal question of statu-
tory construction, which we review for cor-
rectness. Field v. Boyer Co., L.C., 952 P.2d 
1078, 1079 (Utah 1998). A district court's 
disposition of a summary judgment motion is 
a question of law that we review for correct-
ness. Schiutz u. BMW of North America, 
Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111-12 (Utah 1991). 
"We accord a trial court's interpretation of a 
contract no deference and review it for cor-
rectness." Aquayen Int'l, Inc., v. Calrae 
Trust, 972 P.2d 411, 413 (Utah 1998). Mixed 
questions of law and fact are reviewed for 
abuse of discretion in applying the law to the 
facts. Woodhaven Apartments v. Washiny-
»• We note that the general application oi respon-
deat superior requires an employer lo be respon-
sible for the actions of an emplo\ee where the 
ernplo\ce, acting within the scope of her employ-
ment, injures a third part\ In this case the 
employee is the injured part}, not the part\ caus-
ENTEC INC. Utah 2 2 1 
218 (Utah 2002) 
ton, 942 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1997) (citing 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)). 
ANALYSIS 
I. LIABILITY REFORM ACT 
15 J 11 9 GenTec and Valley Asphalt argue 
that the trial court should have combined 
Bishop's negligence with that of his employ-
er, Valley Asphalt, under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior. Alternatively, GenTec 
and Valley Asphalt also argue that if the 
doctrine of respondeat superior does not ap-
ply, the reapportionment provision of the 
LRA, section 78-27-39(2)(a), is unconstitu-
tional under the Uniform Operation of Laws 
clause of the Utah Constitution, Utah Const, 
art. I section 24, and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the federal constitution, U.S. 
Const, amend. XIV, section 1. The first 
question before us therefore concerns the 
interaction between the LRA and the com-
mon law doctrine of respondeat superior.1 
Utah has adopted the common law, except 
for instances where the common law is con-
trary to or conflicts with the United States 
Constitution, the Utah Constitution, a stat-
ute, or Utah public policy. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 68-3-1 (2001). In determining 
whether a state statute pre-empts the com-
mon law, we have used the federal model for 
determining whether federal law pre-empts 
state law. See Gilcjer v. Hernandez, 2000 UT 
23, 1111, 997 P.2d 305. The United States 
Supreme Court has stated, 
[i] Sometimes courts, when facing the 
pre-emption question, find language in the 
. . statute that reveals an explicit [legisla-
tive] intent to pre-empt [common] law. [ii] 
More often, explicit pre-emption language 
does not appear, or does not directly an-
swer the question. In that event, courts 
must consider whether the . . . statute's 
"structure and purpose," or nonspecific 
statutory language, nonetheless re\eal a 
clear, but implicit, pre-emptive intent. 
ing injury, and, thus, use of respondeat superior 
under such circumstances would be pioblemutic 
in any event In this case, howexer, we need not 
address this problem because we conclude that 
the doctrine has been pie-empted, as discussed 
hereafter. 
2 2 2 Utah 48 PACIFIC REPORTER, 3d SERIES 
[a] A . . . statute, for example, may 
create a scheme of [statutoryj regulation 
"so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
inference that [the legislature] left no room 
for the [common law] to supplement it." 
[b] Alternatively, [statutory] law may 
be in "irreconcilable conflict" with [the 
common] law. Compliance with both 
for example, may be a "physical impossibil-
ity," or, 
[c] the [common] law may "stand as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of 
[the legislature]." 
Id. (citing Burnett Bank of Marion County v. 
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31, 116 S.Ct. 1103, 134 
L.Ed.2d 237 (1996) (citations omitted)). 
U 10 The Utah Legislature did not explicit-
ly pre-empt the common law doctrine of re-
spondeat superior when it passed the LRA. 
Therefore, we look to the statute's structure 
and purpose to determine whether it reflects 
an implied legislate, e intent to do so. We 
conclude that the state statute and the com-
mon lawr principle are in conflict, and that the 
common law must necessarily give way to the 
statute. Compliance with both is impossible. 
Additionally, the "[common] law . . . *stand[s] 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of [the legislature].' " Id. 
Ull Application of the common law doc-
trine of respondeat superior to determine 
fault allocation in this case would undermine 
the legislature's objectives in enacting the 
LRA. Under the plain language of the stat-
ute, the only time the principle of respondeat 
superior could theoretically apply is in the 
initial apportionment of fault under section 
78-27-39(1), in cases where the person seek-
ing recovery is not an employee. As reallo-
cation under the statute occurs only when 
the plaintiff is an employee of an immune 
employer, the principle of respondeat superi-
or cannot operate to combine the employee's 
and the employer's fault in the initial alloca-
tion pursuant to section 78-27-39(1), or in 
the reallocation under section 78-27-39(2)(a). 
If it did, the effects of section 78-27-38(2), 
permitting recovery for an injured plaintiff 
from any defendant "whose fault, combined 
with the fault of persons immune from suit, 
exceeds the fault of the [plaintiff]," Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-38(2X2001;, would be 
completely nullified. The combined fault of a 
defendant and an immune employer would 
always be greater than that of the plain-
tiff7employee if the plaintiff/employee's fault 
were to be attributed to the employer; the 
combined fault would, by definition, be 100 
percent. The LRA must pre-empt the com-
mon law; otherwise sections 78-27-38(2) and 
78-27-39(2)(a) would be without meaning or 
function. 
H 12 More explicitly, we believe that the 
history of the allocation and reallocation pro-
visions of the LRA reveals a legislate e intent 
to override the operation of respondeat supe-
rior in this situation. Recent amendments to 
the LRA were undertaken by the legislature 
in specific response to Sullivan v. Scoulur 
Grain Co. of Utah, 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993). 
One of the issues addressed in Sullivan was 
whether a jury could apportion fault to an 
injured employee's employer where the em-
ployer was a party immune from suit. Upon 
a plain reading of the statute and a review of 
the legislative history, wre determined that 
the LRA required apportionment both to 
immune parties and to defendants in order to 
prevent a "defendant [from being] held liable 
for damages in excess of its proportion of 
fault" in violation of the statutory language. 
Id. at 879. The dissent in Sullivan pointed 
out that the result wrould seriously curtail 
employee recovery, id. at 886 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting), but the majority felt obliged to 
follow the statutory language. Id. at 881. 
The legislature took notice of the case, and, 
in 1994 after vigorous debate, amended the 
LRA to provide for reallocation of fault in 
cases where the fault of all parties immune 
from suit is less than 40 percent. Section 
78-27-38 was amended by adding the lan-
guage "under Section 78-27-39" to read, "No 
defendant is liable to any person seeking 
recovery for an amount in excess of the 
proportion of fault attributed to that defen-
dant under Section 78-27-39." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-38(3) (2001). The legislature 
thus balanced the factors for and against 
reallocation of fault and found that realloca-
tion between the plaintiff and the defendant 
was a better policy than forcing the plaintiff 
BISHOP v. GENTEC INC. 
Cite as 48 P.3d 218 (Utah 2002) Utah 223 
to bear the full burden of the immune party's 
fault. "Thus, in some instances the [revised] 
statutory scheme itself holds defendants lia-
ble for some percentage of fault initially at-
tributable to a person immune from suit." 
field v. Boyer Co., L.C., 952 P.2d 1078, 1081-
82 (Utah 1998). 
113 Valley Asphalt's and GenTec's reli-
ance on respondeat superior is in effect a 
challenge to the operation of the reapportion-
ment provisions of the LRA, section 78-27-
39(2)(a). Their position, if accepted, would 
recreate the Sullivan dilemma. Through the 
doctrine of respondeat superior, Valley As-
phalt and GenTec seek to reject the legisla-
ture's explicit resolution of that dilemma. 
GenTec's and Valley Asphalt's contention 
that fault should not be reallocated to a 
defendant in excess of the liability originally 
attributed to that defendant is therefore una-
vailing in light of the legislature's 1994 
amendment to the LRA.2 The trial court 
correctly determined that the LRA pre-
empted the common law. 
[6,7] 1114 GenTec and Valley Asphalt 
also argue that the reallocation provision of 
the LRA should be declared unconstitutional 
under the Uniform Operation of Laws provi-
sion of the Utah Constitution, art. I, section 
24, and federal equal protection jurispru-
dence. Article I, section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution provides that "[a]ll laws of a 
general nature shall have uniform operation." 
"In scrutinizing a legislative measure under 
article I, § 24, we must determine whether 
the classification is reasonable, whether the 
objectives of the legislative action are legiti-
mate, and whether there is a reasonable rela-
tionship between the classification and th^ 
legislative purposes." Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 
(Utah 1989). 
2. We note that anothei historic common law 
doctrine abandoned by the LRA, that of joint and 
seieial liabihtv, would have made GenTec liable 
for the entire amount ot the damages. GenTec 
would piesumabh agree that the result com-
pelled by the LRA is belter than the result under 
this common law pimciple The legislatuie's 
decision to implement the LRA was premised on 
fairness. See Float Debate, Utah Senate, 46th 
Leg 1986, Geneial Sess . Senate Day 31, Records 
No. 63 (Feb 12, 1986). Fairness'includes not 
onh fairness to the defendant, but also fairness 
1115 GenTec and Valley Asphalt argue that 
the failure to include an injured employee's 
fault with that of his or her employer under 
the common law doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior creates an unconstitutional classification. 
They assert that this classification unduly 
burdens non-immune defendants because 
they may become liable for fault in excess of 
the fault initially attributed to them, at least 
where the immune party's fault is less than 
40 percent. 
H 16 AJS explained above, the legislature 
never intended the fault initially attributed to 
the injured employee to be combined, pursu-
ant to respondeat superior, with the fault of 
the employer in the reallocation. The legis-
lature recognized the injustice of a specific 
classification where an injured employee or a 
partially at-fault defendant third party would 
have to bear or share the burden of an 
immune employer's fault. The classification 
they settled on responds in a rational way to 
the conflict between protection of the inter-
ests of plaintiff-employees and of defendants. 
The amended statute strives to balance and 
protect the interests of both. Where the 
immune employer's fault is greater than 40 
percent, the injured plaintiff-employee bears 
the burden of the employer's fault, but where 
the employer's fault is less than 40 percent, 
the injured plaintiff-employee proportionate-
ly shares the burden of the employer's fault 
with non-immune defendants. The 40 per-
cent fault threshold is a reasonable cut-off 
point; the statutory scheme legitimately 
strives to balance and protect both defen-
dants and injured employees. The classifica-
tion therefore serves a legitimate legislative 
purpose: to balance economic burdens be-
tween an injured employee and a defendant 
where an immune employer is also at fault. 
to the plaintiff. The legislature made a policy 
judgment after Sullivan that illustrated the di-
lemma cieated by the original statute and deter-
mined that the best policy was to shaie the 
burden ol an immune party's liabihtv in certain 
cases between the plaintilf and the defendants 
instead of making the plaintilf bear the lull bur-
den. We cannot see how spreading this burden 
proportionally between parties is unconstitution-
al Certainly, the result that GenTec and VaIIe\ 
Asphalt ad\ocate would not be fauei 
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1117 Likewise, we conclude that the eco-
nomic classification undertaken by the legis-
lature here easily meets the "rational basis" 
standard required by the Equal Protection 
Clause of the federal constitution; the legis-
lature's classification, as discussed above, was 
entirely reasonable and legitimate. There-
fore, neither the Uniform Operation of Laws 
provision nor the Equal Protection Clause 
requires us to invalidate the LRA with re-
spect to reallocation; the legislature's policy 
choice to reallocate the burden of an immune 
party's fault proportionally in some circum-
stances between defendants and plaintiffs is 
constitutional. 
II. CONTRACT PROVISIONS 
[8J 118 Valley Asphalt argues that the 
trial court improperly granted summary 
judgment with respect to certain indemnifica-
tion provisions found on the reverse side of 
the GenTec invoice for the equipment in-
volved in Bishop's accident. We have previ-
ously stated that "[on] grounds of public 
policy, parties to a contract may not general-
ly exempt a seller of a product from strict 
tort liability for physical harm to a user or 
consumer unless the exemption term 'is fairly 
bargained for and is consistent with the poli-
cy underlying that [strict tort] liability.' " 
Inteiivest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 
1356 (Utah 1996) (quoting Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts § 195(3) (1981)). Com-
ment (c) to the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts, section 195, indicates that agreements 
exempting a seller from strict products liabil-
ity are unenforceable.3 
[9-11] 1119 In the context of negligence, 
we have consistently held that an "indemnity 
agreement which purports to make a party 
respond for the negligence of another should 
be strictly construed." Freund v. Utah Pow-
er & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 370 (1990). In 
construing such agreements, we have looked 
at the "objectives of the parties and the 
surrounding facts and circumstances" in in-
terpreting the contractual language. Id. "In 
3. In accoid with the Restatement, the Utah Leg-
islature promulgated section 78-15-7 on March 
15, 2000, which voids any agreement to exempt a 
seller of a product from strict products liability 
on grounds of public policv. Section 78-15-7 is 
general, the common law disfa\ors agree-
ments that indemnify parties against their 
own negligence because 'one might be care-
less of another's life and limb, if there is no 
penalty for carelessness.' " Hawkins v. 
Peait 2001 UT 94, <I 14, 37 P.3d 1062 (citing 
Hyde v. Chevron USA, 697 F.2d 614, 632 
(5th Cir.1983)). Parties seeking to exempt 
themsehes from tort liability must " 'clearly 
and unequivocally' express an intent to limit 
tort liability" within the contract. See Inter-
west, 923 P.2d at 1356 (quoting DCR, Inc. v. 
Peak Alarm Co, 663 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 
1983)). "Without such an expression of in-
tent, 'the presumption is against any such 
intention, and it is not achieved by inference 
or implication from general language ' " 
Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, we will 
not infer an intention to indemnify against 
other kinds of liability, including strict liabili-
ty, where such intention is not clearly ex-
pressed. 
11 20 The two pertinent paragraphs found 
on the reverse side of the GenTec invoice 
read as follows: 
INDEMNIFICATION 
Customer shall indemnify and hold GenTec 
harmless from all expenses (including at-
torney's fees), claims, demands, suits, 
judgments, actions, costs, and liabilities 
(including without limitation those alleging 
GenTec's own negligence) ivluch arise 
from, relate to or are connected witii the 
Customer's negligent possessioii, use, op-
eratio)i or resale of the equipment and 
other goods described herein or any manu-
als, instructions, drawings or specifications 
related thereto. 
(Emphasis added.) 
INSTALLATION 
Customer shall be solely responsible at its 
cost for the installation and erection of the 
equipment and other goods purchased. Al-
though GenTec may in some cases provide 
a serviceman, data, manuals, instructions, 
drawings or specifications to aid Customer 
with installation or start-up.[sic] GenTec 
inapplicable to the current case because the acci-
dent here occurred before the new section \vas> 
adopted. The statute nonetheless reflects the 
legislature's view of public policy on this ques-
tion. 
3ISHOP v. GENTEC INC. 
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Vtnh 99^ 
a^umes no responsibility for proper instal-
lation or support of the equipment or other 
uuods when erected and disclaims any ex-
press or implied warranties with respect to 
such installation or support. Whether or 
not data manuals, instructions, drawings or 
specifications are provided or a serviceman 
aids in the installation, Customer shall in-
demnify and hold GenTec harmless from 
all expenses (including attorney's fees), 
claims, demands, suits, judgments, ac-
tions, costs, and liabilities (including 
without limitation those alleging GenTec's 
own negligence) which may anse from, 
relate to, or be connected with damage or 
personal injury ansing out of the installa-
tion, erection, staH-up, or use of the equip-
ment and other goods purchased (including 
any manuals, instmctions, or drawings re-
lated thereto). 
(Emphasis added.) 
11 21 The plain reading of the paragraph 
entitled "INDEMNIFICATION" restricts 
Valley Asphalt's agreement to indemnify to 
those situations where Valley Asphalt itself is 
negligent. Thus, where Valley Asphalt is not 
negligent, Valley Asphalt has no duty to in-
demnify GenTec at all. Furthermore, there 
is no reference in the indemnification lan-
guage to products liability. GenTec included 
a parenthetical clause to indicate that "liabili-
ties" specifically included GenTec's own neg-
ligence, but we will not read that reference to 
include products liability, in view of the prin-
ciples of strict construction to which we ad-
here in this area. 
1122 Analysis of the paragraph entitled 
"INSTALLATION" results in a similar con-
clusion. In the relevant portion of the "IN-
STALLATION" paragraph, GenTec purports 
to disclaim any liability for damage or per-
sonal injury "arising out of the installation, 
erection, start-up, or use of the equipment." 
That language must be read in accordance 
with the paragraph as a whole, which notes 
that Valley Asphalt is solely responsible for 
installation. Thus, whereas the INDEMNI-
FICATION paragraph purports to protect 
GenTec generally from any liability for negli-
gence when injuries "arise from [Valley As-
phalt's] negligent possession, use, operation 
or resale" of equipment, the INSTALLA-
TION paragraph specifically protects Gen-
Tec for injuries arising out of "the installa-
tion, erection, start-up, or use" thereof. By 
definition, injuries arising from Valley As-
phalt's installation could not be attributed to 
the condition of the product when sold (prod-
ucts liability), and therefore the INSTALLA-
TION paragraph cannot be read to provide 
indemnification for products liability. Thus, 
GenTec is not entitled to indemnification for 
Bishop's products liability claim. 
[12] U23 GenTec has also argued on ap-
peal that the plaintiffs cause of action 
against it was tried to the jury as both a 
products liability claim and a negligence 
claim, and that it is therefore entitled to the 
protections in the INDEMNIFICATION 
paragraph for negligence. We disagree. 
Bishop's complaint against GenTec contains 
only one cause of action, for "Products Lia-
bility (Strict Liability in Tort)." The com-
plaint alleges a defective and dangerous 
product, and asserts that the product was 
defectively designed and manufactured. It 
also alleges, as part of the defective design 
theory, that GenTec "so negligently, careless-
ly and recklessly designed, manufactured, 
. . . sold, . . . serviced and failed to warn 
relative to said silo system . . . so as to 
directly and legally cause the accident, inju-
ries and damages to plaintiff as described 
herein, . . . as a result of the unreasonably 
dangerous defects in the silo system design, 
the plaintiffs' husband and father, Douglas J. 
Bishop, was fatally injured." 
f 24 In several memoranda to the trial 
court, and now on appeal, GenTec cites the 
foregoing language as evidencing a theory of 
recovery for ordinary negligence, which it 
argues should bring Bishop's claim within the 
negligence language of the INDEMNIFICA-
TION & INSTALLMENT provisions of the 
contract. GenTec has misapprehended the 
applicable principles of products liability law. 
[13] H 25 Products liability always re-
quires proof of a defective product, which can 
include "manufacturing flaws, design defects, 
and inadequate warnings regarding use." 
Gmndberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 92 
(Utah 1991). Alternative theories are avail-
able to prove different categories of defective 
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product, including negligence, strict liability, 
or implied warranty of merchantability. See, 
e.g., Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product 
Liability § 2 cmt. n (1997). Alternative theo-
ries entail different evidentiary burdens. 
For example, proof of a defect under a negli-
gent manufacture theory will necessitate 
proof that the defective condition of the prod-
uct was the result of negligence in the manu-
facturing process, or proof that the manufac-
turer knew or should have known of the 
defective condition, whereas these elements 
are unnecessary under strict liability or 
breach of warranty theories. Whatever the 
theory, however, the defendant's liability is 
for the defective product, and not merely for 
any underlying negligence. See generally, 63 
Am.Jur.2d Products Liability § 8 (1996) ("In 
a products liability action, a defect in a prod-
uct may consist of a mistake in manufactur-
ing, improper design, or the inadequacy or 
absence of warnings regarding the use of the 
product.") 
II 26 Thus, allegations of negligence con-
tained in a claim for products liability do not 
transform the claim into one for ordinary 
negligence. GenTec has overlooked this 
principle in construing the import of the Spe-
cial Verdict Form returned by the jury in 
this case. The Verdict Form asked: "1 . When 
the product, the silo, left the defendant Gen-
Tec, was it in a defective condition, making 
the product unreasonably dangerous to the 
decedent?" and "3. Was the manufacturer, 
GenTec, negligent?" Both questions were 
answered in the affirmative by the jury, and 
GenTec now argues that the answer to ques-
tion three demonstrates that this case was 
"submitted to the jury on negligence theo-
ries." We conclude, however, that the refer-
ence to negligence in question three could 
only have been connected to the plaintiffs 
theory of a product defect based on negli-
gence, as an alternative to its theory of a 
product defect based on strict liability, which 
was addressed by question one. At least one 
state has expressly held that the adoption of 
strict liability doctrine does not abolish the 
theory of "product liability negligence" as 
proof of a product defect, Big Rivers Elec. 
Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 820 F.Supp. 1123, 
1127 (S.D.Ind.1992), and no argument has 
been made in this case that the theories are 
mutually exclusive or inconsistent. See also 
.Monsanto Co. v. Reed. 950 S.W.2d 811, 814 
(Ky.1997). Therefore, we reject GenTec's 
argument that this claim sounded in negli-
gence and was covered by the invoice's in-
demnification language. 
III. JURY VERDICT 
[14J 1127 Bishop appeals the trial court's 
denial of his motion to amend the jury ver-
dict pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60. Bishop 
also appeals the trial court's decision to 
strike the juror affidavits. GenTec properly 
argues that we should review a trial court's 
determination under Utah R. Civ. P. 59 and 
60(b) pursuant to an abuse of discretion stan-
dard. We do not address rule 59, however, 
as rule 59 was not argued by Bishop to the 
trial court. 
115 J M 28 As noted above, Bishop original-
ly filed a motion with the trial court pursuant 
to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a) or (b) to amend the 
jury verdict to correct a clerical error; alter-
natively, the motion asked the court to 
amend the jury verdict pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 59. In spite of the caption of the 
motion referring to the alternative theory, 
Bishop actually argued at the hearing on the 
motion only for a correction of the jury ver-
dict under rule 60. Further, Bishop's coun-
sel orally conceded at the hearing that no 
tenable basis for relief existed under rule 59. 
"[I]t is the substance, not the labeling, of a 
motion that is dispositive in determining the 
character of the motion." Bair v. Axiom 
Design, L.L.C.. 2001 UT 20, 11 9, 20 P.3d 388. 
Thus, even though the motion was captioned 
as either a rule 60 or a rule 59 motion, we 
conclude that its substance requires us to 
treat it as a rule 60 motion to correct a 
clerical error. 
11 29 Basing its ruling on Rosenlof v. Sulli-
van, 676 P.2d 372 (Utah 1983), which dealt 
with a rule 59 motion for a new trial, the trial 
court denied Bishop's motion and struck the 
juror affidavits pursuant to rule 59. The 
trial court did not state its grounds for deny-
ing Bishop's motion under rule 60, other than 
explaining that it believed Bishop's motion 
was substantively a motion to impeach the 
jury verdict pursuant to rule 59. We dis-
BISHOP v. GENTEC INC. 
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agree with the trial judge's characterization correct a jury 
0f the substance of the motion and conclude 
that Utah R. Civ. P. 60 is determinative, that 
the affidavits were admissible, and that the 
jury verdict should be amended to reflect the 
true intent of the jury. 
H 30 "The correction contemplated by rule 
(30(a) must be undertaken for the purpose of 
reflecting the actual intention of . . . the par-
ties." Lindsay v. Atkin. 680 P.2d 401, 402 
(Utah 1984). "[I]n this broad approach to 
correctability under Rule 60(a), it matters 
little whether an error was made by the 
court clerk, the jury foreman, counsel, a par-
ty, or the judge himself, so long as it is 
clearly a formal error that should be correct-
ed in the interest of having judgment, order, 
or other part of the record reflect what was 
done or intended." Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. 
Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah 1983) 
(quoting Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Con-
struction of Rule 60(a) of Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure Authorizing Coirection of 
Clerical Mistakes in Judgements, Orders, or 
other Parts of Record, and Errors Therein, 
13 A.L.R. Fed. 794 (1972)). 
1131 Prior to the adoption of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, we addressed the 
issue of whether a trial court could correct a 
jury verdict to reflect the true intent of the 
jury. In Movlton v. Staats, 83 Utah 197, 27 
P.2d 455 (1933), we allowed the trial court to 
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verdict to reflect the true 
intent of the jury. In Sunilwud Corp. v. 
Radclitfe, 576 P.2d 847 (Utah 1978), Justice 
Maughan argued that juror affidavits were 
admissible "to demonstrate what verdict was 
actually agreed upon." Id. at 850 (Maughan, 
J., dissenting).1 Similarly we noted in 
Brown v. Johnson, 24 Utah 2d 388, 472 P.2d 
942 (1970), that "[w]hile jurors may not by 
affidavit or otherwise impeach their verdict, 
they may give proof to explain it." Id. at 946 
n. 1 More recently, the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals has also determined that, under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a jury 
verdict may be corrected to reflect the true 
intent of the jury. See East ridge Dev. Co. v. 
Halpert Assocs., Inc., 853 F.2d 772, 783 (10th 
Cir.1988).5 
U 32 Bishop is not arguing in this case that 
the mistake was a judicial error made in 
rendering the judgment, but rather that the 
error was clerical and was made by the jury 
in "recording the judgment as rendered." 
We agree that accurately recording the in-
tent of the jury in its calculation of the 
damage award constitutes correction of a 
clerical error, not a judicial error. "The 
distinction between judicial error and clerical 
error . . . depends on whether it was made in 
rendering the judgment or in recording the 
judgment as rendered." Richards v. Siddo-
4. The court did not decide this issue as it was not 
property before the cour t on appeal. 
5. A split of author i ty current ly exists over wheth-
er a cour t can admit evidence, including ju ror 
affidavits and test imony, to determine whether 
the jury verdict reflects the true intent of the jury 
and to co r rec t the ju ry verdict. Jurisdictions 
admitting evidence to correct a jury verdict in-
clude: United States v. Stauffer, 922 F.2d 508, 
513 (9th Cir .1990) (criminal case); Karl v. Bur-
lington N. R.R. Co., 880 F.2d 68, 73 (8th Cir. 
1989) (nar rowly in terpret ing the clerical erroi 
exception to apply to an e r ror in transmission of 
the jury verdict) ; East ridge Dev. Co. v. Halpert 
Assoc."Inc., 853 F.2d 772, 783 (10th Cir.1988); 
Attndge v. Cencotp Div. of Dover Techs. Int'l, Inc.. 
836 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir.1987); Umphiey v. 
Spiinkcl. 106 Idaho 700, 682 P.2d 1247, 1254-55 
U983), Latino v. Crane Rental Co., 417 Mass. 
426. 630 N.E.2d 591 , 593 (1994); Moisakis v. 
Allied Bldg. Prods. Corp., 265 A.D.2d 457, 697 
N'.Y.S2d 100, 105-06 (1999) (noting that ju ror 
evidence can be used to, correct clerical errors , 
but not to de te rmine the extent of ju ror confu-
sion r ega id ing the verdict as rendered) ; Newpott 
Fisherman's Supply Co. v. Derecktor, 569 A.2d 
1051, 1052-53 (R.I.1990); State v. Williuuette, 
190 Wis.2d 677, 526 N.W.2d 144, 151 (1995) 
(cr iminal case, but extended by the Wisconsin 
S u p r e m e Court to both civil and cr iminal cases); 
i>ee aLo 8 Wigmore , Evidence § 2355 (Chad-
b o u r n e rev. 1978) (discussing the admissibility of 
evidence to cor rec t a jury verdict); J.F. Ghent, 
Annotat ion, Competency of Juror's Statement or 
Affidavit to Show That Verdict in Civil Case Was 
Not Correctly Recorded. 18 A . L . R J d 1132 § 3 
(1968) (discussing cases that allow clerical e r ro r 
except ion) . 
Jur isdic t ions not admit t ing evidence to c o n e c t 
a jury verdict include; Plummer v. Spungfield 
Term" Ry., 5 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993), Cyi v. 
Michaud, 454 A.2d 1376, 1383-84 (Me. 1983); 
McKinney v. Smith, 63 N.M. 477, 322 P 2d 110, 
111 (1958); see aLo J .F . Ghent, Annotation, 
Competency of Juror's Statement or Affidavit to 
Show That Verdict in Civil Case Was Not Correct l\ 
Recorded, 18 A . L . R J d 1132, §§ 6-7 (1968) (dis-
cuss ing cases that do not allow clerical e r ro r 
except ion) . 
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ivay, 24 Utah 2d 314, 471 P.2d 143, 145 (1970) 
(quoting 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 202). 
Accordingly, the juror affidavits should have 
been admitted. On remand the jury verdict 
should be corrected to reflect the true intent 
of the jury by increasing the general and 
special damages to $1,000,000 and $1,0(37,000 
respectively, and then deducting Bishop's 
percentage of fault as required by the LRA. 
CONCLUSION 
1133 We affirm the trial court's holding 
that the LRA precludes the application of the 
common law doctrine of respondeat superior; 
the legislature has pre-empted the common 
law. We reverse the trial court's determina-
tion on summary judgment that Valley As-
phalt must indemnify GenTec for all liability. 
Finally, we reverse the trial court's decision 
to strike the juror affidavits and instruct the 
court below to increase the general and spe-
cial damages award to $1,000,000 and 
$1,067,000 respectively, before deducting 
Bishop's percentage of fault. 
11 34 Justice DURRANT, Justice 
WILKINS, and Judge BENCH concur in 
Justice DURHAM'S opinion. 
1135 Associate Chief Justice RUSSON 
concurs in the result. 
II 36 Having disqualified himself, Chief 
Justice HOWE did not participate herein; 
Court of Appeals Judge RUSSELL W. 
BENCH sat. 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Travis E. TELFORD, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 20000654. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 17, 2002. 
Movant sought to correct murder sen-
tence of five years to life imprisonment. The 
First District Court, Brigham City, Ben H. 
Hadlield, J., denied motion. Movant appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court held that: (1) inde-
terminate sentencing scheme did not violate 
the separation of powers clause; (2) accom-
plice liability was not a per se violation of the 
Eighth Amendment; and (3) movant could 
not use motion as a vehicle to attack underly-
ing conviction. 
Affirmed. 
1. Constitutional Law c=>80(2) 
Sentencing and Punishment c=»1005 
Indeterminate sentencing scheme was 
valid as against claim that it violated the 
separation of pow ers clause because it forced 
the sentencing judge to pass on his ultimate 
core judicial function of sentencing to the 
Board of Pardons and Parole. Const. Ait. 5, 
§ 1; U.C.A.1953, 77-18-4. 
2. Sentencing and Punishment c==>1452 
Accomplice liability is not a per se viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment, as the accom-
plice liability statute requires accomplices to 
have a comparable degree of culpability as 
the principal in order to be convicted of the 
same level of offense. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 8; Const. Art. 1, § 9; U.C.A.1953, 76-
2-202. 
3. Sentencing and Punishment e=»2280 
Claims under rule governing motion to 
correct illegal sentence are not restricted by 
time limits for bringing notice of appeal. 
Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 22(e). 
4. Sentencing and Punishment o==2279 
Claims under rule governing motion to 
correct illegal sentence are not waived by 
failure to raise them at the first opportunity 
before the District Court. Rules Crim.Proc., 
Rule 22(e). 
5. Sentencing and Punishment <3=*2279 
An illegal sentence is void and, like is-
sues of jurisdiction, may be raised at any 
time. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 22(e). 
STATE v. 
Cite as 48 P.3d 
t>. Sentencing and Punishment c»2254 
Claims under rule governing motion to 
correct illegal sentence must be narrowly 
circumscribed to prevent abuse. Rules 
Crim-Proc-» ^ u^ e 22(e). 
7. Sentencing and Punishment c=»2250 
Motion to correct sentence was not prop-
er vehicle for movant to raise claim that 
indeterminate sentencing scheme violated 
Sixth Amendment, which only pertained to 
rights of accused persons prior to conviction 
and did not create any distinct rights related 
to sentencing. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6; 
Const. Art. 1, § 12; U.C.A.1953, 77-18-4; 
Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 22(e). 
8. Sentencing and Punishment 0*2250 
Movant could not use motion to correct 
sentence as a means to attack underlying 
murder conviction, which he attempted to do 
by raising constitutional challenges to accom-
plice liability statute. U.C.A.1953, 76-2-202; 
Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 22(e). 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Jeffrey T. 
Colemere, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff. 
Travis E. Telford, pro se. 
PER CURIAM. 
111 Defendant Travis E. Telford was con-
victed of murder and received a sentence of 
five years to life. The Board of Pardons and 
Parole set his parole date in 2018. Telford 
petitioned for extraordinary relief. The dis-
tinct court denied the petition, the court of 
appeals affirmed, and this court declined to 
review the court of appeals' decision on cer-
tiorari. See Telford v. Bd. of Pardons, 29 
P.3d 1 (Utah 2001). 
112 Telford then moved for correction of 
his sentence under rule 22(e) of the Utah 
Rule* of Criminal Procedure. The district 
court denied Telford's motion, and this ap-
peal followed. Telford attacks the constitu-
tionality of Utah's indeterminate sentencing 
scheme, section 77-18-4 of the Utah Code. 
1- For instance, rule 22(c) may be employed to 
coirect a sentence under encumstances where 
the sentencing court had no jurisdiction, or to 
TELFORD Utah 2 2 9 
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He claims indeterminate sentencing "forces 
the sentencing judge . . . to pass on his ulti-
mate core judicial function of sentencing to 
the Utah State Board of Pardons and Pa-
role," in violation of article V, section 1 of the 
Utah Constitution, the separation of powers 
clause. Telford also maintains indeterminate 
sentencing contravenes the Sixth and Eighth 
Amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion, and article I, sections 9 and 12 of the 
Utah Constitution. In particular, he main-
tains that because he was merely an accom-
plice to the murder, the State may not im-
pose the same punishment on him as on his 
co-perpetrator or, for that matter, any other 
person who commits a crime classified as a 
first degree felony. Although his brief is not 
entirely clear on this issue, Telford appears 
to attack indeterminate sentencing on both 
per se and as applied grounds. We address 
his arguments as follows. 
[1J 11 3 This court has already addressed 
and rejected the contention that Utah's inde-
terminate sentencing scheme violates the 
separation of powers clause. See Padilla v. 
Bd. of Pardons, 947 P.2d 664, 668-69 (Utah 
1997). Telford has provided no basis for us 
to depart from our established precedent. 
We therefore reject his separation of powers 
argument. 
[2] U 4 To the extent Telford argues ac-
complice liability under section 76-2-202 of 
the Utah Code is a per se violation of the 
Eighth Amendment and article I, section 9 of 
the Utah Constitution, his contentions like-
wise fail. The accomplice liability provision 
requires the fact finder to determine that the 
accomplice had the same mental state as the 
person who directly committed the crime. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202. Because 
the statute requires that accomplices bear a 
comparable degree of culpability to be con-
victed of the same level of offense, Telford's 
argument is meritless. 
L3-6] 11 5 The balance of Telford's argu-
ments are not properly raised under rule 
22(e). The purpose of rule 22(e) is to allow 
correction of manifestly illegal sentences.1 
conect a sentence be\ond the authonzed statuto-
ry range See State ~v Babbel. 813 P 2d 86, 87 
(Utah 1991) 
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EXHIBIT 12 
DAVID SLAGLE (A2975) 
ROBERT R. HARRISON (A7878) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Ashley Valley Medical Center 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LORI HAASE, 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY 
Plaintiff, INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL 
VERDICT 
vs. 
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL No. 98-0800377 
CENTER, 
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
Defendant. 
Defendant, Ashley Valley Medical Center, hereby requests that the Court instruct the 
jury in accordance with proposed instructions numbered 1 through U , inclusive. Defendant 
further requests that the Court submit the case to the jury on special verdict in accordance with 
the form submitted herewith. 
DATED this 2 / f day of February, 2002. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
David W.^lagle (J 
Robert R. Harrison 
Attorneys for Defendant 
INSTRUCTION NO. > 
It is my duty to instruct you in the law that applies to this case, and it is your duty, as 
jurors, to follow the law as I state it to you, regardless of what you personally believe the law is 
or ought to be. Even if you do not like the laws that must be applied, you must use them. On 
the other hand, it is your exclusive duty to determine the facts in this case, and to consider and 
weigh the evidence for that purpose. Your responsibility must be exercised with sincere 
judgment, sound discretion and honest deliberation. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
In this case, the plaintiff alleges she was injured by a surgeon during an operation he 
performed in 1996. Her claim against the surgeon, Dr. Thomas Hawkes, has been settled and his 
negligence is not at issue in this trial. This trial is about what happened before her surgery. 
The plaintiff claims that Ashley Valley Medical Center is responsible for her injury 
because it allowed Dr. Hawkes to use its operating room facilities. Specifically, she claims Dr. 
Hawkes made mistakes during the surgery; that the mistakes were made because he was impaired; 
that the hospital administrators knew or should have known about his alleged impairment; and that 
the hospital administrators were negligent in not taking away his privilege to use the operating 
room. 
The plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Dr. Hawkes was 
impaired when he performed her surgery; that he would not have caused her injury but for his 
impairment; that the hospital failed to meet the standard for evaluating Dr. Hawkes; and that if 
the standard were met, it would have chosen to take away his privileges. You will be required 
to answer questions on the Verdict Form as to each of these issues. If you find that plaintiff has 
not met her burden on each issue, by a preponderance of the evidence, you will answer each such 
question "no." 
INSTRUCTION NO. Z 
Whenever in these instructions it is stated that the burden, or the burden of proof, rests 
upon a certain party to prove a certain allegation made by him, the meaning of such an instruction 
is this: That unless the truth of that allegation is proved by a preponderance of the evidence, you 
shall find that the same is not true. If the evidence is evenly balanced, as to its convincing force 
on any allegation, you must find that such allegation has not been proved. 
INSTRUCTION NO. J± 
The party upon whom the burden of proof rests must sustain it by a preponderance of the 
evidence. You should not base your verdict on speculation or conjecture as to negligence upon 
the part of either party or as to the cause of the injury or as to damage claimed. 
If the evidence does not preponderate in favor of the party making the claim of negligence, 
proximate cause or damage, then that party has failed to fulfill his burden of proof and your 
finding must be against that party on that issue. 
INSTRUCTION NO. *( 
The term "preponderance of the evidence" means that evidence which, in your minds, 
seems to be of the greater weight; the most convincing and satisfactory. The preponderance of 
the evidence is not determined by the number of witnesses, nor the amount of the testimony, but 
by the convincing character of the testimony, weighed impartially, fairly and honestly by you. 
If the evidence is evenly balanced as to its convincing force on any allegation, you must find that 
such allegation has not been proved. 
INSTRUCTION NO. io 
This case must not be decided for or against anyone because you feel sorry for anyone or 
angry at anyone. It is your sworn duty to decide this case based on the facts and the law, without 
regard to sympathy, passion or prejudice. 
INSTRUCTION NO. "7 
This case must be decided only upon the evidence which you have heard from the 
witnesses, and have seen in the form of documents, photographs or other tangible things admitted 
into evidence. 
Anything you may have seen or heard from any other source may not be considered by you 
in arriving at your verdict. 
You should not consider as evidence any statement of the lawyers made during trial. 
INSTRUCTION NO. £ 
Remember, the lawyers are not on trial. Your feelings about them should not influence 
your decision in this case. The lawyers are here to represent the best interests of their clients. It 
is the duty of the lawyer on each side of a case to object when the other side offers evidence which 
the lawyer believes is not admissible. You should not speculate as to the reasons for the 
objections, nor should you allow yourself to become angry at a party because a party's lawyer has 
made objections. 
INSTRUCTION NO. Q 
Your verdict must be based solely and exclusively upon the evidence in this case and upon 
the instructions outlining the law as given to you by the Court. You should not be influenced by 
preconceived opinions or prejudices or by sympathy or any other motive except to do justice 
between the parties to this case. You should not allow any sympathy which you may have for the 
Plaintiff to influence you in any degree whatsoever in arriving at your verdict. This does not 
mean that you may not sympathize with the Plaintiff, because it is only natural and human to 
sympathize with persons who have sustained misfortune, but you are instructed that you must not 
permit your feelings of sympathy to influence a fair and impartial consideration of the evidence. 
Further, you are not permitted to base your verdict on speculation, guesswork or 
conjecture, nor upon what you think ought to be the law or the facts in this case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the 
evidence. In judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the witnesses, you have a right 
to take into consideration any biases, any interest in the result, and any motive or lack of motive 
to testify fairly. You may consider the witnesses' conduct while testifying before you, the 
reasonableness of their statements, their apparent frankness or candor, or the want of it, their 
opportunity to know, their ability to understand, and their capacity to remember. You should 
consider these matters you believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses' 
statements. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ' f 
In resolving any conflict that may exist in the testimony of medical experts, you may 
compare and weigh the opinion of one expert against that of another. In doing this, you may 
consider the relative qualifications and credibility of the expert witnesses, as well as the reasons 
for each opinion and the facts and other matters on which such opinions are based. 
INSTRUCTION NO. \1s 
An opinion is the expression of a conclusion or judgment which does not purport to be 
based on actual knowledge. In determining whether a particular statement was a statement of fact 
or merely an expression of opinion, you may consider the surrounding circumstances under which 
it was made, the manner in which the statement was made and the ordinary effect of the words 
used. You may also consider the relationship of the parties and the subject matter with which the 
statement was concerned. 
INSTRUCTION NO. / 3 
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinions of a witness to be received as 
evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. Witnesses who, by 
education, study and experience, have become expert in some art, science, profession or calling, 
may state opinions as to any such matter in which that witness is qualified as an expert, so long 
as it is material and relevant to the case. You should consider such expert opinion and the 
reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound by such an opinion. Give it the weight you think 
it deserves. If you should decide that the opinions of an expert witness are not based upon 
sufficient education and experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons given in support 
of the opinions are not sound, or that such opinions are outweighed by other evidence, you may 
disregard the opinion entirely. 
INSTRUCTION NO. H 
A proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, 
produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred. A proximate cause 
is one which sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury. Expert testimony is required 
to show proximate cause in a claim of negligent credentialing. 
INSTRUCTION NO- h 
On the Special Verdict, which requires you to answer specific questions, you will see that 
question number four asks you to find from a preponderance of the evidence, whether the hospital, 
through its administrators, was negligent in not restricting Dr. Thomas Hawkes' operating room 
privileges. In order to answer this question, if it becomes necessary to do so, you will have to 
decide whether the hospital acted below the appropriate standard of care. To do so would be 
negligence. 
The only way you may properly learn the applicable standard of care is through evidence 
presented during this trial by individuals testifying as expert witnesses and through other evidence 
admitted for the purpose of defining the standard of care. 
In deciding whether a hospital properly fulfilled its duties, you are not permitted to use a 
standard derived from your own experience with physicians, hospitals or any other standard of 
your own. 
INSTRUCTION NO. / ^ 
The fact that, for purposes of this suit, the hospital has stipulated that Dr. Thomas Hawkes 
was negligent during the operation that he performed on Lori Haase, should not be taken by you 
as any proof or indication that the hospital was negligent. As you have been told elsewhere in 
these instructions, the claims against the hospital are separate and distinct from the issues 
concerning whether Dr. Hawkes was or was not negligent. 
INSTRUCTION NO. H 
You must determine whether Defendant complied with the standards of care applicable to 
it based upon the information available to it prior to the Plaintiffs surgery, rather than on the 
basis of facts which are revealed by later developments. 
INSTRUCTION NO. JE 
The Plaintiff bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, which 
evidence must include expert testimony, that the hospital's negligence, if any, more likely than 
not caused the injury or loss of which the Plaintiff complains. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ! * 
Plaintiff is not entitled to your verdict merely by showing, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that a defendant failed to conform to the standard of care elsewhere defined in these 
Instructions. Plaintiff must also prove, by a preponderance of expert medical testimony, that the 
injury or loss of which he complains would not have occurred if Ashley Valley Medical Center 
had conformed to the standard of care. In this connection, it is not enough for Plaintiff to have 
shown that the result might have been different, or that there is a possibility that the result would 
have been different, had a defendant conformed to the standard of care. In other words, unless 
Plaintiff has proved, by a preponderance of the expert medical testimony, that the result probably 
would have been different if the Hospital had conformed to the standard of care as defined in these 
Instructions, then Plaintiff has not proved that any injury or loss sustained by her was proximately 
caused by the conduct of the Defendant. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
On the Special Verdict which will be submitted to you, you will find that question number 
five deals with the issue of damages. The following instruction is given to you to help answer that 
question, if it becomes necessary for you to do so. 
A party who is injured as a proximate cause of negligence of another party is entitled to 
a monetary award which will fairly and adequately compensate the injured party for the injury and 
damage sustained. The plaintiff in this case has the burden of proving her damage by a 
preponderance of the evidence. You are not permitted to award damages for detriment which, 
although possible, are remote or based on conjecture or speculation. 
Further, the fact that I have instructed you on the issue of damages is not to be taken as 
an indication that I either believe or do not believe that the Plaintiff is entitled to damages. 
With that in mind, there are two kinds of damage: 
Special Damage: 
Special damages are those that are alleged to have been sustained in reference to the special 
circumstances of the plaintiff. They include the reasonable value of medical and nursing care, 
both medical and non-medical services and supplies and tools reasonably required and actually 
given in the treatment and/or care of the plaintiff and the reasonable value of such items that more 
probably than not will be required and given in the future. 
Special damages also include lost earnings and loss of future earning capacity or loss of 
earning power. 
In awarding special damages, you may consider the reasonable value of working time lost 
to date. In determining this amount, you should consider (1) evidence of the plaintiffs earning 
capacity; (2) earnings; (3) how the plaintiff ordinarily was occupied; and (4) what the plaintiff was 
reasonably likely to have earned in the time lost if the plaintiff has not been injured. 
If you find the plaintiff has suffered a loss of earning capacity, you should award the 
present case value of earning capacity reasonably likely to be lost in the future as a result of the 
injury in question. 
Special damages also include the reasonable value of the loss of employee-related benefits, 
such as loss of or reduction in retirement benefits, health benefits, paid vacation, employee stock 
options and savings benefits and the like. 
General Damages: 
In awarding damages, you may consider any pain, discomfort, and suffering, both mental 
and physical, its probable duration and severity, and the extent to which the plaintiff has been 
prevented from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as previously enjoyed. You may also consider 
whether any of the above will, more likely than not, continue in the future. If so, you may award 
such damages as will fairly and justly compensate the plaintiff for them. 
No definite standard or method of calculation is prescribed by law to fix reasonable 
compensation for pain and suffering. Nor is the opinion of any witness required as to the amount 
of such reasonable compensation. Furthermore, the argument of counsel as to the amount of 
damages is not evidence of reasonable compensation. In making an award for pain and suffering, 
you shall exercise your authority with calm and reasonable judgment, and the damages you fix 
shall be just and reasonable in light of the evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO- 1 \ 
The law forbids you to decide any issue in this case by resorting to chance. If you decide 
that a party is entitled to recover, you may then determine the amount of damages to be awarded. 
It would be unlawful for you to agree in advance to take the independent estimate of each juror, 
then total the estimates, draw an average from the total, and to make the average the amount of 
your award. Each of you may express your own independent judgment as to what the amount 
should be. It is your duty to thoughtfully consider the amounts suggested, test them in the light 
of the law and the evidence and, after due consideration, determine which, if any, of such 
individual estimates is proper. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In this case you may not include in any award to Plaintiff any sum for the purpose of 
punishing the Defendant, or to make an example of it for the public good or to prevent other 
injuries. Such damages would be punitive rather than compensatory, and the law does not 
authorize punitive damages in this action. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2^> 
The amount of damages for any loss to be suffered in the future would not be the present 
payment of the total of such damages, but must be discounted to the present cash value of such 
future benefit. Therefore, in determining the present value of any future benefit lost to the 
Plaintiff as a result of the injury, you should calculate the same on the basis that any sum you 
might award will be invested with reasonable wisdom and frugality, and that all of it, except the 
amount currently needed to compensate for the loss sustained, will be kept so invested as to yield 
a rate of return consistent with reasonable security. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
It has never been my intention to give any hint that you should return one verdict or 
another in this case. Please understand that I do not wish in any way to influence your verdict. 
It would be improper for me to do so. Deciding a proper verdict is exclusively your job. I cannot 
participate in that decision in any way. Please disregard anything that I may have said or done 
if it made you think that I preferred one side over another, that I believed one witness over 
another, or that I considered any piece of evidence more important than another. 
You are the exclusive judges of the facts and the evidence. It is your duty to render a just 
verdict based upon the facts and the evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Your attitude and conduct at the outset of your deliberations is very important. It will not 
be productive for any of you, upon entering the jury room, to make an emphatic expression of 
your opinion on the case, or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When that 
happens, your sense of pride may be aroused and you may hesitate to recede from an announced 
position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates in this 
matter, but are judges. Your deliberations in the jury room are for the ascertainment and 
declaration of the truth and the administration of justice. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
It is your duty to make findings of fact as to the questions I will submit to you. In making 
your findings of fact, you should bear in mind that the burden of proving any disputed fact rests 
upon the party claiming the fact to be true, and that fact must be proved by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 
This is a civil action and six members of the jury may find and return a verdict. At least 
six jurors must agree on the answer to each question, but they need not be the same six on each 
question. As soon as six or more of you have agreed on the answer to each question, have the 
verdict signed and dated by your foreperson and then return it to this room. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Upon retiring to the jury room you will select one of you to act as foreperson, who will 
preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict to which you agree. The foreperson should 
not dominate the jury, but the foreperson's opinion should be given the same weight as the 
opinions of the other members of the jury. 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LORIHAASE, 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. No. 98-0800377 
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER, Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
Defendant. 
We, the jurors empaneled in the above-entitled case, answer the questions put to us as 
follows: 
1. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Dr Thomas Hawkes was 
physically impaired at the time he operated on Lori Haase9 
Yes 
No 
If you answered question number 1 "no" then do not answer the 
following questions. Have your foreperson sign the verdict and return to 
the courtroom. 
2. Do vou find from a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Thomas Hawkes' physical 
impairment was a proximate cause of injury to Lori Haase9 
Yes 
No 
If you answered question number 2 "no" then do not answer the 
remaining questions. Have your foreperson sign the verdict and return 
to the courtroom. 
3. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Ashley Valley Medical Center, 
through its administrators, knew or should have known that Dr. Thomas Hawkes was physically 
impaired at the time he operated on Lori Haase? 
Yes 
No 
If you answered question number 3 "no" then do not answer the 
remaining questions. Have your foreperson sign the verdict and return 
to the courtroom. 
4. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Ashley Valley Medical Center, 
acting through its administrators, was negligent in not restricting Dr. Hawkes" operating privileges at 
the time he operated on Lori Haase? 
Yes 
No 
If, and only if, you answered questions numbered 1 through 4 
"yes," then answer the following question. 
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5. What sum of money do you find from a preponderance of the evidence will fairly and 
adequately compensate Lori Haase for her injuries: 
Special damages $ 
General damages $ 
TOTAL $ 
DATED this day of February, 2002. 
Jury Foreperson 
N:\10749\151\MN\SPECVERD.DWS 
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ROBERT R. HARRISON (A7878) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Ashley Valley Medical Center 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LORI HAASE, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER 
and COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY 
MEDICAL CENTER and JOHN DOE 
DEFENDANTS 1 THROUGH 10, 
Defendants. 
Pursuant to Rule 4-502, Code of Judicial Administration, Robert R. Harrison of Snow, 
Chnstensen & Martineau, attorneys for Defendant Ashley Valley Medical Center, hereby cenifies 
that he served upon all counsel of record the following: 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL 
VERDICT and SPECIAL VERDICT. 
No. 98-0800377 
Judge Boyd Bunnell 
DATED this / day of March, 2002. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
<d^^^-t^r^3 <pbwi^'>~\ 
Robert R. Harrison 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I state that I am employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
attorneys for defendants herein; that I served the attached CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (Case 
Number 98-0800377, Eighth Judicial District Court in and for Uintah County) upon the parties 
listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Douglas G. Mortensen 
Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Honorable Douglas L Cornaby (Original and one copy) 
3612 North 2900 East 
Layton, Utah 84040 
and causing the same to be hand delivered on the / day of March, 2002. 
N \10749\151\CERTSERV.WPD 
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Tab 13 
EXHIBIT 13 
Douglas G. Mortensen, USB #2329 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C. 
648 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone (801)363-2244 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LORI HAASE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER 
AND COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY 
MEDICAL CENTER, AND JOHN DOE 
DEFENDANTS 1 THROUGH 10 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S SUBMISSION 
OF PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Civil No. 98-0800377 
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
Plaintiff Lori Haase submits to the court the attached proposed jury 
instruction to be submitted to the jury. Plaintiff asks leave to reserve the right to submit 
additional instructions and/or withdraw instruction she has submitted based on the 
actual evidence presented at trial. 
z DATED this _[_ day of February, 2002. 
JEPPSON, P.C. 
Attorneys 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
certify that on the day of February, 2002 I caused to be served via the method 
indicated a copy of the foregoing to the following: 
Robert R. Harrison 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Jaryl L. Renctorer 
EppersopK&lRencher 
5th Floor Crandall Building 
IpyWest 100 South 
£alt Lake City, Utah 84111-1566 
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby 
Eighth District Court Judge 
3612 North 2900 East 
Layton, UT 84040 
• 
• 
D 
• 
/ 
D 
• 
• 
• 
D 
• 
• 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile - 363-0400 
Hand-Delivered 
Federal Express 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile - 983-9808 
Hand-Delivered 
Federal Express 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
Hand-Delivered 
Federal Express 
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Lori L i m a / 
AssistaXAttomey General 
16CT£ast 300 South 
P/5. Box 140872 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872 
/ 
• 
• D 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
Hand-Delivered 
Federal Express 
A 
^' V 
Haase\AshleyValley.PldgJury instructions 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES 
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the 
evidence. In judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the witnesses, you have a right 
to take into consideration any biases, any interest in the result, and any motive or lack of motive 
to testify fairly. You may consider the witnesses' conduct while testifying before you, the 
reasonableness of their statements, their apparent frankness or candor, or the want of it, their 
opportunity to know, their ability to understand, and their capacity to remember. You should 
consider these matters you believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the 
witnesses' statements. 
References: 
MUJI 2.9 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS 
You may believe that a witness, on some former occasion, made statements inconsistent 
with that witness' testimony given here in this case. 
That does not necessarily mean that you are required to entirely disregard the present 
testimony. The effect of such evidence upon the credibility of the witness is for you to determine. 
References: 
MUJI2.10 
INSTRUCTION NO-
EFFECT OF WILLFULLY FALSE TESTIMONY 
If you believe any witness has willfully testified falsely as to any material matter, you may 
disregard the entire testimony of that witness, except as that witness may have been 
corroborated by other credible evidence. 
References: 
MUJI2.11 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY 
In the present action, certain testimony has been read to you by way of deposition. You 
are not to discount this testimony for the sole reason that it comes to you in the form of a 
deposition. It is entitled to the same consideration as if the witness had personally appeared. 
References: 
MUJI2.12 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
OUT OF STATE/TOWN EXPERTS 
The fact that an expert witness resides or pursues his or her profession in 
another state or community should not effect the weight you give that witnesses1 
testimony. A party may rely upon qualified experts from other states and countries in 
presenting evidence to the jury. 
MUJI 6.30 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
CONFLICT BETWEEN MEDICAL EXPERTS 
In resolving any conflict that may exist in the testimony of medical experts, you 
may compare and weigh the opinion of one expert against that of another. In doing 
this, you may consider the relative qualifications and credibility of the expert witnesses, 
as well as the reasons for each opinion and the facts and other matters on which 
opinions are based. 
MUJI 6.31 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
INTRODUCTORY INSTRUCTION ON NEGLIGENCE 
In this case the plaintiff claims the defendant was negligent in failing to protect 
her from injury by Dr. Hawkes. In particular, the plaintiff claims that the defendant 
negligently extended hospital operating room privileges to Dr. Hawkes and/or failed to 
exercise reasonable care in seeing that patients treated by Dr. Hawkes at the hospital 
received appropriate care and treatment from a competent, non impaired surgeon. The 
plaintiff asserts that the defendant knew or should have known that at the time Dr. 
Hawkes performed surgery on her he was not in a fit condition to perform that surgery 
and that the injury inflicted during that surgery and the damages flowing therefrom 
would not have occurred but for the negligent, reckless or otherwise wrongful acts and 
omissions of Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center in extending hospital operating 
room privileges to Dr. Hawkes and/or in otherwise failing to exercise reasonable care to 
see that patients treated by him received appropriate surgical care and treatment. 
To return a verdict for the plaintiff, you must find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that: 
1. The defendant was negligent in one or more of the particulars alleged by 
the plaintiff; and 
2. The defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's 
injuries. 
If you find in favor of the plaintiff on those two questions, you must then decide 
the amount of the damages suffered by the plaintiff. 
MUJI 3.1; See also JIFU 2.5 (1957) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR NEGLIGENT CONDUCT 
A hospital has a duty to use reasonable care to protect patients being treated at 
the hospital from injury. "Negligence" simply means the failure to use reasonable care. 
The amount of care that is considered "reasonable" depends on the situation. 
You must decide what a prudent hospital with similar knowledge and/or with access to 
information available here would do in a similar situation. Negligence may arise in 
acting or in failing to act. 
A party whose injuries or damages are caused by another party's negligent 
conduct may recover compensation from the negligent party for those injuries or 
damages. 
MUJI 3.2 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
AMOUNT OF CARE REQUIRED VARIES WITH CONDITIONS 
The amount of care that is considered "reasonable" depends on the situation. 
Some situations require more caution because an institution of ordinary prudence 
would understand that more danger is involved. In other situations, less care is 
expected, such as when the risk of danger is low or when the situation happens so 
suddenly that a person of ordinary prudence would not appreciate the danger. 
MUJI 3.6 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
AMOUNT OF CAUTION REQUIRED FOR DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES 
Because of the great danger involved in human surgery, those who are engaged 
in providing facilities for such surgery are held to a higher-than-ordinary standard of 
care and must exercise extra caution for the protection of patients undergoing surgery. 
The greater the danger, the greater the care that must be used. 
MUJI 3.8 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
ROLE OF CUSTOM IN JUDGING BEHAVIOR 
When deciding whether a corporation is negligent, you may consider customs of 
behavior, such as business customs or industry customs, However, following a custom 
does not necessarily mean a corporation exercised ordinary care. It is merely a factor 
you may consider. A custom or standard may be negligent in and of itself. 
MUJI3..10 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
VIOLATION OF INDUSTRY STANDARD 
A violation of an industry standard intended to protect patients from harm is 
evidence of negligence if it is shown that: 
1. The person injured belongs to a class of people the standard intended to 
protect; and 
2. The standard intended to protect against the type of harm which in fact 
occurred as a result of the violation. 
MUJI3.11 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
NEGLIGENCE OF COMMISSION VERSUS OMISSION 
Negligence is of two kinds. The first kind is the doing of something that an 
ordinarily careful and prudent person or, in this case, hospital, would not have done 
under the same or similar circumstances; the second kind is the omission to do 
something than an ordinarily careful and prudent person or, in this case, hospital, would 
have done in the same situation. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
NON NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF 
You are instructed as a matter of law that the plaintiff, Lori Haase, was not 
negligent. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
DUTY OF HOSPITAL TO COMPLY WITH STANDARD OF CARE 
A hospital is required to exercise the same degree of care ordinarily possessed 
and used by other hospitals in good standing. The law requires a hospital to exercise 
the degree of care that other qualified hospitals would ordinarily exercise under the 
same circumstances. 
MUJI 6.1 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
DUTY OF HOSPITAL TOWARD PATIENT 
It is the duty of a hospital toward a person received as a patient to use 
reasonable care in the selection of both its employees and its staff physicians and 
surgeons and in otherwise providing for the needs of the patient. 
If the hospital undertakes, through the agency of any person in its employ, to 
provide to the patient the services of a surgeon, the hospital's duty is to perform such 
services in accordance with the standard of care required by law of such surgeon. 
MUJI 6.20 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
CORPORATION'S LIABILITY FOR ITS EMPLOYEES' 
NEGLIGENCE AND BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE 
In this case, Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center leased certain employees to 
Dr. Hawkes. While those employees were performing services for the benefit of Dr. 
Hawkes and his medical practice, they remained employees of Columbia Ashley Valley 
Medical Center. If you find that any such employee breached a duty to act in the best 
interests of patients of Columbia Ashley Valley Hospital, either by acting or failing to act, 
such breach of duty is imputed to the medical center itself. Columbia Ashley Valley 
Medical Center is liable for the acts and omissions of its employees under the Doctrine 
of Respondeat Superior, including the employees it leased to Dr. Hawkes. 
MUJI 25.7 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
CORPORATION ACTS THROUGH ITS AGENTS 
Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center is a corporation and, as such, can act 
only through its officers and employees, and others designated by it as its agents. 
Any act or omission of an officer, employee or agent of a corporation, in the 
performance of the duties or within the scope of the authority of the officer, employee or 
agent, is the act or omission of the corporation. 
MUJI 25.1 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL FOR ACTS OF AGENT 
The acts or omissions of an agent are, in contemplation of law, the acts and 
omissions of the agent's principal, so long as they are done within the scope of the 
agent's employment. If, therefore, an employee of Columbia Ashley Valley Medical 
Center was acting within the scope of his or her employment at the time the events in 
question occurred, then Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center is responsible for such 
conduct. 
J1FU 10.1 cf BAJI 54-A See CJS 11.82 Agency, Section 91 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
SCOPE OF AGENTS AUTHORITY DEFINED 
In order for Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center to be held responsible for the 
act or acts of one or more of its employees, the act or acts must be within the scope of 
the agent's employment authority either expressed or implied. However, it is not 
necessary that the specific act, or failure to act, be expressly authorized by the 
employer to bring it within the scope of the agent's employment. An act is within the 
scope of an agent's authority 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
SCOPE OF AGENT'S AUTHORITY DEFINED 
In order for Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center to be held responsible for the 
act or acts of one or more of its employees, the act or acts must be within the scope of 
the agent's employment authority either expressed or implied. However, it is not 
necessary that the specific act, or failure to act, be expressly authorized by the 
employer to bring it within the scope of the agent's employment. An act is within the 
scope of an agent's authority if it is done while the agent is doing anything which his or 
her contract of employment expressly or impliedly authorizes him or her to do or which 
would be reasonably incidental to his or her employment. 
JIFU 10.2 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
AGENCY ESTABLISHED 
It has been established that Ron Perry, Sherry Stettler and , , 
, were acting as agents for Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center and 
within the scope of their employment at the time the events in question occurred. If you 
find, therefore, that any alleged act or omission of any of these persons occurred, such 
act or omission is attributable or chargeable to the employer, Columbia Ashley Valley 
Medical Center. 
JIFU 10.3 
SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT 
INSTRUCTION NO. _ 
Scope of employment refers to those acts which are so closely connected with 
what the employee is employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that 
they may be regarded as methods, even though quite improper ones, of carrying out 
the objectives of the employment. In general, the servant or employee's conduct is 
within the scope of/her employment if it is of the kind of whicfy^she is employed to 
perform, occurs substantially within the authorized limits of time and space, and is 
actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer. 
References: 
Burknerv. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989); 
W. Keetori, Prosser & Keeton On The Law of Torts Section 70, at 502 (5th 
Edition 1984); 
Restatement (Second) of Agency Section 228 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT 
An employer is liable for the act or omission of its employee when the employee 
is acting within the scope of the employee's employment authority at the time of the act 
or omission. An employee is acting within the scope of the employee's employment 
authority if each of the following is true: 
1. The employee is engaged in conduct of the general kind the employee 
was employed to perform; in other words, the employee was engaged in 
carrying out the duties assigned by the employer, as opposed to being 
wholly involved in a personal endeavor; and 
2. The employee's conduct occurs within working hours, and within the 
normal work place; and 
3. The employee's conduct was motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of 
serving the employer's interest. 
If you find that, at the time of the act or omission in question, the employee 
deviated from the employer's express or implied orders or wishes or attended to 
business other than that of the employer, but was serving the employer's interests at 
the same time, the employee was acting in the scope or course of employment and the 
employer shall be held liable for the acts or omissions of the employee. 
MUJI 25.6 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICIAN PREDICATED ON LACK OF SUPERVISION 
A hospital owes to its patients a duty, irrespective of whether the physician who 
treated the patient was its employee or agent or was an independent contractor, to 
review, monitor and supervise the care and treatment administered within its facility. If 
you find from the evidence that Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center deviated from 
the standards of care required of it in the performance of this duty and that the injury to 
Mrs. Haase resulted from such breach of duty, you must find the hospital liable. 
Kellevv.Wiqgin. 724 SW2nd 443 (Ark. 1987); Traxler v. Varadv. 12 Cal App. 4th 1321, 
16 Cal Rptr 2d 297 (1993); Camacho v. Mennonite Bd of Missions. 703 P2d 598 (Colo. 
1985); Cronicv. Doud. 523 NE 2d 176 (III. 1988); Yanev v. McCrav Mem. HOSD. 496 
NE2d 135 (Ind. App. 1986); Siblev v. Board of Supervisors of Louisana State Univ.. 446 
S2d 760 (LA. App. 1983); Oehler v. Humana. Inc.. 775 P2d 1271 (Nev. 1989); Marek v. 
Professional Health Services. Inc.. 432 Atl 2d 538 (NJ. Super. 1981); Schoenina v. 
Gravs Harbor Community HOSP.. 698 P2d 593 (Wash. 1985). 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICIAN PREDICATED ON NEGLIGENCE 
IN EXTENDING AND/OR CONTINUING STAFF PRIVILEGES 
The law requires a hospital to screen its medical staff to ensure that only 
competent physicians are permitted to treat its patients. If, therefore, you find from the 
evidence that Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center knew or ought to have known 
that Dr. Hawkes' condition or propensities made him a danger to patients and that but 
for Ashley Valley's failure to remove him, failure to adequately monitor and supervise 
him or failure to cease extending him privileges to operate in the hospital Mrs. Haase's 
injury would have not occurred, you must find for the plaintiff against the hospital. 
Townsend v. Kiracoff. 545 F. Supp. 465 (D. Colo. 1982); Focke v. U.S.. 597 F. Supp. 
1325 (D. Kan. 1982); Jackson v. Power. 743 P2d 1376 (Alaska 1987); Ziealerv. 
Superior Court of Pima County. 656 P2d 1251 (Ariz. 1982); Park North General 
Hospital v. Hickman. 705 SW2d 262 (Texas App. 1985); Alexander v. Gonser. 711 P2d 
347 (Wash. 1985); Greenwood v. Wierdsma. 741 P2d 1079 (Wyo. 1987). 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICIAN PREDICATED ON OSTENSIBLE AGENCY 
In this action there is evidence tending to show that Dr. Hawkes was not an 
employee of Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center but was an independent 
contractor. Should you determine this to have been so, if you find from the evidence 
that the hospital held itself out to the public as an institution furnishing doctors, staff and 
facilities for the care of the public, and that Mrs. Haase undertook treatment by Dr. 
Hawkes by reason of reasonable reliance of such a holding out, your verdict on the 
question of liability for any resulting injury should be for the plaintiff against the hospital. 
Jackson v. Power, 743 P2d 1376 (Alaska 1987); Gilbert v. Sycamore Mun. Hosp.. 622 
NE 2d 788 (III. 1993); Golden v. Kishwaukee Community Health Services Center. 645 
NE2d 319 (III. App. 1994); Adamski v. Tacoma General Hospital. 579 P2d 970 (Wash. 
INTRODUCTORY INSTRUCTION ON PROXIMATE CAUSE 
In my introductory statement to you on the concept of negligence, you will recall 
that I informed you that in order for any party to prevail on a claim of negligence against 
another party, that party must prove that the other party's negligence was a proximate 
cause of the injury complained of. I will now explain to you the concept of proximate 
cause. 
A proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and continuance 
sequence, produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred. A 
proximate cause is one which sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury. 
References: 
MUJI 3.13 (1993) (Modified by adding 1st paragraph to connect Causation to 
Negligence) 
Proximate Cause Established by Negligence 
Which Increases Risk of Harm 
Instruction No. 
Proximate cause may be established by evidence that the negligence of a party 
was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury or in increasing the risk of harm 
to the plaintiff. 
References: 
George v. LDS Hospital, 797 P2d 1117 (Ut App 1990) 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 323 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
CONCURRENT PROXIMATE CAUSES 
There may be more than one proximate cause of the same injury. If the 
negligence a person and a corporation combines to produce an injury, and the 
negligence of each of them is a proximate cause of the injury, then the person and the 
corporation must share liability for the resulting injury, in proportion to their individual 
negligence. 
MUJI3.15 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
RES IPSA LOQUITUR 
You may draw an inference of negligence on the part of a physician or hospital if 
each of three elements is established by a preponderance of the evidence: 
1. That the patient's injury was of a kind which, in the ordinary course of 
events, would not have happened had due care been observed; and 
2. That the patient's actions were not responsible for the injury; and 
3. That the cause of the injury was under the exclusive management or 
control of the physician or hospital. 
If you find each of the foregoing elements by a preponderance of the evidence, 
then negligence on the part of the physician or hospital may be inferred and would be 
sufficient to support a finding of negligence. The defendant may introduce evidence to 
rebut the inference of negligence. It is your duty to resolve conflicts in the evidence. 
MUJI 6.32 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
PROXIMATE CAUSE 
A proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and continuous 
sequence, produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred. A 
proximate cause is one which sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury. 
To find "proximate cause," you must first find a cause and effect relationship 
between the negligence and plaintiff's injury. But cause and effect alone is not enough. 
For injuries to be proximately caused by negligence, two other factors must be present: 
1. The negligence must have played a substantial role in causing the 
injuries; and 
2. A reasonable person could foresee that injury could result from the 
negligent behavior. 
MUJI 3.13 and 3.14, combined and modified 
INSTRUCTION NO. y 
RES IPSA LOQUITUR X 
You may draw an inference of negligence on the pa^of a physician or hospital if 
each of three elements is established by a preponderance of the evidence: 
1. That the patient's injury was of a kirfd which, in the ordinary course of 
events, would not have happened had due care been observed; and 
2. That the patient's action^were not responsible for the injury; and 
3. That the cause of thpinjury was under the exclusive management or 
control of the physician or hospital. 
If you find each of tbre foregoing elements by a preponderance of the evidence, 
then negligence on theypart of the physician or hospital may be inferred and would be 
sufficient to support^ finding of negligence. The defendant may introduce evidence to 
/ 
rebut the inference of negligence. It is your duty to resolve conflicts in the evidence. 
MUJI 6.32 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
INTRODUCTORY INSTRUCTION ON DAMAGES 
If you find the issues in favor of Lori Haase and against Columbia Ashley Valley 
Medical Center, then it is your duty to award Lori Haase such damages that you find 
from a preponderance of the evidence will fairly and adequately compensate her for the 
injury and damage sustained. 
MUJI 27.1 
GENERAL DAMAGES 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In awarding damages, you may consider any pain, discomfort, and suffering, 
both mental and physical, its probable duration and severity, and the extent to which the 
plaintiff has been prevented from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as previously 
enjoyed. You may also consider whether any of the above will, more likely than not, 
continue in the future. If so, you may award such damages as will fairly and justly 
compensate the plaintiff for them. Such damages are called general damages. 
No definite standard or method of calculation is prescribed by law to fix 
reasonable compensation for pain and suffering. Nor is the opinion of any witness 
required as to the amount of such reasonable compensation. Furthermore, the 
argument of counsel as to the amount of damages is not evidence of reasonable 
compensation. In making an award for pain and suffering, you shall exercise your 
authority with calm and reasonable judgment, and the damiages you fix shall be just and 
reasonable in light of the evidence. 
References: 
MUJI 27.2 (1993) (Modified) 
SPECIAL DAMAGES 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The law also allows you to award special damages. Special damages are those 
that are alleged to have been sustained in reference to the special circumstances of the 
plaintiff. They include the reasonable value of medical and nursing care, both medical 
and non-medical services and supplies and tools reasonably required and actually 
given in the treatment and/or care of the plaintiff and the reasonable value of such 
items that more probably than not will be required and given in the future. 
Special damages also include lest wagec and loss of future earning capacity or 
loss of earning power. 
In awarding special damages, you may consider the reasonable value of working 
time lost to date. In determining this amount, you should consider (1) evidence of the 
plaintiff's earning capacity; (2) earnings; (3) how the plaintiff ordinarily was occupied; 
and (4) what the plaintiff was reasonably likely to have earned in the time lost if the 
plaintiff had not been injured. 
If you find the plaintiff has suffered a loss of earning capacity, you should award 
the present cash value of earning capacity reasonably likely to be lost in the future as a 
result of the injury in question. 
Special damages also include the reasonable value of the loss of employee-
related benefits, such as loss of or reduction in retirement benefits, health benefits, paid 
vacation, employee stock options and sayings benefits and the like. 
Reference: 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 353, 354 (5th ed. 1979) 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 396 (7th ed. 1999) 
MUJl 27.3 (1993) 
MUJl 27.4 & 27.5 (1993) (modified) 
AMOUNT OF DAMAGE NEED NOT BE 
PROVED WITH PRECISION 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Although an award of damages may not be based only on speculation, some 
degree of uncertainty in the evidence of damages will not relieve a defendant from 
recompensing a wronged plaintiff. As long as there is some rational basis for a damage 
award, it is the wrongdoer who must assume the risk of some uncertainty. Where there 
is evidence of the fact of damage, a defendant may not escape liability because the 
amount of damage cannot be proved with precision. The amount of damages may be 
based on approximations if the fact of damage is established and the approximations 
are based on reasonable assumptions or projections. 
References: 
Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 
1985) 
Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 957 (Utah 1983) 
Sampson V. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1007 (Utah Ct App. 1989) 
DAMAGE AWARD NOT TO BE DIMINISHED 
BY COLLATERAL SOURCE PAYMENTS, IF ANY. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Any fact or inference in the evidence that any portion of Mrs. H^xa^e 
damages may have been paid by some person or entity other than Mrs. f W \ $ C is not 
to be considered by you or used to diminish the damage award you make, if any. The 
fact, if it be a fact, that any of the plaintiffs claimed expenses or damages were or may 
be paid by some source other than the plaintiffs own funds does not effect the plaintiffs 
right to recover for such expenses or damages. 
It is the court's duty following trial to see that what other damages are awarded 
are allocated or distributed to the party who, by law, is entitled to receive them. You are 
instructed not to concern yourself with such matters. They will be handled by the court 
in due course following trial. This instruction applies with respect to past, present and 
future damages. 
References: 
MUJI 14.16 
MUJI 27.3, comment to MUJI 27.3 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (UCA §78-14-1 et seq.) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
FAILURE TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE 
In this case you have heard mention of drug screen tests administered to Dr. 
Hawkes prior to his perform surgeries at the hospital. You have also heard mention of 
a report from a surgeon in Texas who operated on Dr. Hawkes' neck in the Spring of 
1995. You have also heard mention of Dr. Hawkes having received treatment on more 
than one occasion in the emergency room of Columbia Ashley Valley Hospital. Finally, 
there is evidence that the surgery Dr. Hawkes performed on Mrs. Haases' knee was 
videotaped. Where evidence which would properly part of a case is within the control of 
the party in whose interests it naturally would be to produce it, and without satisfactory 
explanation the party fails to produce it, you may infer that the evidence would be 
unfavorable to that party if the party had produced it. In other words, the failure of 
Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center to produce evidence on the matters in question 
or to provide a satisfactory explanation for its failure to do so permits you do believe 
that had the missing evidence been produced, it would have been unfavorable to the 
hospital. 
Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Company. 876 P2d 415 (Utah App. 1994); Nation-wide 
Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs. Inc. 692 F2d 214, 217-18 (First Cir. 1982); National 
Association of Radiation Survivors v. Turnaae. 115 F.R.D., 543, 557, 58 (N.D. Cal. 
1987); Williams, et al. v. Washington Hospital Center. 601 A.2d 28, 31 (D.C. Col. 1991) 
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PRODUCE 
AVAILABLE STRONGER EVIDENCE 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
If you should find that it was within the power of a party to produce stronger and 
more satisfactory evidence than that which was offered on a material point, you may 
view with distrust any weaker and less satisfactory evidence actually offered by him or 
her on that point, unless such failure is satisfactorily explained. 
References: 
JIFU3.13;BOJ130; 
Cram v. Reynolds, 55 Utah 384, 186 P. 100. 
WHEN UNFAVORABLE PRESUMPTION 
IS JUSTIFIED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that the highest proof of which any fact is susceptible is that 
which presents itself to the senses of the court or jury. Neglect, then, to produce such 
evidence by any party who has it in his power justifies an unfavorable presumption 
against that party and you are at liberty to draw an unfavorable inference against such 
party if you think it warranted under all the circumstances and believe such party has 
failed to produce any such evidence. 
References: 
State v. Campbell, 116 Utah 74. 208 P.2d 530 (Utah 1949) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Punitive damages may be awarded if compensatory or general damages are 
awarded and it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or 
omissions of the responsible party are the result of willful and malicious intentional 
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference 
toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others. 
You are instructed that under current Utah law in any judgment where punitive 
damages are awarded and paid, fifty percent of the amount of the punitive damages in 
excess of $20,000 shall, after payment of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to the 
State Treasurer for deposit into the State's General Fund. 
UCA §78-18-1 (1)(a)and(3)(1991). 
